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Abstract 
 
This study examines the complex, important, yet unclear responses to terrorism within the 
framework of international law. The question of who is a terrorist depends to a significant 
extent on the subjective outlook of the definer and many researchers tend to believe that an 
objective and internationally accepted definition of terrorism can never be agreed upon. The 
aims of terrorism and guerrilla warfare may well be the same, but they are distinguished from 
each other by the targets of their operations. A lawful cause does not act to legitimate the 
means and methods used; therefore, this research examines, in particular, the jus ad bellum 
and the jus in bello applicable when peoples actively practise their right to self-determination, 
and the relationship between the struggle for self-determination and terrorism.  
The thesis explores ideas and disagreements over definitions of what constitutes terrorist 
activity. Such problems are tracked by discussing the background and history of terrorism 
and responses to terrorism, and the thesis considers how these manifests in debates around 
definitions of armed conflict and their relationship to war crimes, and the reasons which 
made it impossible to include terrorism within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court.  
Finally, the thesis considers the unfolding developments around the problem of foreign 
terrorist fighters, and UN Security Council policy and practice on this issue including 
concerning how the law seems to be changing in this field and what the implications might be 
for humanitarian action. Furthermore, this thesis discusses the question of what should be 
done to address the threats caused by the return of foreign terrorist fighters and whether the 
measures issued by international bodies such as Security Council Resolution 2178 are 
sufficient. The concluding part of the thesis makes recommendations aimed at improving the 
international legal framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
Table of Contents 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ....................................................................................................... 3 
ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................................. 4 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................ 5 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ............................................................................................... 10 
CHAPTER ONE .................................................................................................................... 12 
INTRODUCTION & RESEARCH CONTEXT ................................................................. 12 
1.0 Overview & Background .......................................................................................................................... 12 
1.1 Inspiration and motivation for the topic .................................................................................................. 16 
1.2 Research statement and questions ........................................................................................................... 16 
1.3 Hypotheses ................................................................................................................................................ 17 
1.4 Research Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 19 
CHAPTER TWO ................................................................................................................... 24 
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF TERRORISM ....................................................... 24 
2.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 24 
2.1 The meaning of Terrorism ....................................................................................................................... 24 
2.2 A brief historical background .................................................................................................................. 26 
2.2.1 Pre-Modern Terrorism (Ancient and Medieval Terrorism) ................................................................... 26 
2.2.2 Modern Terrorism (French Revolution, Colonial and Leftist Terrorism Era) ........................................ 29 
2.2.3 Post-Modern Terrorism (Radical Religious Terrorism Era) .................................................................. 33 
2.3 The nature of terrorism ............................................................................................................................ 35 
2.4 Conceptual and Legal difficulties in defining Terrorism ........................................................................ 36 
2.5 Characteristics of International Terrorism ............................................................................................. 40 
2.6 The Importance of Defining Terrorism ................................................................................................... 41 
2.7 Understanding the causes of Terrorism ................................................................................................... 42 
2.8 Terrorism and other interchangeably used concepts: a comparative analysis....................................... 46 
2.8.1 Freedom Fighting and Terrorism ......................................................................................................... 46 
2.8.2 Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism .......................................................................................................... 50 
2.8.2.1 Goals of Terrorism along with Guerrilla Warfare .......................................................................... 51 
6 
 
2.8.2.2 The Involvement of States in Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare ..................................................... 52 
2.8.2.3 Guerrilla Warfare as a Particular Science ...................................................................................... 53 
2.8.3 Terrorism or National Liberation Movement ........................................................................................ 53 
2.9 A New Conceptualization for the 21st Century ....................................................................................... 54 
2.10 Targets and Responses............................................................................................................................ 55 
2.11 International policy against Terrorism/ Guerrilla Warfare/ Insurgency ............................................. 56 
CHAPTER THREE ............................................................................................................... 61 
THE QUALIFICATIONS OF TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION 
MOVEMENTS ....................................................................................................................... 61 
3.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 61 
3.1 The necessary distinction between Terrorism and Armed Conflict ....................................................... 66 
3.2 The inapplicability of jus in bello to terrorism ........................................................................................ 67 
3.3 Legal criteria of Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) ................................................................ 68 
3.3.1. Control of territories by armed combatants ......................................................................................... 68 
3.3.2 Intensity of the conflict ........................................................................................................................ 69 
3.4 The distinction between non-State entities and terrorist groups ............................................................ 70 
3.4.1. The belligerents of non-state entities ................................................................................................... 70 
3.4.2. The armed organization of the belligerents.......................................................................................... 71 
3.5 Terrorist acts as war crimes ..................................................................................................................... 72 
3.5.1 The war crimes of terrorism against the civilian population ................................................................. 73 
3.5.1.1 Serious violations of humanitarian law ......................................................................................... 73 
3.5.1.2. Serious consequences of acts of terrorism .................................................................................... 75 
3.5.2 The intentional character of war crimes of terrorism in the jurisprudence and statutes of International 
Criminal Jurisdictions................................................................................................................................... 76 
3.5.2.1. The criminalization of terrorism by the International Criminal Court ........................................... 76 
3.5.2.2 The criminalization of terrorism by ad hoc criminal tribunals ....................................................... 77 
3.6 The issue of the qualification of acts perpetrated by National Liberation Movements and the position 
of the Arab States ........................................................................................................................................... 79 
7 
 
3.7 The position of the Arab states in the struggle of peoples for self-determination in the face of the 
position of the West ........................................................................................................................................ 80 
3.7.1 The Arab distinction between terrorist acts and the struggle for national liberation .............................. 82 
3.7.1.1. The Arab position of the causes of terrorism in the face of the Israeli vision ................................ 83 
3.7.1.2. The Arab distinction between terrorism and the struggle for national liberation ........................... 85 
3.7.2 The Western refusal of any distinction between the terrorist acts of the liberation movements and 
international terrorism .................................................................................................................................. 87 
3.7.2.1. The European Union and the lists of terrorist organizations ......................................................... 88 
3.8 International Law and the Right to Self-determination .......................................................................... 89 
3.8.1 The Right to Self-determination, an essential principle of International Law ........................................ 90 
3.8.1.1. The Right of peoples to Self-determination .................................................................................. 90 
3.8.1.2. The Right to an independent state ................................................................................................ 91 
3.8.2 The legal obligations of the occupier in international law ..................................................................... 92 
3.8.2.1. Definition of the military occupation ........................................................................................... 93 
3.8.2.2. The legal regime of the military occupation ................................................................................. 93 
3.9 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................. 94 
CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................................. 96 
THE LEGAL ISSUES OF THE ACCURATELY CRIMINALISING 
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ...................................................................................... 96 
4.0 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 96 
4.1 The problem of the classification of terrorist offenses in international law ........................................... 97 
4.2 International Criminal Law in the Law of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and the Courts 
Established by the United Nations: Multiple Definitions of Terrorism ........................................................ 99 
4.3 Controversies over the question of the characterization of terrorism: an armed aggression? ............ 103 
4.3.1 Legal aspects of armed aggression in international law ...................................................................... 105 
4.3.1.1. Constitutive acts of armed aggression ........................................................................................ 105 
4.3.1.2. The direct or indirect involvement of one or more States ........................................................... 108 
4.3.2 Armed aggression by terrorist groups: a complex qualification .......................................................... 109 
4.3.2.1. A difficult qualification ............................................................................................................. 109 
4.3.2.2. New extension of international law ............................................................................................ 110 
8 
 
4.4 International Terrorism and Organized Crime .................................................................................... 112 
4.4.1 The necessary distinction between organized crime and terrorism ...................................................... 113 
4.4.1.1. Organized crime: legal definitions ............................................................................................. 113 
4.4.1.2. The constituent elements of organized crime ............................................................................. 114 
4.4.2 The relationship between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Complexity of Terrorist Financing 
Networks .................................................................................................................................................... 115 
4.4.2.1. Financial links ........................................................................................................................... 115 
4.4.2.2. The common money laundering networks .................................................................................. 116 
4.5 The qualifications of international courts .............................................................................................. 117 
4.6 Qualifications of the Military Criminal Court of Nuremberg and other International Criminal 
Tribunal ........................................................................................................................................................ 118 
4.7 The legal aspects of the attack constituting crime against humanity in international law .................. 119 
4.7.1. The exclusion of the condition of armed conflict............................................................................... 120 
4.7.2. Systematic attack against the civilian population............................................................................... 120 
4.8 Serious terrorist attacks classified as crimes against humanity ............................................................ 121 
4.8.1. Legal aspects of this classification .................................................................................................... 122 
4.8.2. The constituent elements of this qualification ................................................................................... 122 
4.9 The characterization of terrorism and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) ................................ 125 
4.9.1 The characterization of the attacks in the STL Statute ........................................................................ 126 
4.9.1.1. The description of the attacks committed in Lebanon ................................................................. 126 
4.9.1.2. The Agreement between Lebanon and the United Nations ......................................................... 128 
4.9.2 The framework of the STL as an international anti-terrorist court with a mixed jurisdiction ............... 129 
4.9.3 The definition of terrorism as an international crime by the STL ........................................................ 130 
4.10 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 132 
CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................................. 135 
THE CONCEPT OF FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS AT THE .......................... 135 
FRAMEWORK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ............................................................... 135 
5.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 135 
5.1 Security Council Resolution 2178 .......................................................................................................... 136 
5.2 The Definition of Foreign Terrorist Fighters......................................................................................... 142 
9 
 
5.3 The need to improve counter-terrorism measures ................................................................................ 147 
5.4 The legal status of foreign fighters in International Humanitarian Law ............................................. 149 
5.5 The concept of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and International Law ...................................................... 152 
5.6 The new criminal figures foreseen in the Res. 2178 (2014) ................................................................... 159 
5.7 The concept of prevention ...................................................................................................................... 160 
5.8 Further actions & new resolution by the UN Security Council ............................................................ 162 
5.9 Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................... 166 
CHAPTER SIX .................................................................................................................... 168 
SUMMARY & CONCLUSION .......................................................................................... 168 
6.0 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 168 
6.1 Key Findings of the Research ................................................................................................................. 174 
6.2 Recommendations ................................................................................................................................... 175 
6.3 Mapping of Contribution ....................................................................................................................... 177 
6.4. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 178 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................ 181 
 
Final word counts (84,628 words) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
List of Abbreviations 
 
 ANC  African National Congress  
 ANF Al-Nusrah Front 
 AP  Additional Protocol  
 ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations 
 ASP Assembly of States Parties  
 CIA Central Intelligence Agency 
 DoD Department of Defence 
 ECHR  European Court of Human Rights 
 ERP  People's Revolutionary Army 
 ETA Basque Country and Freedom 
 ETLO East Turkestan Liberation Organization 
 FATF Financial Action Task Force 
 FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 
 FNLA National Front for the Liberation of Angola 
 FSA Free Syrian Army  
 FTF  Foreign Terrorist Fighters 
 GA Res General Assembly Resolution   
 GC Geneva Conventions  
 HC Hague Convention 
 IAC International Armed Conflicts 
 ICC International Criminal Court 
 ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 ICI International Commission of Inquiry 
 ICJ International Court of Justice  
 ICPPT International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism  
 ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross  
 ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
 ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
 IDF Israeli Defence Forces 
 IHL International Humanitarian Law 
11 
 
 IHRL International Human Rights Law 
 ILC  International Law Commission 
 IMF International Monetary Fund 
 IMT International Military Tribunal 
 IO International Organisation  
 IRA Irish Republican Army 
 ISIL  Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant 
 ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
 LN League of Nations  
 LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
 MI5 Military Intelligence, Section 5 
 MPLA People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola   
 NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
 NGO Non-Governmental Organisation  
 NIAC   Non- International Armed Conflicts 
 PA Palestinian Authority 
 PKK  Kurdistan Workers' Party- in Kurdish -Party Krekarani Kurdistan  
 PLC Palestinian Legislative Council  
 PLO Palestine Liberation Organization 
 POW  Prisoner Of War  
 STL Special Tribunal for Lebanon  
 UK  United Kingdom 
 UN United Nations  
 UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo  
 UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 USA  United States of America 
 USSR   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
 VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
 WGIP Working Group on Indigenous Populations  
 YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel- in English( People's Protection Units ) 
 
 
12 
 
Chapter One 
Introduction & Research Context  
1.0 Overview & Background  
 
Many scholars, academics and legal experts have pointed out that terrorism is one of the most 
controversial legal and political issues facing the international community at present. For 
many years it has been the subject of numerous legal studies aiming to clarify the 
phenomenon and finding an effective international response to counter international 
terrorism. However, how could the international community punish an offense whose 
definition remains uncertain and the acts that constitute it are varied? Is it possible to repress 
in the same way a “nationalist terrorism” whose structures are based on deep historical and 
ideological national roots with international terrorism? And in the event that several forms of 
terrorism occur in the same territory, will it be necessary to adopt a differential treatment 
according to the specificity of the terrorism that one seeks to fight? 
On the international scene despite the many international efforts to counter international 
terrorism, before and after the establishment of the United Nations (UN), none of the 
proposed definitions has received unanimous. This problem appeared as early as 1937, when 
international efforts to promulgate the International Convention for the Prevention and 
Punishment of Terrorism (ICPPT) adopted under the auspices of the League of Nations (LN) 
failed because of the outbreak of the Second World War. Since this attempt, the international 
community has addressed the issue of terrorism which threatens both the lives of innocent 
people (hijackings, suicide attacks, etc.) and the stability of international relations (attacks on 
protected persons, etc.) by type of offense or type of problem rather than in a comprehensive 
manner. The United Nations has never developed a unique definition of terrorism that clearly 
represses the various terrorist activities that harm life, freedom, democratic society, social 
peace and public order. 
According to the definition of the Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism,
1
 terrorist act means not only all acts covered by international conventions but also: 
" Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the 
                                                             
1
 See the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, December 9, 1999. 
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purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act "
2
. 
However, this UN definition is general and it does not encompass all forms of terrorism. In 
the face of this legal gap in the definition of international terrorism, many delegations called 
for a legal definition of terrorism in a comprehensive international convention on terrorism. 
In order to fight against terrorism different departments should cooperate with each other. 
Cooperation is the key word of the United Nations resolutions in this area. According to 
them, an effective fight against terrorism goes hand in hand with the development of close 
cooperation between States, international organizations and regional organizations. In this 
context, the international organization plays a coordinating role. The purpose of international 
cooperation is to repress the organization, encouragement, financing and tolerance of terrorist 
activities from one territory against other States. Co-operation between all States in this area 
begins with an exchange of information to clarify groups financing terrorists or acts of 
terrorism. It is then based on effective judicial cooperation to facilitate investigations by 
police and law enforcement agencies, such as general intelligence, the establishment of 
extradition agreements for suspects or recognized perpetrators of terrorist acts. Also 
necessary support measures leading to the establishment of domestic instruments, new anti-
terrorism laws and provisions in line with those provided for in international treaties. While 
there is no comprehensive definition of terrorism in the United Nations until now, it is quite 
clear that the UN views terrorism in a number of relevant resolutions as criminal and 
unjustifiable regardless of the perpetrator, wherever it occurs, and regardless of its political, 
philosophical, religious, racial, ideological or ethnic motives. Should we fear a confrontation 
with the demand for the implementation of a fundamental principle set forth in the United 
Nations Charter which is the absolute right of peoples to self-determination, as well as the 
consequences of the search for the independence in case of foreign occupation
3
? How can we 
distinguish between repressive terrorism and the struggle of peoples for self-determination? 
This is another point which the General Assembly has not settled and required further study. 
Countering terrorism will only be effective to the extent that United Nations member states 
deal permanently with the causes of terrorism. In this respect, Kofi Annan, the former 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reminded us that we must tackle the roots of 
                                                             
2
 Article 2(b)of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9
th
 Dec, 1999. 
3
 See resolution 1514 (XV), Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 
General Assembly, adopted at the 947th meeting, on 14 December 1960. 
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terrorism, which are poverty, ignorance and unresolved conflicts such as the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict
4
. 
The United Nations remains the only forum for promoting counterterrorism and international 
cooperation at the global level. But the legal approach developed by this organization remains 
very sectoral and provides only little by little solutions to the global problem of terrorism. 
These solutions provided for in many UN conventions and resolutions tend to combat certain 
problems related to terrorist activities such as arms and drug trafficking, money laundering 
and disruption of global communications networks. The lack of a comprehensive legal 
definition of terrorism appears as a gap in international law. The development of a 
comprehensive convention would establish the international framework for cooperation in the 
field of terrorism and complement existing legal instruments
5
. 
Although due to some changes that were made in national as well as international level still 
there are several reasons where the international community wants to make changes. It has 
been discovered that those persons who are in charge of fighting terrorism at the international 
scene show their strength that a few countries observe it as “terrorism” despite the fact that 
others do not do this deep understanding as an early step towards overwhelming the 
misperception that overcomes. In this thesis, the link will be explored between terrorism, 
right to self-rule and freedom movement. Regarding view of the present situation of the 
world particularly the Middle East and North Africa, it is critical to return to the concept and 
idea of self-determination. Especially some rights regarding international law such as rights 
of self-rule should not be underestimated
6
. 
While the term terrorism is originally defined as the act that is committed by the government 
usually it is done by killing civilian population. Their main goal can only be to get political 
gains or they can terrorize people and not to allow any against political regime against them. 
Most of the government led terrorist activities can have a political purpose this may affect 
these activities as they will back terrorist group or may be positive with their ideology. Some 
governmental official, define the term terrorism as a use of standard of the illegitimacy or 
                                                             
4
 See Statement by Kofi Annan to Security Council to commemorate one-year anniversary of Committee on 
Counter-Terrorism, 04 October 2002.  
5
 Amble, J.C., 2012. Combating terrorism in the new media environment. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 
35(5), pp.339-353. 
6
 Lesser, I., Arquilla, J., Hoffman, B., Ronfeldt, D.F. and Zanini, M., 1999.Countering the new terrorism. RAND 
corporation. 
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unlawfulness of the act
7
. As far as the whole world is concerned terrorism has become an 
increasing problem for the entire international community. A lot of international terrorism 
cases have been judged by domestic courts. International terrorism and violence cases have 
conventionally resolved in the national courts. In this thesis, the different types of tribunals 
will be explained about terrorism and their limitations in giving judgments
8
. This thesis will 
also look at the history as well as the culture of International Criminal Court. The crimes that 
are presently under the authority and domain of the ICC will be thoroughly argued in turn 
along with an assessment and evaluation of whether specific acts of terrorism and violence 
fall inside the legal definitions of such type of crimes
9
. 
The term terrorism is can be dealt with collaboration with international bodies
10
. On 
September 24, 2014, the United Nations Security Council, in a meeting chaired by US 
President Obama, approved the resolution 2178, by imposing on States the adoption of 
measures against foreign terrorist fighters. A series of legislation has recently been passed to 
give States the power to prevent what is called terrorism related travel. However, the 
definitions are vague and the rules are prone to being interpreted in a variety of ways. The 
constant reinvention of definitions means that we could be talking about the same piece of 
international law but at the national level there's more than one way of interpreting it. 
Therefore, many of international law scholar, academic and experts are involved in analyzing 
and understanding any new resolution that the UN Security Council passes like resolution 
2178.  It demands that all states make it a serious criminal offense for their citizens to travel 
abroad to fight with terrorist organizations or to recruit and fund others to do so. It is 
necessary in this regard this thesis to discuss the Res. 2178 in the context outlined in 
particular by the Res. 2170 (2014) and 2199 (2015), which contain a series of measures 
aimed primarily at freezing up the funding sources of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant 
(ISIL), which took control of large territories in Syria and Iraq
11
.  
 
 
 
                                                             
7
 Weiss, T.G., 2011. United Nations and changing world politics., p121 
8
 Baylis, J., Smith, S. and Owens, P., 2013. The globalization of world politics: An introduction to international 
relations. Oxford University Press. 
9
 Duyvesteyn, I., 2004. How new is the new terrorism?. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(5), pp.439-454. 
10
 Hoffman, B., 1996. Intelligence and terrorism: Emerging threats and new security challenges in the post‐cold 
war era. Intelligence and National Security, 11(2), pp.221-223. 
11
 Foreign terrorist fighters, Security Council Counter Terrorism Committee. 
16 
 
1.1 Inspiration and motivation for the topic 
 
The main inspiration for the research and the rational for this particular chose of topic by 
confining effort to find lasting legal and practical solutions to the problems of combating 
international conflicts. 
The principle of the right of peoples to self-determination in their practical and legal 
framework has been established, not only a principle of international law but also a right to 
be exercised through national liberation movements. The concept of terrorism is often 
confused with the activities of liberation movements (as they share the use of force) , which 
necessitates a distinction between them in respect of activities that contribute to the self-
determination and independence of peoples, and not to allow colonizing states and regimes to 
invoke counter-terrorism in the elimination and destruction of these movements. 
This research aims and attempts to establish simplified, clear and direct criteria for 
distinguishing and analyzing legally between the armed struggle ( liberation movements ), 
which is considered legitimate in international law, and terrorist acts which are considered 
illegal and violation of international law. Especially in light of the vague policies practiced by 
the major powers and individuals who fight against terrorism in their countries, so that they 
will be able to label those whom they want to be legitimate and describe those whom they 
want to be labelled as terrorists according to their interests and desires. For example; PKK in 
Turkey (Kurdish Liberation Movement) considered as a terrorist organisation, however, on 
the other hand, YPG in Syria, which is a sub-section of PKK in Syria, consider as a liberation 
movement due to the fact that they are fighting against ISIS alongside with the other 
international coalition armies. 
1.2 Research statement and questions 
 
The purposes of this thesis are to critically analyse, explain and to seek a clarification of the 
concept of the term of international terrorism.   
There are some general questions that this study attempts to answer;  
[1] How has the term terrorism been a formed in addition to what are the factors that emerge 
as of the policy along with legislations to replies and measure their observations about the 
overall idea and concept of terrorism? 
These questions are addressed as part of the discussion in chapter two. 
[2] This research will also explore the linkage between terrorism, the right to self-
determination and Liberation Movement. Does the one who call himself a freedom fighter is 
17 
 
liable for the death of civilians if these occur during any liberation movement?  Can a 
terrorist group claim to be a 'freedom fighter' merely for the reason that it fights for national 
liberation but then again terrorism allowed in the provision of self-rule as the aims and 
objectives of terrorism along with guerrilla fighting might well be equal? 
These questions are addressed as part of the discussion in chapter three. 
[3] In addition, the difficulty raised the question of the absence in international law of a 
general convention on terrorism, and of the absence of a general legal definition of acts of 
this type and how can terrorism be defined? Is it not necessary to distinguish terrorism from 
the struggle of peoples against oppression and self-determination? Should we not also 
differentiate between terrorism and organized crime, as well as individual terrorism and state 
terrorism? Finally, in order to fight against terrorism, is it possible to consider it legally as an 
armed aggression and thus resort to armed force? Could its constitutive elements qualify it as 
a crime against humanity? 
These questions are addressed as part of the discussion in chapter four. 
[4] This study will also critically analyse the issue of foreign terrorist fighter and what are the 
implications might be for humanitarian action in the recent developments in this field. It will 
also discuss the qualification as terrorists of the foreign fighters according to the Res. 2178 
(2014).  Also to identify who are the foreign terrorist fighters? The question of what should 
be done to address the threats caused by the return of foreign terrorist fighters and are the 
measures issued by international bodies such as Security Council Resolution 2178 sufficient? 
Or should specific measures be devised for the processing of returns? 
These questions are addressed as part of the discussion in chapter five. 
[5] This study therefore addresses two additional central questions; are the current existing 
treaties to counter terrorism well designed and do they receive enough recognition and 
effective implementation? Are there remaining gaps which could be filled by way of further 
specific conventions? 
 
1.3 Hypotheses 
 
In recent eras, some nations have been targeted by terrorist activities. Terrorism through it is 
one of the most diverse forms of expression along with cruelty which is a dramatic act of 
violence that you can see all over history (conquests, wars). Terrorism is, as a result, both 
domestically as well as globally, and in a method open to all vicious, humiliating and 
threatening acts and applied deprived of any reservation or moral distress. Due to these 
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reasons, where the life of innocent individuals totally unaware of that "war" or varied 
interests lose and the world is surprised daily by news of attacks happened on public roads 
12
. 
The negative identity hypothesis declares that failure, in order to attain a submissive role 
leads towards the supposition of a negative identity (i.e., a terrorist character). So this is 
regarded as one of the most difficult form of violence to contain for the reason that its scope 
extends beyond the battle regions
13
. It is a phenomenon that is regarded as undiscriminating 
violence and by legal provisions; the terrorist acts and action must be answered covering 
prevention along with punishment
14
. 
The events of 11 September 2001 revealed many inadequacies in the international legal order, 
and the rules of international law remained silent as to the management of the follow-up to 
acts of aggression. The legal experts came to the conclusion that it was not possible in law to 
legally define or qualify such terrorist acts. The Security Council, at its 4730th meeting, 
adopted resolution 1368
15
, condemned these attacks as a "threat to international peace and 
security and called on all States to work together urgently to bring to justice the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of these acts  and declared ready to take all necessary measures to 
respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September "
16
. 
In this respect, the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter took decisions 
on 28 September 2001 binding on States. The UN Security Council Resolution 1373
17
 calls 
on states to prevent and punish the financing of terrorist acts to freeze funds and the financial 
assets or economic resources of those who commit or tend to commit acts of terrorism or to 
facilitate acts of terrorism, and to cooperate by applying all conventions relating to 
terrorism
18
. Terrorism, whatever its form, may appear as a violent attack on democracy and 
the rule of law. In this sense, Walter Schwimmer, the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe, states that terrorism "is a violation of the most fundamental principles of humanity, a 
disregard for the moral codes of all cultures and a failure to religions worldwide "
19
. 
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In the era of globalization, terrorists have taken advantage of the opening of borders, the 
establishment of free trade zones, the free movement of capital and modern means of 
communication to increase their influence. But how to fight cross-border terrorist groups 
when terrorism is not legally defined? What kind of response is envisaged against these 
criminals when no independent convention on terrorism exists on the international scene? 
The rules of international law have remained silent as to the management of the action to be 
given to terrorist acts. Discussions at both the European Council and the United Nations had 
shown the difficulty of reaching such a definition at the time. 
The attacks of September 11 raised the question of their definition as well as that of their 
qualification. This legal gap reflected the difficulty of dealing with the situation faced by 
lawyers because the existing conventions on terrorism were not applicable to the case. Given 
the absence of a legal definition of terrorism, the following questions arise: What is terrorism 
legally? What are its legal aspects? Who are the terrorists according to international law? 
What are the acts and intent elements of the terrorist offense? What is the criminal approach 
to the notion of terrorism? What is the link between terrorists and freedom fighters? What are 
their means?  Are the September 11 terrorist attacks truly "acts of war" as former US 
President George W. Bush has said? What is the legal difference between an "act of war" and 
a "terrorist act"? Can the response of the United States be equated with a "war on terror"? 
These issues of legal criterion are also substantive issues as each involves different legal 
reflections, distinct political interpretations and more or less similar international and state 
consequences. Before analyzing all these legal issues in this thesis, we need to explain and 
analyze in this introduction the methodology with an aim to provide sufficient answers to the 
research questions and problem. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
 
At the beginning of the research one of the key considerations is what type of methodology to 
adopt for the study. The different types of methodologies were reviewed over a period of 
three to four months. The purpose of the review was to identify which research methods were 
most suitable for the research exercise. The section below contains a brief outline of various 
methods reviewed and whether or not they appropriate for this research.  The methodology 
will advance the reader’s understanding of how the research has been framed and what tools 
20 
 
has been applied and why
20
. This section also identifies why the research design has been 
constructed in the way it has throughout the thesis, and a justification for why the 
comparative approach has been deemed appropriate will be presented and for the researcher 
to find out gaps in the literature which this research will seek to address. Given the nature of 
this topic and the study, ethical considerations are not relevant to this study.   
 
Generally, there are three main methodological approaches in social sciences research 
currently exist; namely quantitative, qualitative or a mixed methods design. According to 
Anthony W. Heath; “Qualitative researchers attempt to describe and interpret some human 
phenomenon, often in the words of selected individuals (the informants). These researchers 
try to be clear about their biases, presuppositions, and interpretations, so that others can 
decide what they think about it all”21. Qualitative method is, therefore, any form of research 
that makes findings not reached at by statistical approach or other means of quantification. 
Qualitative research leverages on different sources of data, such as; observations, documents, 
films, and even quantitative data. Qualitative method can be a particularly useful approach to 
studying educational problems that requires developing an understanding of complex social 
environments and the meaning that people within those environments bring to their 
experience
22
.  
On the other hand, quantitative research is the type of research that the general purpose is to 
explain, predict, investigate relationships, and describe current conditions or to examine 
possible impacts or influences on designated outcomes. When together qualitative and 
quantitative methods coexist in the same study, the resulting combination is called "mixed 
methods research". The mixed method research is a research procedure that utilizes jointly 
qualitative and quantitative methods
23
.  
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Qualitative research differs from quantitative research in several ways; both methods 
typically addresses different problems arises from a different philosophical view of the world 
works to achieve different goals and uses different methods and design
24
.  
Following are some of the main differences between qualitative and quantitative approach. 
Qualitative research provides insights and understanding of the problem closely. Whereas, 
quantitative research is quantifies the data and generalise the result from sample to target 
population.  In qualitative research, the researcher is the main tools bringing her/ his own 
perceptions to the selection and meaning of data. Quantitative research relies on external 
tools such as tests, surveys or other ways used to measure and quantify a particular 
phenomenon
25
.  
In quantitative research, the data collection process involves extensive data translated into 
numbers, an activity called quantification, analyzed through a mathematical and statistical 
process of interpretation. On the other hand, the data collection procedure in qualitative 
research requires intensive data on human phenomena, collected from multiple sources of 
evidence, and analyzed in a non-statistical manner. Qualitative research aims to explore and 
identify patterns, themes, hunches and initial models that provide an initial understanding of 
this phenomenon. Quantitative research is meant to test existing theory; while qualitative 
research aims at generating or building new theory
26
. 
Qualitative research usually uses a small sample to examine and explain experiences through 
the use of intensive descriptions of detailed data in an effort to know and interpret human 
perceptions. Quantitative research normally uses large samples to analysis numerical data by 
comparing or finding relationships among sample attributes so that the result can be 
generalized to the population
27
.  
However, the presentation of the above research methods in this section is not intended to be 
part of this discussion, but rather to highlight the characteristics and the differences of each 
research approaches. Consequently, it is being carefully considered as a part of the research 
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design but due to the nature of terrorism the above types of methods are not relevant to this 
study. 
 
Finally, this thesis will utilise a comparative approach
28
, which is an aspect of a qualitative 
methodology, to analyse different countries that have been targeted by terrorist attacks and 
those state anti-terrorism policies.  This thesis will analyse those nations which are been 
targeted by the act of terrorism. This thesis will reflect on individual states that used strength 
alone to counter campaigns of terrorist attacks, and also compare as well as contrast the 
consequences of those campaigns that are related to counterterrorism through states that 
involved groups of terrorist. The data and sources which will be in this thesis will be official 
from the current case studies of specific terrorist campaigns among states rules and strategies 
versus the actions that are taken by states too
29
. 
 
This complete thesis will monitor a definite technique along with methodology with an aim to 
provide sufficient respond to the research problem and get to the points mentioned above. 
This research will completely use a documentary method, which helps the research to reach 
the objectives by the historical, critical, and comparative approach. This means using the 
documentary method will be based on the evaluation of published and unpublished resources, 
for example; books, journals, articles, and research papers to have more knowledge on the 
international terrorism. The historical approach explains the background overview of 
terrorism, liberation movement and the ICC. The critical approach is relevant for assess 
different explanations collected from literatures to build this study.  This means critical and 
analysis approach is helpful to understand the state legislation and the international 
instruments.  Ultimately, the comparative approach improves in order to understand the 
power of court and its functions along with its operations of the International Criminal Court, 
and other international criminal jurisdictions
30
.  
 
The analysis will focus on differentiate countries that exercised violence only to respond to 
terrorist attacks, and compare and contrast the results of those anti-terrorist campaigns with 
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states that engaged terrorist groups. The assessment of success of the anti-terrorism policies 
will be the intensity of violence of the terrorist attacks, and the length of the terrorist 
campaigns
31
. The discussion will now progress to examine the subject matter and definition 
of next chapter. 
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Chapter Two 
Background and History of Terrorism  
2.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter will examine the conceptual and legal difficulty involve in the search for the 
generally accepted definition of the term of terrorism. In the general sense, terrorism is a 
phenomenon which impact on both political and social life and its definition as a crime 
cannot be separated from its political and social context. Therefore, each legal definition of 
terrorism as a crime should also reflect the context of the political and social culture to which 
it belongs. However, even adopting a “national” definition requires consensus among 
different segments of society and the ability to be modified according to prevailing conditions 
of the times. In this chapter, the focus of the discussion will be on the main obstacles 
encounter in trying to establish a common definition of the term terrorism. The main 
objective of this chapter is to address one of the research questions which state how is the 
concept of terrorism formed and what factors emerge from the policy and legislations to 
responses and how can perceptions about the concept of terrorism is measured? However, the 
question is what does terrorism concept means and when did terrorist actions begin affecting 
the states? This question will help determine the historical context and understanding of the 
term terrorism as well as the counter terrorism responses undertaken by the international 
community. In addition, the confusion between terrorism and other phrases such as “freedom 
fighting” and “liberation movement” continue .The difficulty of accurate labelling become 
even worse with the addition of the concept of “guerrilla warfare”.  Therefore, this chapter 
will examine each term independently and clarify that the confusion between terrorism and 
those interchangeably used concepts.  
 
2.1 The meaning of Terrorism  
 
The word of terrorism in the dictionary comes into English from French terreue from Latin 
terrorem (terror) or a great fear a dread from the verb terrere which is to fill with fear or to 
frighten
32
. Thus terrorism has built into its very relevant meaning fear, fright or dread. The 
first use of the word terrorism comes from the 18
th
 century French Revolution, when the 
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word terreisme was used in 1798 to describe the activity of the French state and employing 
physical violence to control the subject population. At the root of our understanding of 
terrorism then is fear
33
.  Terrorism is an act that causes fear but of course not everything that 
causes fear can be called terrorism.  This would be unreasonable, it would mean that parents 
are terrorists, teachers are terrorists and the person who nearly hits you in your car and causes 
your heart to race could also be called a terrorist.  As we know this is not true, in order to 
label something terrorism or someone a terrorist we instead have to look at the historical 
context of actions and deeds that have been labelled as such and this leads us to the problem 
of perception, at the root of this perception is one's own view of the world.   
The question is, for example, are there certain shared universal values or truths by which we 
can judge something to be an act of terrorism or do we have to look at each case individually 
at each act and each actor in isolation given their historical context. If we assume that murder 
is universally wrong and this is a doubtful assumption as we know naturally from our own 
experiences. For example if you kill someone who's attempting to do harm to you this is 
murder, we might call it self-defence but it is murder.  If we return to the assumption say that 
murder though is universally wrong and a terrorist acts such as the recent bombing in 
Manchester which causes the loss of life then we can see that one of the essential part of 
terrorism is murder but what kind of murder.  In the case of Manchester again it is murder for 
the sake of political gain. So what kind of political gain,  if we believe that the bombers were 
motivated by ideology fighting in what is call the global jihad, then we have another element 
that helps us refine our view of terrorism. Ideology can be defined as a deeply held political 
or redundant religious belief that motivates one to act. Kirtley stated then terrorists are 
motivated by ideology to act in violent ways that induce fear that is terror in their conquered 
population
34
.  
What are some of the legal issues and responses relating to terrorism and can we perceive 
some basic shared human values such as the case of murder that has mentioned above. This is 
in fact seemed to unify human nature in some way shape or form.  Most societies, both pre-
industrial and modern, have a number of proscribed social behaviours and prescribed 
behaviours
35
. These behaviours that are proscribed are at base wrong because they 
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undermined the group's prospects of survival for example; murder, rape, incest, kidnapping, 
treason or rebellion which are considered morally wrong in most societies. Prescribed 
behaviours are positive actions which help bind the society together and help it physically 
survive like marriage, hunting, growing food, working or having children. These are 
encouraged by society because they're useful to its survival. So by mention these it helps to 
established some kind of fundamental agreement of a shared humanity and perhaps even 
although this is more dubious of shared morality from which we can argue the right or wrong 
of terrorism and better help to classify it. 
2.2 A brief historical background 
 
The history of terrorism can be classified into three stages; pre-modern terrorism (early 
terrorist era), modern terrorism (French revolution and anarchism era, colonial era, leftist 
terrorism era), and post- modern terrorism (radical religious terrorism era). 
2.2.1 Pre-Modern Terrorism (Ancient and Medieval Terrorism) 
This section will briefly cover some aspects of ancient and medieval terrorism.  Terrorism is 
an old profession, certainly in warfare and it has been an integral part of the human 
experience since earliest of times. Take an example from ancient times , the Assyrians from 
what it's today northern Iraq were notorious for their brutality and shocking treatment of their 
enemies with their assaults on cities, looting and deportations of captive peoples 
immortalized in the Bible
36
. The violence and fear associated with the Syrian attack spread 
far and wide and led to the surrender of many enemies without a fight. However, to discover 
something about terrorism in the remote past is difficult. Guerrilla fighters one sees in the 
ancient sources but individuals or groups who fit the broad definition of terrorism as 
propaganda of the deed are difficult to find.  Some of the earliest acts of political violence 
were called tyrannicide, in which a political actor attacked a tyrant in the name of justice. 
Greek philosopher Aristotle thought deeply about the causes of tyrannicide, he noted that 
many men attacked tyrants because of a real or imagined insult often because they or 
someone they were related to had been shamed by the tyrant. Another cause states Aristotle is 
that the tyrant has made a shameful attempt on a person of his subjects often sexual or 
another moral violation. He also further notes that many who attempted to murder tyrants 
have been personally injured, beaten, or tortured by the princes whom they then try to kill. In 
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other words the state is seen as a kind of illegitimate organism because it causes fear among 
its subjects, this is the closest Aristotle would get to formulating the idea state terror. Another 
motive for the killing of tyrants according to Aristotle is the hope to become famous; the 
Brutus murdered Julius Caesar perhaps the most famous act of tyrannicide ever committed
37
.   
The next group is Sicari, the Sicari were an ancient Jewish sect living in Judea controlled as a 
province of the ancient Roman Empire. Jews had lived under independent monarchy this is 
until the 1st century BC; in the first century AD, Jews longed to be free of foreign 
interference
38
.  
The Jewish inhabitants disliked Roman foreigners whose personal morals and habits were 
very different from those of their Jewish subjects, growing anger among Jews led to 
increasing violence in Judea. The first to be assassinated by Sicarii was Jonathan the high 
priest, after his death there were numerous daily murders. The Sicari then extended their 
efforts to the countryside where they attacked the estates and entered the city by night, this is 
Jerusalem, and kidnapped the Secretary of the temple Captain Eleazar ,the son of the high 
priest and Ananias, and led him off in bonds.  They then sent to Ananias saying that they 
would release the Secretary to him if he would induce Albinus, who was the Roman governor 
of the province, to release ten of their number who had been taken prisoner; Ananias under 
this constraint persuaded Albinus and obtained his request
39
. So we have here is great 
pressure tactic the Sicari kidnap a prominent notable the son of the high priests and ransom 
him for ten of their own number. Kidnapping here for the Sicari was an integral part of their 
strategy and a tactic that proved to be effective. 
The political motive was clear, the Sicari wished to rid the land of Romans clearly religion 
played a major role in motivating the Sicari also they followed distinctive set of Judaism 
called the forth philosophy
40
 according to which the payment of taxes to the Romans made 
the Jews slaves to foreign overlords.  According to the Sicari, God alone was their leader and 
the state was to be completely in the hands of the Jewish God and his representatives for the 
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accomplishment of God's purposes.  In other words, the Sicari wished to create a Jewish 
theocracy, the rule of state by religious figures
41
. 
The next period is the medieval period, in the case of the assassins. The assassin is the 
English form of the word “Hashishiyya” which is the root of the European word “assassin”.  
The word “Hashishiyya” has something to do with the Arabic word of hashish, means men 
who smoked hashish or it could just mean be a word of unknown entomology.  In any case, 
the assassins belong to the so called Nizari branch of the Ismaili sect of Shi’a Islam. There 
was a group located mainly in northern Syria and east into Persia, and their main floret of 
activity was from the 11
th
 through the 13
th
 centuries AD
42
.  
After the Prophet Muhammad (peace upon him) died and his death led to the succession of 
the first Caliph, the Caliph is a word simply means the man who succeeds the Prophet. Abu 
Bakr’s in this case who succeeded to the leadership of the Muslim community or the Ummah. 
A split soon developed in the Ummah many thought that the Prophet should have been 
succeeded by his cousin and son-in-law Ali Ibn Talib who is married to the daughter of 
Muhammad named Fatima, those who hold the belief that the caliphate that is the related 
political and religious government of Islam belongs to the family of the Prophet are called 
Shia Muslims.  So this is the origin of the Shia -Sunni divide that you hear so during the Iraq 
war how this became prominent in American discourse. Shia islam is Ismaiili islam, which 
takes its name from the belief that the imamate ( leadership of the umma- the spiritual 
leadership) is to be traced through Ismaiili the son of a cleric who followed the supporters of 
Ali Ibn Talib and his clerics name was Jafar al-Sadiq. The Ismailis emerged in the 9th 
century in many parts of the Muslim world as a secret revolutionary society; they were 
particularly active in northern Persia in a region called ( Khurasan- modern Iran) in Yemen, 
North Africa and India
43
. 
In the 11
th
 century the leader of a sect of Ismaiili the Nazari sect in northern Iran was Hassan 
al- Sabbah.  Hassan was trained in philosophy in the northern Iranian city of Ray which is 
just outside now northern Tehran the capital of Iran.  He trained in Fatimid Egypt which was 
the first ismaeli government established in the Middle East. In 1090, Hassani Sabbah seized 
Alamut castle, a mountain fortress in northern Iran
44
.  Hassan preached a doctrine called 
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Dawa Jadida (new doctrine) which is what the assassins called themselves. He implemented 
various tactics that the assassins would employ until their suppression. These include 
constant hostilities with their Sunni neighbors and the Sunni for their part believed that the 
murder of Ismailis was a pious and desirable act. The assassins had a program of secret 
missionary activity and resistance to Sunni Islam by propaganda, rioting, and assassination. 
Their goals were it seems self-preservation and to the extension of Ismaiili doctrine with the 
ultimate goal of founding the Ismaiili state
45
.  
As stated above, a religious ideology and a political motivation behind the actions of the 
assassins. You can also see the reasons for this in some ways of their oppression at the hands 
of the Sunni majority. The methods of the assassins are what really made them famous and 
feared throughout the region. They practice of Fidai (one who offer up his life for another) 
can be seen in action by the willingness that assassins exhibited in their public actions and 
their willingness to be captured.  One of their first victims was the seljuk sultanate of Iran 
Nizam al-Mulk.  The Seljuk vizier Nizam al-Mluk was killed by an assassin this is their first 
highest profile killing and while assassination was not uncommon in the medieval world the 
methods of the assassins were both novel and terrifying
46
. 
In Syria the assassins were familiar to the Crusaders were launched in 1095. This is a 
European effort to recapture the Holy land from Islam and in the end a failed attempt for 
Europeans to colonize the Mediterranean including the holy city of Jerusalem. This led the 
Europeans to encounter assassins in various ways. The assassins medieval considered a 
terrorist. They did have a political motive and they conducted public killings to propagandize 
and so fear among their enemies and targeted audience. They were also so effective that their 
existence is covered in mystery and their legend lives on popular culture to this day
47
.  
2.2.2 Modern Terrorism (French Revolution, Colonial and Leftist Terrorism Era) 
Modern terrorism begins as the 1890s and its associated with anarchism. That's mostly about 
extreme nationalist and political movements that are using terror to make a point anti-
capitalist. One of the most significant appearances of terrorism after the WWII was the 
tendency of global violence and ferocity that took place in the year of mid-1960s where 
several features came together in order to facilitate and make more obvious international 
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terrorism. Smaller technical and scientific advances, creating weapons but using greater 
destructive power; the means for quicker movement along with communication that are 
offered to the terrorists; broad worldwide connections of the selected victims and the public 
relations generated any extremist attack
48
. The origins of the guerrilla terrorist upsurge that 
eventually began in the 60s can be marked out to the battle in the central Middle East faces 
Arab countries against Israel nation. In the late 40s, several Jewish extremists and activist, for 
instance, the Stern, eventually used terrorism in contradiction of Arab communities along 
with other groups in their struggle for freedom from Israel. For the duration of and after the 
sixties, its Arab opponents decided towards using terrorism much more thoroughly
49
 .  
The exclusion of Palestinian guerrillas as of Jordan in the year of September 1971 was 
remembered using the formation of a rebel called Black September terrorist support. The 
PLO, which was formed for Philistine Liberation, has carried out terrorism as well as 
commanded the global operations both in Israel and in a lot of other countries. Palestinian 
international terrorism base reduced during the 80s, in struggle PLO to win worldwide 
support to their cause, but then again there were new methods related towards the insurgency 
happened in Iran along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In the incidence of terrorism 
further than the Middle East countries in the 60s was obvious in the three Nations that had 
advanced technology and the changes of dictatorship to democracy soon after WWII had 
been faster as well as traumatic which includes West Germany (which is now a part of the 
federal Republic of Germany), Japan and Spain. In some other Western states fundamental 
leftist groups, during the Cold War every so often funded by Communist governments also 
emerged. As terrorists ultimately tried to bring the failure of the state by means of violent 
along with self-destructive reappearance theories that inspired by unclear revolutionary and 
also sustained by leftist groups of different social sectors
50
. 
In old days of West Germany, the alleged Red Army Group, which was also known as the 
Baader-Meinhof gang, made many bank robberies and attacked US Army military 
installations. In the year of 1977, their most spectacular actions eventually took place through 
kidnapping and murder of most important industrial named as, Martin Schleyeralong with the 
consequent kidnapping by Arab groups of a flight Lufthansa plane bound for the city of 
Mogadishu in Somalia. As one of the terrorist group that was led by Japanese Army, groups 
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of the German gang regularly cooperated with Palestinian terrorist group, along with special 
significance the killing of players of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics in the year of 
1972
51
. 
By the end of the 1970s, many activists of the Red Army Faction were eventually in jail or 
died. After the end of World War II, the terrorist campaign conducted by Irish Republican 
Army (IRA) emerged as of the Irish movement for the civil rights in the 60s, who ultimately 
demanded better conditions for Catholics in Northern Ireland. The increasingly terrorism that 
was used in cooperation with Catholics and Protestants led to the separation of the two 
communities in areas that were guarded by soldiers and militarization of state of Ireland. The 
Provisional Irish Republican Army-IRA conducted a series of blasts, assassinations along 
with other terrorist attacks inside as well as outside Ireland aimed against both military and 
civilian targets inspired by a revolutionary leftist thought and supported by Libya along with 
other supporters of leftist governments. On August 31, 1994, the campaign continued up until 
the Irish Republican Army-IRA declared a ceasefire
52
. 
The power of the Italian guerrilla terrorists, of whom one of most vital were the Red 
Brigades, might have invented in the revolutionary or rebel tradition of the country along 
with its political uncertainty. In 1978 their activities ended along with the kidnapping as well 
as the murder of previous Prime Minister Aldo Moro. Leftist terrorism failed after many 
years, thanks to the measures taken by the police, but did not vanish at all. Though, left-wing 
or progressive terrorism in Italy appeared to increase, by way demonstrated in the year of 
1980 with the blast at the railway station in Bologna (Italy). The notable Uffizi Gallery in 
Florence (Italy) was one of the main targets of a long series of terrorist attacks that took place 
in the year 1993, actually achieved by the Italian mafia. To promote a rigid authoritarian 
government courtesy a climate of instability and uncertainty a lot of these attacks are now 
measured exercises, "black propaganda" intended both the right as well as by other groups
53
 . 
In Latin America Terrorist movements and activities had their roots in ancient civilisations of 
political fights located. As terrorist activities simply moved from the countryside landscape 
towards the cities, the main invention was the formation of the supposed urban guerrilla 
movements. Sendero, Peru Maoist terrorist group, in the end became one of the most 
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bloodiest and well-known for the use of tactics that were very bloody to weaken the state in 
addition to cause it by oppressive measures e.g. in the 90s 
54
. However, among a prevailing 
trend in Italy through some specific traits by which crime that was organized imitates the 
terrorists to promote their interests, a number of members of the cocaine cartel in Colombia 
eventually used terrorist tactics in order to obstruct the implementation of laws and order 
heading for combating drug trafficking
55
 .  
In the developing nations, the phenomenon that former legitimising terrorist group struggle 
and gained control of the government or specific areas in which to exercise power is given. 
Israel along with Algeria is just two examples of those states whose officials and leaders were 
once classified as terrorists. Governments that are born in such circumstances can preserve 
their ties to terrorism at once they are in power. It is a well-known fact that Libya and Iran 
both have revolutionary governments which have also supported acts of terrorism, with 
official character. North Vietnam ultimately supported a communist movement of terrorism 
and rebellion in South Vietnam for the duration of the Vietnam War. Some reporters have 
revealed that these terrorist attacks were led by Israeli Mossad agents
56
. 
 Against South Korea, North Korea had launched some terrorist attacks, as the blast in 
Rangoon in the year 1983, in which 4 members of government and 13 South Koreans were 
killed, when the attacker destroyed plane of Korean Airlines in 1987, and it was initiated by 
the agents of North Korean
57
. One of the best terrorist examples would be the attack that was 
suffered by the Star boat Greenpeace, the Rainbow Warrior in Auckland harbour in the year 
1985, through the work of the French secret services. One of the most tragic examples of 
terrorism today in Europe constitutes the featuring in Spain by the armed group ETA 
(Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), which, with its continuous attacks, kidnappings, murders as well as 
coercion, has marked with the blood of the diplomatic Spanish consolidation process values 
democratic
58
. 
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2.2.3 Post-Modern Terrorism (Radical Religious Terrorism Era) 
Today terrorism remains the largest security priority worldwide. The next front in the war on 
terror it's hard to say as there are so many groups in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Africa but 
less in South America now. However, the radicalism and extremist
59
 have become a part of 
the landscape in almost every part of the world.  The next front in the war on terror is difficult 
to predict.  The question is the next front the war on terror war will be with Iran, it seems 
possible. There has been obviously rhetoric against the Iranian regime which is a militant 
Shia regime for years now over their pursuit of nuclear weapons which will continue to see in 
the news. 
 The most recently is the intervention of Iran in the Syrian civil war on behalf of the President 
of Syria Bashar al-assad who is an Iranian ally and a needed client in that region. Syria 
provides the bridge whereby Iran can funnel its weapons and personnel to Hezbollah to 
pressure Israel and to wage a war against Israel.  Therefore, without Syria on its western side, 
Iran feels vulnerable not only to being cut off from Hezbollah and also from pressure from its 
Sunni neighbor’s form of the Saudi Arabia-led Gulf states. 
Iran has attacked the United States through acts of terrorism on several occasions, the Beirut 
embassy attacked 1983, and most famously the attack on the Marine Barracks there in Beirut 
which had been one of the most, was at that time, costly terrorist attack in US history. Khobar 
towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was also done by Hezbollah. Consequently Iran has 
at times lashed out at the United States for perceived aggression and will continue to do so.  
Most recently with the United States claiming to arm the Syrian rebel opposition, the Iranians 
have responded by declaring their intent to send Revolutionary Guards to Syria and this could 
lead  to really dangerous situation that could escalate into a shooting war between the United 
States or other powers in the region and Iran. 
 One of the main hotspot though of jihadi
60
 terrorism in Africa is in Mali. There was a 
January 2013 French invasion with ongoing fallout and has been still rebel activity there. It's 
very complicated political landscape but basically there is an ethnic minority Tuareg Berbers 
who are fighting the government there and alongside them and often in opposition to them 
are these Sunni radicals that have infiltrated from across the border Libya and Algeria and 
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elsewhere that are attempting to set up a an Islamic state in northern Mali. They have been 
French military intervention which was impossible to carry out without US support. They 
provided most of the logistical and technical support and the intelligence. 
 In Somalia of course al-shabaab group they have been pretty badly bloodied by efforts of the 
United States and its allies drone strikes and so on their camps and on the territories that they 
tried to control but they continue to wage their battle against the interim government of 
Somalia.  Somalia remains a failed state with a very weak central government and it could the 
balance of power there could shift with an influx of new fighters and so on the side of al-
shabaab.  Al-shabaab includes a number of Americans including Omar Hammami (also 
known as Abu Mansur al-Amriki ) who's from American from Alabama, it's been a attraction 
for American Somalis from northern United States .He have been recruited by radical 
mosques there in the Upper Midwest and sent abroad
61
. 
 In Kenya there has been a lot of overflow, there's organized crime that support this al-
shabaab. There been attacks on tourists in Kenya as well as a vendetta attacks by al-shabaab 
against itself and against potential Klan rivals within the borders of Kenya numbering in the 
dozens now over the last couple years
62
. 
In Nigerian Boko Haram sect in northern Nigerian Islamic part of the portion of Nigeria has 
been under intense pressure.  It's been a very bloody extremely brutal campaign by the 
Nigerian government over the last couple of years that has cost the lives of thousands of 
civilians and Boko Haram supporters and foot soldiers on the part of the Nigerian 
government
63
. 
All of these conflicts are leading to the flight of people like Boko Haram members or Al 
Qaeda and Islamic extremists and its surrounding territory and it's infiltrating, in places like 
the Central African Republic and Chad are in places that they're very deprived and they have 
almost no militaries or central government. So these places now it is like a virus affecting 
these regions it becomes very difficult to quarantine these jihadi groups .They're very fluid 
and they're able to move over great distances undetected, so Africa remains at the forefront of 
the war on terror. 
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 In Asia, India has numerous terrorist groups active within his borders. These are again the 
example of the largest Asian countries right now in terms of population India and China. 
India has the Naxalite Maoist insurgency; they've just assassinated some Indian government 
officials in central India in the rugged lands of the force and massif of Central India. 
 Lashkar-e-taiba is active in Kashmir as being known as Pakistani proxy. They’re still active 
and conducting terrorist attacks in Kashmir and also in India itself. There’s also a new a 
relatively new Islamist militant insurgency in the northeast of India called an (Assam). So 
India has really grave security challenges in terms of its internal stability from these terrorist 
groups and again why they do not represent an existential threat, India has in terms of per 
capita a much poorer country than a Western country.  It has great challenges in terms of 
infrastructure, literacy, and education and would be better spent money arguably in 
humanitarian efforts and social and civic efforts rather than fighting terrorist groups
64
. 
 In China, although very little gets out in the Western media, very little is known about the 
Turkic groups that are Islamic fighting the Chinese government in Xinjiang. The main group 
is the East Turkestan Liberation Organization (ETLO), there's a lot of disinformation coming 
out of China which of course itself is the world's largest oppressive state and western 
intelligence seems to cover on specific knowledge of the region.  However, the roots of this 
movement are goes back to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also the Saudi Arabian 
money that spilled over Central Asia and funded groups like this and obviously provided the 
underpinnings of the Salafi Wahabi ideology that many of these groups now support. There's 
massive state torture in Asia and central Asia but they're also Islamic radical elements 
attempting to topple the government
65
. 
2.3 The nature of terrorism  
 
Terrorism can therefore be expressed generally as a proscribed act counter to the values, 
expressed by most every human society and social group. So the question is who articulates 
and conducts terrorist acts.  Terrorism obviously in this context then if you view take this 
assumption of proscribed acts as being immoral terrorism then becomes both illegal and 
immoral. The other question is there rules of terrorism and terrorists articulated strategy they 
carefully define the limits of their actions and they also express boundaries in the way they 
expect to be treated. This is very clear for example in the so called Global War on Terror 
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from the Islamist side where there are very strict rules of engagement set out by terrorists 
regarding their selection target what's a legitimate target and so on.  There are obviously 
problems of perspective which again raise guerrilla fighters in the Afghan war the Soviets in 
the 1980s, the so-called Mujahideen, they were called freedom fighters in the United States 
but they committed acts defined by the international community as war crimes or terrorism
66
.  
2.4 Conceptual and Legal difficulties in defining Terrorism 
 
This section will be discussing a few of the challenges and legal difficulties behind defining 
the term terrorism.  It will also look at the various definitions proposed by the United 
Nations, Governmental Organizations, as well as scholars in the field.   It's often been said 
that “one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter”67. This is describes the problem 
of defining what terrorism truly is.  Academics, politicians, security experts, the armed 
forces, and journalists all use a variety of definitions of terrorism. Some definitions focus on 
the terrorist organizations mode of operation, others emphasize motivation and yet others 
focus on the characteristics of the person who is perpetrating the terrorist act
68
. 
The word itself comes from the Latin word to frighten as explained above; following the late 
19th and early 20
th
 centuries, it will find that many anarchists and revolutionary groups 
embrace the term terrorism; however, since World War II it's carried a much more negative 
connotation. The prevalent definitions of terrorism are telling many difficulties, from both a 
conceptual and a literal perspective.  It is not surprising that often hear a group described with 
more positive connotation and depending on who is describing the group. For instance, you 
may hear it terrorist organization called a guerrilla fighting organization or a resistance front 
or a National Liberation Movement. Likewise you may hear these same groups called 
terrorists but at what point is a group a terrorist organization, at what point is a person a 
terrorist, how do you  know when you're faced with terrorist activity or a civil disorder  or a 
rebel group or an act of war
69
.   
Throughout the years, there have been many organized groups that assassinate high-level 
politicians and military members. This is typically what was thought of as terrorism prior to 
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the 20th century. During the Revolutionary period in France there was actually a period of 
violence so deadly that thousands of innocent civilians were condemned to death.  This reign 
of terror was actually a policy by the government against the people.  The 21
st
 century 
definition has completely reversed; today it's typically viewed as an action against the 
standing government not in action by a government. There is no general consensus as to how 
to define terrorism, this is partially because the term is politically loaded.  For instance, a 
group may be labeled a resistance organization or a separatist movement at one point in time 
but as the political situation changes they can be labeled a terrorist organization.  Likewise, 
the same group may be labeled a terrorist organization by one country but a resistance 
movement by another; similarly legitimate organizations may use the same tactics as terrorist 
organizations. 
To begin, we discuss some of the scholarly definitions of terrorism. Now many scholars have 
offered definitions of this word.  These definitions come from some of the most prominent 
scholar in the terrorism field. Alex Schmid was one of the first scholars to offer a definition 
of the term terrorism, when he said that “terrorism is the peacetime equivalent of a war 
crime”70.  In 2004,  Bruce Hoffman one of the world's leading experts in terrorism has given  
a more nuanced definition of the term, he described it as politically named violent and 
conducted by organizations with an identifiable chain of command or a cell structure he said 
it was perpetrated by a sub-national group or non-state entity
71
. Lastly the famous Israeli 
scholar Boaz Ganor offers a very simple definition of the term when he says “terrorism is the 
deliberate use of violence aimed against civilians to achieve political ends”72. 
Many terrorist acts cross international boundaries, so the UN definition is important to study. 
UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defined terrorism as “criminal acts, including 
against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking 
of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of 
persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an 
international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act”. As you can see here in the 
UN's definition use of the word criminal in this definition, this is an important distinction 
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later we will see how another organization directly contradicts this element of the UN's 
definition.   
The next two definitions come from two very important governmental organizations in the 
United States both of which have a role in countering terrorist activity. The first comes from 
the US Department of Defense which define terrorism as “ the calculated use of unlawful 
violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate 
governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or 
ideological”73.      
The next definition comes from the US State Department which has the challenging role of 
protecting US embassies overseas and promoting the policies of the United States abroad. It 
defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to 
intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in 
furtherance of political or social objectives"
74
. 
Two other US government agencies that are directly involved with countering terrorist 
activity are the FBI and the CIA notice how their definitions of terrorism are slightly different 
from those of the Department of Defence and the State Department. First, let's look at the 
FBI's definition; it defines terrorism as "the unlawful use of force and violence against 
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives". As we notice how the FBI 
definition includes violence against property. Now let's look at the CIA's definition, the term 
"terrorism means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents”. As we notice here that 
the CIA says terrorism is not criminal, whereas the UN defines terrorism as a criminal act. 
Some of the elements of terrorism in the previous definitions were located in more than one 
definition and some of them actually contradict each other. For instance; the UN defines 
terrorism as criminal activity whereas the CIA defines it as non criminal. The DoD definition 
is the only one that includes the element of instills fear. The DoD and the FBI both see 
terrorism as unlawful, the CIA and the State Department both agree that terrorism is 
premeditated targets non-combatants and it's sub-national in nature.  The State Department, 
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FBI, CIA and DoD as well as scholars Hoffman and Ganor all agree that the motive is 
typically political or ideological.  
If we look at some of the most violent activity that has taken place worldwide over the past to 
see if each of these matches the elements listed by the various organizations definitions. For 
instance, when the Free Syrian Army fights the regime of Bashar al-assad in Syria, are they 
considered to be terrorists?  From many Western journalists the answer is no because the 
FSA is targeting enemy combatants. However, the question is about the Al-Nusra Front when 
Fights Assad's regime is they also a terrorist organization? This it depends, sometimes groups 
may take actions that are really acts of war, but at some point in time they were involved in 
terrorist activity so they're considered a terrorist organization. In this case the Al-Nusra Front 
may be involved in a civil war on the one hand but they're considered a terrorist organization 
because of the other activities they've been involved with.  
Now if we look at mass shootings , think back to the Fort Hood shooting of 2009
75
 when 
Major Nidal Hasan fatally shot 13 people and injured 30 others at a military base in Texas . 
The Fort Hood massacre instilled here it was unlawful and it was premeditated.  The FBI 
later uncovered emails between Nidal Hasan and a Yemeni cleric named Anwar al-awlaki 
showing that this was a politically motivated attack. There is some question as to whether or 
not Major Hassan's targets could be considered non-combatants? He targeted military 
personnel but those personnel were not openly engaged in combat during the time of the 
attack. How is the Fort Hood massacre different than when Adam Lanza fatally shot 20 
children at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown Connecticut
76
.  Adam Lanza instills 
fear, he conducted a premeditated attack on non-combatants, and it was a surprise but was 
unsure what his motives were.  This is the key difference unlike Major Hasan we do not 
believe that Adam Lanza's motives for political in nature.   
From the above definitions, another question arises of what is a civilian and does this mean 
the terrorism cannot occur against the military personnel. We can say that civilians are non-
combatants, non-uniformed unarmed people perhaps as a person working in a government 
bomb factory that a civilian? By some accounts yes but within the view of some no, 
especially this is one of the legal excuse that the Usama bin Laden used and justifying his 
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attacks against Americans of any stripe there were no civilians according to him.  Bin Laden 
declared that America being a democracy had its citizens shape its government and citizens 
were therefore responsible for the actions of its government. Therefore every one of its 
citizens was morally culpable for the actions of the US state.  Ultimately this guilt from bin 
Laden's perspective made it right and legal to kill any American regardless of age, sex or 
official status because they were morally guilty for the accidents democratically elected 
government.  This is an inversion of the idea of limited moral culpability and one of the ways 
in which bin Laden altered the face of Islamist terrorism.  In another way, so in bin Laden's 
view there are no civilians because perhaps you or your parents voted for George Bush and 
George Bush conducted war against Islam for example, and you share in Bush's actions and 
you are morally culpable for the actions of say the Iraq war.  This is a great legal leap for Bin 
Laden to make it was revolutionary in the way Islamists approached their perception of the 
United States and conduct of terrorist operations.  
In contrast, the US efforts for example to label some groups in the civil war in Syria as 
terrorists while asserting that others conducting the same kinds of operations in the same war 
at the same time are not terrorists
77
. Also the example of the Irish Republican Army 
particularly during the early 20th century when southern Ireland broke through British rule, 
were these terrorists or guerrilla revolutionaries fighting against the colonial power
78
.   
The above brief overview has intended to offer a few attempts at defining what we call 
terrorism. This concludes that there is no one definition able to accommodate all situations 
due to problems of perspective evident and situational use of definitions almost very 
important.  
2.5 Characteristics of International Terrorism 
 
Terrorism cannot be simply defined as one of the violent crimes that happen in everyday life 
but it is now classified as the fourth generation warfare. It is defined as the use of violent 
force in order to achieve specific goals and aims that might be religious, political or 
ideological aims. Terrorism can be considered as the major threat towards the whole country 
in case of an international terrorism it is a war crime so there are many antiterrorism laws that 
are created in order to combat terrorism. To the overall population, undiscriminating violence 
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spreads its effects. His irregularity means conduct astonishment is pervading terror. 
Immorality causes unnecessary suffering: hit the most vulnerable areas. It is unintended: 
distract the judgment eyes of the populace to a certain point, which is not the target that was 
planned. Terrorism itself that marks and targets civilians have grown the participation of 
military, ex - military, along with members of different intelligence services. A number of 
reasons are inspired by the terrorists. Student’s terrorism eventually classifies them into three 
groups: rational, mental, and cultural. A terrorist might be created by combinations thereof
79
.  
To reach their target and real terrorism, they try to determine if there are less exclusive as 
well as more operation always. To (or “intending to”) assessing the risk and danger, he 
weighs the defensive abilities of the target in contradiction of their capacities and skills to (or 
“intending to”) attack.  With an aim of sustaining the struggle and determination, with the 
measures and abilities of some group one of the important question is whether terrorism 
completely works, with given social conditions and situations at the time. Rational analysis 
and study of the terrorist are likewise of a military chief or a business tycoon who 
contemplates available lines of conduct
80
 .  
Current history provides certain examples of some groups that have decent projection 
towards success apparently paid the value for the response towards terrorism. In the late 70s, 
the Tupamaros in the country of Uruguay and the ERP (People's Revolutionary Army) and 
Montoneros in Argentina motivated aggressive popular reaction towards terrorism. They 
pushed civilisations beyond their beginning of tolerance and therefore were demolished. The 
same scenario applies to several groups that were working in Turkey dated in the late 1970s 
and perhaps a number of families of person named as Mafiosi in Italy in the era of '90s
81
 . 
2.6 The Importance of Defining Terrorism 
 
As mentioned above, by describing the word terrorism is not just a theoretic matter of the 
subject but a functioning concern of the first order. As per today world, terrorism is no longer 
a specific country problem but then again an issue comprising some global aspects. In a broad 
range of countries terrorist organizations might commit attacks; those who are victims of 
these attacks are from diverse nationalities; the workplaces, headquarters, and training sites of 
terrorist organizations and governments function in a number of countries. Terrorist 
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organizations accept direct as well as indirect assistance as of different states, recruit support 
as of a number of different ethnic and cultural communities, along with secure financial and 
monetary help from all over the world. Responses related to terrorism should also be on a 
global scale since terrorism and violence is an international phenomenon
82
.  
Through developing an operational and efficient international strategy it needs agreement or 
contract on what it is we are eventually dealing with, in additional words; international 
community want a description and explanation of terrorism. Recruitment of International 
groups against terrorism, for instance, which initiated in the mid of 90s and ended in the 
international agreements in the Group-7 countries in Sharem el-Sheikh Conference, 
ultimately can’t lead towards effective operational results given that the members cannot 
agree on a single definition
83
. Not a single duty and responsibility can be enforced on those 
nations supporting the act of terrorism, nor any can step be taken to combat terrorist related 
organisations as well as their allies deprived of answering the query of ‘what is terrorism,’. It 
is nearly not possible to formulate or impose international contracts and contracts against 
terrorism deprived of a definition of terrorism. A visible instance of the need to (or “intending 
to”) defining terrorism worries the repatriation of terrorists. Even though many nations have 
signed two-sided, and mutual agreements and contracts regarding a vast range of crimes, 
expulsion for political wrongdoings are often clearly excluded, along with the detailed 
background of terrorism which is always politically related. To deport individuals who are 
wanted for terrorist activities this gap allows countries to avoid their obligation
84
. 
2.7 Understanding the causes of Terrorism  
 
This section will address and explain the causes of terrorism.  Academic, scholars and 
policymakers have attempted to answer this for many years.  Even if we agree on the 
definition of terrorism but they certainly won't agree as to why anybody would want to blow 
up say worshipers at a mosque or commuters who are headed home on a bus or people eating 
at a restaurant or in a bar, why would they behead journalists or humanitarian workers on 
camera. These questions seem extraordinary and very hard to explain but we know that many 
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people from a variety of backgrounds, different ideologies, and different religious faiths have 
engaged in these actions and engaged in them systematically
85
. 
 The answer that those who use terrorism would give that they had no other choice; they're 
implying that terrorism is the weapon of the weak and those who lack power
86
.  If terrorists 
had aircraft they say they would bomb from the air they don't, so they use individuals who 
volunteer them to blow themselves up. However, this really isn't a sufficient explanation even 
if it's true and it's not always true, it's not always the case that the users of terrorism are 
weaker than their opponents.  In fact recent groups such as radical Islamists, whom 
sometimes call jihadists, require violence as a religious duty.  They regard terrorism what we 
would regard as terrorism as an imperative even if they had other means.  They think it's 
something that is both justified necessary indeed an obligation, so how do we go about 
analyzing the issue of causation. One of the first approaches that analysts adopted to 
causation was to look at what we would call macro level conditions, this would be society, 
economy, political regime and we would say are these the causes of terrorism and is it the 
environment in which terrorism occurs.  Over decades efforts have been made to link 
terrorism to for example poverty, inequality, injustice, democracy or perhaps the lack of 
democracy, apocalyptic ideologies, the presence of American troops or American 
multinational corporations ,Western cultural influences, globalization any number of 
conditions
87
.   
The difficulty is that very few people resort to terrorism, the numbers are very small but the 
majority numbers of people live under these conditions are affected by them in one way or 
another. The question is how we explain the behaviour of a few people in terms of what 
affects the many, why doesn't everybody resort to violence under these conditions and clearly 
they don't.  Therefore, underlying conditions considered in the aggregate are not sufficient as 
an explanation but it's not at all clear that they are even necessary to an explanation.  For 
example in the 1960's and 1970's which is when the era of international terrorism began. 
Those groups that used terrorism on the revolutionary left were very often the children of 
privilege middle class, upper class and those would be revolutionaries in Western Europe, 
US, Canada lived in functioning democracies. They could vote, they could protest and in fact 
terrorism was often the consequence of protest movements. It was seemed to be sort of a last 
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resort of hardliners within a protest movement who weren't happy with the compromises that 
other protesters had made with the government
88
. 
Sometimes in the 70s, terrorism was the work of separatists like the Irish Republican Army 
who were doomed to be a permanent minority in a majority system but still overwhelming 
majority of even people who favoured separatism rejected violence and rejected terrorism.  
This sort of challenge led analysts to consider the other end of the spectrum of causation, 
perhaps we need to look at the level of the individual.  This means we need to look at 
psychology, social psychology and demographic factors that might cause an individual to 
take the path of terrorism. There's currently a lot of interest in processes of radicalization, it 
falls in this category of inquiry of asking about individual motivation. The question is how 
some individuals come to favour the use of violence in the service, in this case Islam, and can 
individuals be converted to very radical views through exposure to the Internet. What 
encourages young Muslims or converts to Islam to go abroad to fight possibly to return home 
to commit acts of terrorism.  Here we say did they experience discrimination, frustration , 
some analysts have pointed to a death wish, a sense of romantic adventurism, family 
difficulties and some are pointed to the case of suicidal tendencies in the case of what we 
usually call suicide terrorism and those who use it are more likely to call martyrdom 
operations. It is difficult to answers to these questions in part because they're not very many 
subjects were available to interview and analyse and it's also very difficult to compare the 
uses of terrorism to similar people in the same cohort who rejected terrorism.  One thing that 
we can say pretty decisively is that there's no psychopathology behind the resort to terrorism, 
and there's usually nothing very noticeable in the behaviour or attitudes that would make 
potential recruits stand out among their peers. There's certainly no profile of the terrorists 
although governments over many years have certainly sought to find one and invested 
resources in finding one.  Looking at the group in general individuals who engage in 
terrorism are not so-called lone wolves despite the fact that there's a lot of interest in lone 
wolves these days. They are actually members of a group of people who think alike they join 
a group of like-minded individuals and often they're recruited through groups not as 
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individuals. This is the case no matter what the ideology it can be the far right, the far left, 
Islamist and separatists does not matter
89
.  
There are two implications here for why terrorism would happen; one is that recruits into 
terrorism members of these organizations develop a common identity. This sense of 
cohesiveness and cohesion makes conformity and compliance with group norms extremely 
important makes it extremely difficult for people to break away from the group.  We have 
seen this in many different circumstances over many years; they are subject to a fairly 
extreme peer pressure they exist under conditions of secrecy and danger. Sometimes they are 
part of a fighting core all this creates bonds that are extremely powerful both among the 
members of the group and between the followers and their leaders. Accordingly this is called 
by some people studying terrorism to say that the real cause is not the ideological ambition to 
establish, for example in Islamic State or in previous cases an independent state. This may 
not be the real cause of individual behaviour in the sense of what's driving terrorism. In fact 
students of military history know quite well the soldiers fight and die in battle for their 
buddies not for an abstraction.   
The other implication for causation is that we really need to take the strategies and the 
cultures of militant organizations quite seriously. We can't assume that the resort to terrorism 
is a sign of individual irrationality or unreason or fanaticism or some sort of automatic 
reaction. This would be arguing terrorism is usually calculating it can be a miscalculation but 
as a result of strategic thought. What this means is that, we need to be careful to take note of 
what extremist groups say, their communications rather than dismissing what they say as 
simple propaganda. They may be trying to influence an audience through what they say but 
it's still an insight into how they think
90
.  
The terrorists of the 21st century have become extremely clever at communicating their 
message via the Internet. In the case of radical Islamists such as ISIS or Al-Qaeda, we often 
think of their ideas as outdated and traditional but if they are and that's of course our view of 
what they are, they're accompanied by excellent communication and technical skills, 
particularly in the video domain. In conclusion, for a long time Western observers dismiss the 
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idea of establishing a Caliphate in the heart of the Middle East as completely impracticable 
only to see ISIS establishing control over sizable amount of Syria and Iraq
91
.  
2.8 Terrorism and other interchangeably used concepts: a comparative analysis  
 
It is been believed by most of the researchers and globally recognized explanation of 
terrorism can in the end never be established upon; so they say, ‘terrorist of one group is 
freedom fighter of another group.’ The question arises that who can be called as a terrorist, as 
stated by this philosophy, it depends totally on the personal viewpoint of the definer. In this 
chapter it is argued that a neutral description of terrorism is totally not possible; to combat 
terrorism, it is similarly essential to any attempt that is serious. Concerning what behaviours 
are allowed in wars that are conventional among nations are inaccurate along with an 
objective description of terrorism can be built upon recognized global laws as well as 
principles
92
. To struggle among a non-governmental organisation along with a state, this 
normative code and belief of concerning to a formal state of war, among two nations can be 
stretched deprived of any difficulty. This comprehensive form would eventually distinguish 
among guerrilla warfare as well as terrorism. The main aims and objectives which led down 
guerrilla warfare and terrorism might be same, but if their targets are concerned, they might 
differentiate from each other
93
. Fighters of guerrilla fighters are against military while on the 
other hand terrorist targets are civilians. According to this explanation, a terrorist organisation 
or group can totally no longer be called as a freedom fighter because they are fighting for the 
liberation movement. If an organisation kills civilians even if they called them as freedom 
fighters they will still are put as a terrorist
94
. 
2.8.1 Freedom Fighting and Terrorism 
Normally terrorist organisations define themselves as freedom fighters, fighters in 
contradiction of social, cultural, financial, religious, or imperialist repression, or any grouping 
of these. If we consider the separate side of the barrier, it is a clear attempt to damage 
terrorism; officials have offered the terms 'terrorists' along liberty or 'freedom fighters' as 
inconsistent. Thus, it has been stated by the ex-president of America: 'The main difference 
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between terrorists as well as freedom fighters is from time to time clouded. It is said by some 
men that “One man’s terrorist is another men freedom fighter”.  The logical and ethical 
differences are plain as well as fundamental. Deprived of passing the decision on the self-
report of any of specific group, trying towards presenting the terms 'terrorists' as well as 
'freedom fighters' as commonly special on the whole is a logical misconception 
95
. Two 
different features of human behaviour are terms which describe 'Terrorism' as well as 
'freedom fighting'. The first symbolises a process of struggle along with the second cause. 
The overall causes of set of groups which accepted terrorism by way of a mode and method 
of struggle are as varied as the interests along with goals of humanity. In the spirit of the right 
wing along with left wing philosophies and beliefs among the declared cases of groups of 
terrorist are changes that are social, goals and objectives that are associated along with 
religious beliefs, ethnic complaints, and environment related issues, rights of the animal in 
addition to specific subjects for example abortion. A few of terrorist groups certainly fight for 
freedom or national liberation. In contrast, towards terrorism to advance their cause, not all 
national freedom movements resort. In other words, some are one or the other and some are 
neither some insurgent group are together terrorist along with freedom fighters
96
 . 
Terrorism/ insurgencies have been employed as a tool for dramatic change in society, in an 
attempt to overthrow the concession capitulation/ oppressive regime. Due to the effectiveness 
of their endeavours, it is imperative to comprehend grounds for insurgencies, understanding 
the terrorist connection and usage of guerrilla warfare to obtain desired results. Violence and 
bloodshed have used a method for political discourse, the insurgent/ terrorist groups have 
employed guerrilla warfare/ mass terrorism to leverage their political demands, dictating the 
process on their terms. The means of international discourse changed due to the inception of 
terrorism and insurgent groups
97
.  
The grounds for terrorist/ insurgent groups can be myriad, ranging from cultural/ ethnic 
marginalisation, inept political bureaucracy, economic disparity, mismanagement of 
resources ultimately led leaders such as Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung to invoke idealistic 
strategies against an oppressive government. The Marxist ideology was employed which 
invoked uprising by proletariat class against the elite classes thereof. As a result, the 
successful attempts of these two leaders advertently led to using self-centred methods to 
                                                             
95
 Laqueur, W., 1976. Guerrilla warfare: a historical and critical study. Transaction Publishers. 
96
 Danieli, Y., 2005. Reappraising the Nuremberg trials and their legacy: The role of victims in international 
law. Cardozo L. Rev., 27, p.1633. 
97
 Ibid. 
48 
 
further their personalised agenda. More so, their demand and popularity advertently increased 
due to their dealing with local demands of the populace at large, as well as promising rights 
to nation rejected by host government
98
. 
Whereas violence is a predominant phenomenon over the time-period, terrorism and 
insurgency activities has increased, the terrorist groups/ insurgent groups are inept of creating 
a government, whereas they are apt for organising an overthrow of the host government, they 
advertently lack leadership skills to deal with the population as a whole. With Roman control 
over the controlled territories, to Taliban controlling regions of Afghanistan, notwithstanding 
the current opposition by groups in Iraq, the common denominator amongst these case-points 
is increased violence, casualties, lack of leadership and centred government. Insurgent/ 
terrorist activities have been commonplace throughout human history, inclusive of 
governmental control of the nation (attempted/ achieved)
99
. In 1648, with the Treaty of 
Westphalia, the political profitability and actual propensity of terrorism/ insurgency increased 
all the more, allowing repressed subjects/ groups to organise a platform for leveraging their 
demands forcefully. Violence has been a final element in their tactics to politicise the agenda 
for attaining their aim. However, the agenda is still similar; the modern version has modified 
to a certain extent, particularly in the case of Taliban tribes present in Afghanistan in addition 
to dissenting groups in Pakistan, waging war on national fronts against national forces. The 
ultimate aim of terrorism is to attain desired demands of a minority group via means of 
violence and bloodshed. As is the case, major post-colonial insurgencies have posted the self-
determination right which includes freedom from imperial power, particularly from so-called 
puppet regimes (regimes instituted by the colonial powers to affirm a certain amount of 
control) over colonial leftovers. The creation of Jewish homeland in Israel, present Islamic 
countries, post-colonial India, African, Asiatic and Latin countries fall into this category 
since insurgent repercussions were based on religious/ political grounds
100
.  
During the 18th century, the sudden spike in violence created small forces tasked with 
combating, which was termed as a guerilla force. With the increasing lethal nest of their 
weapons, using the tactics of guerilla fighter warfare, guerilla fighters exploited the weakness 
of opposition forces by harassing them. Whereas guerilla warfare is detected as a form of 
warfare, rather a kind of criminal behaviour, the effectiveness of guerrilla warfare became 
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apparent as it brought favourable results, turning tides in normative battles. The guerilla 
forces operate in a slightly different manner as in the case of Native American warriors; they 
are scattered as opposed to working in the group against enemy firepower. Moreover, they 
attack using man-to-man marking, since they vanish when enemy fire increases, resuming 
attack when enemy fire decreases
101
. The guerrilla warriors dissipate quickly, adapted to 
terrain, quicker to attack when the opportunity arises, loot and plunder the enemy forces and 
disrupt the enemy supplies when possible. This strategy was entirely possible against British 
military. The Chinese forces took on the British armed troops in a terrain suiting them, with 
no military training nor funding, which was employed by Spanish against Napoleonic forces. 
The guerrilla troops were not sanctioned/ owned by the government, were funded by local 
communities, using weapons from opposition forces; as a result, they were self-sufficient 
army relying on chance and skill largely. As the tactical success of guerrilla warfare increase, 
it became a de-facto method of instilling political change, bringing revolution against an 
oppressive regime. Che Guevara and Mao Tse-tung popularised guerrilla warfare tactics. 
Advanced militaries were tackled by using guerrilla warfare tactics which were relatively 
unknown to advanced military forces, and forces were ill-prepared to address the evasiveness 
of guerrilla war
102
. 
As per Mao, he stated that in the case of retreat process, two conditions must be met before 
determining the situation being favourable to them, undesirable for the enemy combatants 
and initiating the counter-attack. 
 These conditions are as following: 
• The populace supports actively the Red Army 
• Terrain is totally favourable for such guerrilla actions  
• The forces of Red Military forces are focused 
• The weak spots of the enemy have been identified 
• The opposition is reduced to a non-combative state, in a condition of demoralisation 
• The opposition is now more prone to make errors 
 
Such conditions are necessary for furthering guerrilla operations. Whereas Mao in actuality 
concentrated his movement on uplifting the Chinese nation, his demands and guerrilla 
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warfare tactics eventually struck a chord with major movements against regimes which were 
deemed as repressive/ totalitarian in nature. There is a low correlation between Che Guevara 
and Mao for demanding rights using guerrilla warfare. Che Guevara asserted the thought-
process of Mao as he posited that fighter needs a sound knowledge of countryside, as well as 
the escape and entry paths, hiding places, quick manoeuvres and in last, the support of 
populace
103
. 
2.8.2 Guerrilla Warfare and Terrorism 
Guerrilla warfare is completely not a different phenomenon in addition to that history is an 
observer to its constant occurrence. In this era, for the duration of the Napoleonic Wars, it 
developed importance which directed to an analysis of its role in leading 19th-century 
thinkers together with Clausewitz, Marx and Engels. The concept along with the practice of 
guerrilla warfare was incorporated inside social, economic as well as political programmers 
over the development of the following century that expected to overthrow recognised 
authority along with altering society through an armed fight. By Italian along with the Polish 
rebels the link that was fictitious in the mid-19th century like Carlo Blanco along with 
Mazzini accomplished execution in the writings and repetition in the 20thcentury
104
. 
Regarding the same phenomenon terrorism along with guerrilla fighting often serves as 
different designations. So the term ‘terrorism,’ though, has an extreme and more negative 
implication, apparently needing one in order to take a stand, while the term that is ‘guerrilla 
warfare’ is supposed as unbiased along with carries a more useful meaning. One of the 
difficulties that is associated with the use of the idea ‘guerrilla warfare’ stalks as of its 
uncertainty. According to some researcher it is defined as ‘guerrilla war’ by way of a 
protracted war of abrasion, along with gradually increasing violence, unclear restrictions, a 
melted line of interaction, give emphasis to the human factor. On the road to guerrilla war, 
guerrilla fighter eventually becomes regular fighters until and unless victory is achieved and 
one of the parties is beaten
105
. Likewise, some other researchers argued that ‘‘guerrilla fight 
be a particular type of fighting by which the side which is strategically weaker adopts the 
strategic aggressiveness in selected forms, times period and places. Weak people use a 
weapon of guerrilla frightening. In guerrilla war the impact of terrorism is always raised, in 
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addition to that it also indicates that “activity of guerrilla warfare is best placed in order, 
ranging from irregular and periodic terrorist attacks not essentially against armed units, along 
with military forces up to continuous guerrilla war and conflict”106.  Some of the other views 
of guerrilla war as well as terrorism as two distinct points along one order dealing using the 
use of strength and violence and ferocity
107
. 
2.8.2.1 Goals of Terrorism along with Guerrilla Warfare 
 
In view to define the term terrorism the kind of aim, goal, and objective required is irrelevant 
(as long as the objective is radical). The aims and targets of terrorist and guerrillas might be 
same, but then again they eventually choose different means in order to achieve them. 
Between the political goals and objectives that unlike organizations (in cooperation with 
terrorist organizations as well as guerrilla movements) find to accomplish it might declare: 
movements of national liberty (liberating regions of a conquering power); rebellion 
(overthrown of government); disorder (forming disorders and turmoil); altering the dominant 
system which is socio-economic, etc
108
. By way of opposing to creating the classification on 
the objectives and goals of violence simply by describing terrorism by means of a method of 
operation that has been directed in contradiction of civilian targets, the slogan has been 
refused that ‘terrorist of one man’s is freedom fighter of another man’s. By replicating the 
personal perspective of the writer this difference among the target of the violence and attack 
along with its aims eventually shows that the difference between ‘terrorism’ along with 
‘freedom fighting’ is totally not a personal difference109. Relatively a significant difference is 
caused, among the criminals’ by involving a clear and vibrant division aims along with their 
mode of process and operation. As described, since its mode of process and procedure an 
organisation and group are defined as ‘terrorist’ along with its target of the attack, while 
calling somewhat a ‘fight for liberation’ has on the way to do using the aim and objectives 
that the organisation eventually seeks to achieve
110
. 
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2.8.2.2 The Involvement of States in Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare  
 
How will the participation of nations effect in the execution of the terrorist attacks on the 
foundation of terrorism with guerrilla warfare? It should be noted that vicious actions 
committed through a state in contrast to civilians are prohibited and banned by international 
agreements in addition to that they are clearly defined as ‘war crimes’ (in the background of a 
war state) and also as the ‘crimes against humanity’. As a result, while these descriptions 
have eventually led towards the international illegitimating of the usage of violence and 
ferocity against civilians by armed military personnel along with political leaders, regarding 
the use of violence a gap still exists against civilians by governments and groups or 
individuals on radical or political grounds
111
. In some ways the state can be involved in 
terrorist activities: as of some levels of general support for terrorist-related groups and 
organisations, through operational and efficient assistance, introducing or guiding attacks, 
along with parallel execution of terrorist attacks by authorised agencies of the state. In 
terrorism, all forms of state participation are placed ‘‘below the overall group of terrorist 
nations, or nation supported or backed terrorism’’. Such a title or description has taken 
completely on the feature of a political or administrative weapon; opposing states assign it to 
one more, in addition to terrorist organisations use it in contradiction of states acting against 
them
112
. In opposing State-Sponsored Terrorism, the question of the involvement of the state 
in attacks of terrorist has been widely discussed
113
.  According to their level of participation 
in terrorism there, this dissertation proposes the following grouping of states:  
1- States supportive terrorism 
Those states that support terrorism, along with providing fiscal aid and assistance, 
philosophical support, military, armed or operational support. 
2- States operational terrorism 
Those states that perform or pledge terrorist actions through groups those are outside the 
institution
114
.   
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3- States perpetrating terrorism 
Those states are committing terrorist acts out of the country through their authorised bodies 
and its intelligence services, or via the members of its military security forces or their straight 
agents.  In other words, other nations with the intention of achieving political aims and 
objectives without stating war, states intentionally attacking civilians
115
. 
2.8.2.3 Guerrilla Warfare as a Particular Science 
 
In the theoretical development, the next breakthrough was T. E. Lawrence’s116 expression 
that some factors if followed beside certain lines, guerrilla warfare might be shown an exact 
science. Periodic the main factors that Lawrence eventually had in mind were: an 
indisputable guerrilla base, a regular and periodic opposing army of restricted strength and 
power using the task of monitoring a wide area also towards a concerned population. What 
were needed by guerrillas themselves in these conditions were speed along with endurance 
and patience, sovereign lines of supply along with special utensils to paralyse the enemy’s 
lines of communication. “Granted flexibility, safety and security (in the method of rejecting 
targets towards the enemy), time, as well as doctrine (the main idea towards converting each 
and every subject to kindliness), with the rebels victory will rest
117”. 
2.8.3 Terrorism or National Liberation Movement 
To make all classifications of terrorism worthless a widespread attempt is to bump overall 
activities of terrorist along with the struggle to (or “intending to”) achieving national 
liberation. As a result, for example, it has been time and again stated by the Syrian authority 
that Syria doesn’t assist terrorist groups; rather, it only funds freedom movements foreign 
along with government ministry of interior of the UAE Arab League repeated this position in 
the year of April 1997 while meeting in Egypt (Cairo). In this document it was named as 
‘Strategy of Arab against terrorism struggle,’ their aggressive activities were emphasized and 
pointed at ‘freedom as well as self-government’ are eventually not in the group of terrorism. 
Despite the fact that hostile actions against different regimes or relatives and relations of 
                                                             
115
 Cohen, A., 2011. Prosecuting terrorists at the International Criminal Court: reevaluating an unused legal tool 
to combat terrorism. Mich. St. U. Coll. L. Int'l L. Rev., 20, p.219. 
116
 Franklin Mark Osanka, 1962. Modern Guerrilla Warfare. The George Washington University. Human 
Resources Research Office. 
117
 Werle, G. and Jessberger, F., 2014. Principles of international criminal law. OUP Oxford pp.43-44. 
54 
 
leaders will ultimately not be well-thought-out political attacks however then again rather 
criminal attacks
118
. 
In relations towards the ‘end’ (national liberation) so will again discuss the means of 
terrorism. If there will be movement to liberate from any foreign oppression, then that 
movement cannot be considered as an act of terrorism. This can again be stated as´, ‘One 
man’s freedom warrior is an additional man’s terrorist,’ in which it is been stressed that all 
depends on the viewpoint along with the worldview of a single one doing the describing. One 
of the former presidents of USSR has given out a statement in the year 1981, all through the 
visit of the former Libyan ruler, Col. Muammar Qadhafi: ‘‘either for the willpower of the 
general public or the laws of olden times imperialists have no respect and concern. 
Indignation causes their Liberation struggles
119
. 
2.9 A New Conceptualization for the 21st Century 
 
One of the important aspects of guerrilla warfare filled through revolutionary principles was 
the participation of citizens of different nations in what were fundamental struggles of the 
state. During the era of Cold War, Che Guevara was one of the essential, and prominent 
figures who was born with Argentinean nationality but then again played a major role in the 
Cuban Revolution in addition to that, afterwards, passed away while attempting to bring a 
socialist revolution in the nation of Bolivia. During the time of jihad, this phenomenon, in the 
end, reached its peak that the US has helped to foster in contradiction of the Soviet Union in 
Afghanistan which saw the strange get-together of Muslim youth that was religious-minded 
as of across the whole world. As a result, the terrorism came back to the US on Sep 2001 by 
bombing buildings in Washington. However, as of Russia to India along with from Algeria to 
the Philippines, a lot of other countries have furthermore had to bear the outcome blows from 
the Afghan battleground
120
. One can predict the recurrence of guerrilla warfare that was 
classical as a means active by those nations which are less powerful when faced through 
definite or planned the United States military interference conceptualization of Guerrilla 
Warfare by way of the recent turn of the United States in the direction of an ‘imperial’ policy. 
During over the past times concluded ‘Action Iraqi Freedom ‘This whole phenomenon was 
on demonstration, albeit in an uncertain manner. As of the viewpoint of the US, of course, 
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these wars could be named as little wars, a phenomenon Britain along with other majestic 
powers had to struggle along with earlier in the decades before the WW1. In other possible 
target nations United States success or else its failure would, in the long run, regulate whether 
history is inscribed starting the viewpoint of Small Wars or as of that of a reborn guerrilla 
movement
121
. 
2.10 Targets and Responses 
 
At the same time as not all the political violence is focused on the very similar objectives, not 
all political-related violence is identical either. Towards diverse state responses 
distinguishing among the targets as well as the aims and objectives of systematic, organised 
communal political violence offers to rise. If you are thinking of a single political moment 
terrorism could not be justified; it is essential to understand the privileged political as well as 
cultural background in which violence occurs. This study and analysis suggest there are a 
huge number of relationships across fights in crises in the War on Terrorism: politically 
motivated Islam is prominent, but then again not as a motivator instead of violence. Religion 
is a meter of identity and character chosen by minorities of Muslim where they are controlled 
instead of representing a “clash of culture and civilisations” or else the inconsistency of Islam 
along with Christianity (or Judaism, or Atheist, or Freethinker, or Nigerian original 
religions)
122
. That violence and strength arise is furthermore a function of state failure and 
disaster than a clash of civilisations. One of the most important features that are always 
linked with terrorism is recognised as Jihad, and it is the rise of violence and ferocity as a 
reaction to a failure of the state. In the worldwide war that was lead against terrorism; 
“terrorist” violence is eventually linked along with political organisations and groups that one 
or the other way challenges the whole state in a separatist or nationalist fashion, or fight a 
severe authoritarian or heavy-handed request of the state interests, together with programs of 
forced assimilation
123
.  
There is always a danger towards misinterpretation of the reasons and motives of terrorist 
groups or misjudging the danger and risk they pose despite the fact that organisations like al 
Qaeda, ISIS seek to promote the idea and motive that politically related violence is 
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completely lined with an “internationalist” Islamic empire. According to some researchers, 
even though al Qaeda is a restricted problem, whose numbers, as well as “terrorist helpers, 
are limited and perhaps controllable.” Beginning from Morocco to Malaysia having a fantasy 
of building an Islamic empire or and the Islamic Kingdom is not the same as having the 
ability, skill and opportunity to do so. In order to be certain, Osama bin Laden along with his 
deputy companion Ayman al-Zawahiri eventually seek to tap into a socioeconomic 
obstruction in addition to that ignite a larger clang of civilisation
124
. Though, the people who 
are living from Morocco to Malaysia have a say in their expectations; along with they have 
devastatingly comprised their general characteristics, straightforward and single forms of 
Islamic worship, as well as democracy. By the end of the year 2005, it has been noted by the 
freedom house that essential nations situated in the Middle East in the previous four years 
have eventually seen substantial and steady progress toward forming freer or open societies. 
In addition to that, there are a lot of Muslim-majority nations which are now considered as 
democratic—Indonesia, Malaysia, Mali, Senegal, and Kuwait. To provide public goods with 
the key, the United States foreign policy method should be to encourage development along 
with the state’s ability125. 
2.11 International policy against Terrorism/ Guerrilla Warfare/ Insurgency 
 
It is important to have a fair amount of perspective regarding intentions behind terrorist acts, 
guerrilla warfare and insurgents. When post-colonial violence is taken into consideration with 
historical perspective, since World War II, most colonial wars have been won by colonial 
subjects against imperial power. Due to Jewish and Arabic violence, British mandate was 
taken over by United Nations, whereas India gained independence on its terms. On a more 
recent note, the Soviet bloc located in Europe wrestled against the Soviet Union to gain 
independence, resulting in the formation of smaller independent states such as Uzbekistan, 
Georgia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan and Ukraine. African and South American 
nations have gained independence after violent civil wars/ anti-government coups. As the 
nature of insurgent actions varies and success rate improves, the counter-insurgence policy is 
required to be reassessed
126
.   
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Two factors can impact counter-insurgency policy sufficiently consists of government 
response and environment response. The insurgent violence can be curbed down when the 
centralised government can take radical action in dispelling insurgent violence. The majority 
of the antagonism occurring against the host government by guerrilla organisations and 
insurgent groups is due to the inappropriate behaviour shown by the government to all 
groups, maintaining hegemony over businesses/ affairs. In the case of Sri Lanka, the LTTE 
(Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) was a terrorist uprising due to the marginalisation of 
minority groups which aggravated national peace situation, involving intervention by Indian 
Army
127
.  
The minority groups should be tackled using fair elections as well as included in local 
accountability to prevent any desperate measures taken by them otherwise. It starts a process 
of self-determination of rights struggle by subgroups. The political process of a country is 
disturbed when violent/ terrorist inclinations increase from a subset. Insurgency inclinations 
can also be curbed down economic capabilities are increased, resource management is 
furthered for minority groups, whereas autonomous control of international corporations 
could also hamper terrorist tendencies to a considerable extent. Regional utilisation is amped 
up, usage of available resources, curbing levels of unemployment, giving the general 
population a true sense of control over their actions, equal distribution of wealth works in 
favour of maintaining regional peace, discontent and averting strife
128
. It could be reasonably 
asserted that leaders of insurgents have educated individuals, a spike in the creation of 
employment and industrial capacities of the region would increase satisfaction levels as the 
air of discontent wanes off. Moreover, the contributing members of the society are prevented 
from terrorist activities as monetary gains are well within sight. As per O’Neill, he 
confidently asserts that national campaigns in an attempt to deal with terrorism and guerrilla 
warfare can ramp up support by tackling the needs of the regional population to best of their 
abilities
129
. 
Apart from the economic and political concessions, land rights/ reforms could be addressed, 
giving the aggravated group a representation via ownership and rights. The majority of such 
grievances can be dealt with by mere compromises and have the ability to prevent 
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accumulation of poverty, discontent amongst people, dissension in ranks and terrorist 
inclinations
130. On the other hand, O’Neill has asserted that programs in the absence of 
competent administrators are akin to hollow promises. Competent managers in the lack of apt 
programs are powerless, withal inept programs may simply exacerbate the existent problems. 
To counter the insurgent/ terrorist activities, economic and political undercurrents are crucial 
to being taken in context since insurgent activities are seldom without a reason. It largely 
relies on conditional propaganda and secrecy to ramp up popular group for the regional 
population
131
. 
When the situational conditions and intelligence is leveraged, a successful country can use 
amassed information to defeat the nascent terrorist group which could gain momentum. 
Whereas certain terrorist groups/ insurgencies are unavoidable, usage of resources minimises 
the likelihood of such activities. International organisations can also participate in counter-
terrorism which could add a dimension to the policy against terrorism
132
. With the help of apt 
management of social services and invoking welfare programs, the demands of insurgents 
could be dealt with. A unified agreement involving freedom fighters-state can assist in 
meeting the local requirements of the minority/ subgroups
133
.  
When western coalitions take aggressive/ economic and political actions against terrorist/ 
insurgent groups, their presence as per most cases aggravates the resistance and propaganda. 
As a case-in-point, the presence of United States in South American terrain is largely 
associated with catalysing numerous communal and nationalistic conflicts for multiple 
decades, affirmed by Guevara during the 1960s
134
. Moreover, the American involvement in 
third-world countries such as Asiatic region, Middle-East and South American terrain can 
assist in curbing down regional tensions where assistance with localized groups such as Arab 
leagues, Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Organization of African Unity 
and Mercosur.
135
 It can help in recognizing the trigger factors and highlight the potential red-
flags by particular regions. To this effect, the counter-insurgent policy also suffers in this 
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regard. Due to illegal actions of US, the weaker group gains international support/ voice due 
to the heinous atrocities committed
136
.  
The extent of American penetration into regional and international countries far exceeds 
those of International Organisations (IO). When American intervention and unneeded climate 
of unrest is eliminated to a certain extent, international organisations (IO) can step in and take 
evasive action, facilitating peace in the region. By this extent, the anti-American rhetoric and 
imperialism tactics will fade away in the long-run. As the terrorist groups in a particular area 
counter the antagonistic element (US), it attains certain leverage in calling its war on fair 
grounds. As per Sarah Sewell, United States is preordained to secure the civilians, as opposed 
to eliminating the opposition, their premier priority. The civilian population is the epicentre 
of gravity, which is inadvertently affected in the ensuing onslaught. More so, in pursuing 
these tactics, the terrorists/ insurgents often use civilians as a shield against the impending 
onslaught. As a result, the popular support is snatched, with the group starving for popularity. 
Furthermore, due to unplanned casualties and deaths due to such operations, the terrorist 
sentiments are further increased as victims of aggrieved families join the ranks of terrorist 
groups to avenge their deaths. As a result, the support of the host nation also decreases to this 
end, resulting national chaos. The state becomes unpopular as it is inept in protecting the 
friendly fire as well as enemy combatants from the reach of civilians, becoming collateral 
damage
137
.  
The most tools against increasing terrorist/ insurgent groups’ penetration into a country is to 
counter them with counter-insurgency strategies. Since the public opinion may sway in 
favour of the terrorist groups, the lack of public/ national support against these groups as the 
government takes the necessary step will advertently may them an unpopular group in case of 
the regional domain. Using nationwide propaganda against these groups, informational 
efforts can be instituted for combating unrest and civilian casualties. As a result, the 
revolutionary segments of the populace will observe dissuading trends towards these self-
proclaimed torch-bearers of justice
138
.  Whereas the constitutional freedom has been allotted 
to press in most countries, censorship policies are needed to be as forceful to decrease the 
spread of terrorist causes and creating recognition for such groups. Responsible journalism 
and reporting is an integral step in giving redundant coverage to terrorist groups and 
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highlighting their causes. The terrorist groups and mass media have developed a symbiotic 
relationship from which mass population ultimately suffers since the recent undue credit for 
its efforts against an imperial power, whereas the latter capitalises on ratings
139
. 
As per Nacos, television has provided the best medium for propagation of terror and 
recognition due to its ability to transmit visual content over a broad spectrum of people. 
Therefore, it can be reasonably asserted that television/ media has played a double-edged 
sword in insurgent policy and counter-terrorism policies. When terrorist/ insurgent messages 
are propagated through mass media, it assists their cause conveniently. It reduces the 
effectiveness of counter-insurgency propaganda to this end. The opposition messages and 
hate-mongering can be deflected by transmission of information, increasing educational 
efforts and creating opportunities, so as to douse the efforts of growing terrorist sentiments. 
Moreover, spreading propaganda has become a de-facto strategy for terrorist groups, whereas 
countering their agenda with responsible reporting is a pivotal initiative to be taken by both 
journalists and government. When the incident is removed from public knowledge, 
decreasing the amount of international attention paid to it, as Netanyahu asserts the common 
tree analogy, these groups could eventually disperse. Since mass media was first employed 
during 1972 Munich Olympics where Israeli sportsmen were taken a hostage, subsequently 
became a skeletal method for terrorist activities to thrive and propagate. When the element of 
oxygen of publicity is eliminated, the advocacy of terrorist acts is driven down in popular 
media. During the past decade, the increased terrorist groups and events have received 
international fame and acknowledgement which inflames the national front. Such endeavours 
are akin to the thorn in anti-terrorism endeavours by agencies/ government at large since the 
key purpose of terrorism is self-fulfilled
140
. 
In summing up, this chapter has already examined the conceptual and legal difficulty involve 
in the search for the generally accepted definition of the term of terrorism. The objective of 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare may well be the same; but they are distinguished from each 
other by the targets of their operations. A legitimate cause does not act legitimate the means 
and methods utilized; therefore, the next chapter will examine peoples actively pursue their 
right to self- determination, and the relationship between the struggle for self determination 
and terrorism. 
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Chapter Three  
The qualifications of terrorism in International Humanitarian Law and the 
issue of National Liberation Movements  
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
International humanitarian law of armed conflict is a legal discipline in its own right.  
Formerly called "the law of war", and it is above all branch of public international law of 
which it presents all the characters
141
.  It developed at a time when the use of armed force 
was a state practice in international relations, unlike the present time when this practice 
became prohibited by a rule of international law contained in the fourth paragraph of the 
second article of the United Nations Charter. Exceptions to this prohibition are permitted in 
case of individual or collective self-defence of measures taken by the Security Council, in the 
manner provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and when people 
exercises its right to self-determination in a national liberation war 
142
. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) tends to reduce the consequences of any declared war 
by inter alia and trying to protect individuals not taking part in hostilities. Michel Deyra 
considers IHL to be above all the rights of conciliation and persuasion on the basis of a 
rational and reasonable approach to belligerency
143
. Eric David clarified the four main 
principles of the modern law of armed conflict
144
:  
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1- The obligation to always distinguish between combatants and non-combatants, and 
consequently the rule of the immunity of the latter;  
2- The obligation to repress the violation of rules applicable to combatants;  
3- The obligation not to use any means to fight the enemy;  
4- The rejection of any discrimination in the care provided to the wounded and sick
145
.  
 
He added that this right is subdivided into two categories of rules; on the one hand the rules 
governing the conduct of hostilities (methods and means of combat); on the other hand, those 
relating to the treatment of persons in the hands of the enemy (prisoners, sick, shipwrecked, 
civilians in the occupied territories, etc.) 
146
. 
As far as terrorism is concerned, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) does not define it, 
but it prohibits most acts commonly considered terrorist acts when they are committed in 
peacetime or in time of war. In accordance with one of the fundamental principles of 
humanitarian law, parties to an armed conflict must at all times make a difference amongst 
civilians and warriors, and also between civilian items and military objectives. Terrorist acts 
can be committed in wartime as well as in peacetime since IHL applies only in situations of 
armed conflict, and it does not regulate acts of terrorism perpetrated in peacetime. Professor 
Vincent Coussirat-Couster stresses that "terrorists cannot be blamed for violating 
humanitarian law in times of peace. Unlike the goals of the national liberation movements, 
terrorist movements do not aim to create a state in the process of becoming independent "
147
. 
By expressly prohibiting all acts aimed at spreading terror among the civilian population,
148
 
humanitarian law 
149
 punishes the following acts: 
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 "attacks against civilians and civilian objects"150 : Article 13, paragraph 2 of 
Additional Protocol II prohibits "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which is to spread terror among the civilian population in non-international armed 
conflicts"; 
 "attacks without discrimination": paragraph 2 of art. 51, para. 4 of Protocol I prohibits 
"acts or threats of violence the main purpose of which is to spread terror to the 
civilian population". Its paragraph 5 defines indiscriminate attacks and its paragraph 6 
reaffirms "the prohibition of reprisals against the civilian population or civilians"; 
 "attacks against facilities containing dangerous forces" 151; 
 "the taking of hostages" 152; 
  "the killing of persons who do not participate or no longer participate in 
hostilities"
153
; 
 "attacks against captured, wounded, shipwrecked or prisoners of war"154; 
Article 33 of the same Convention prohibits collective punishment, as well as any measure of 
intimidation or terrorism in its paragraph 1, while paragraph 3 of the same article prohibits 
retaliatory measures against protected persons and their property. These measures, as stated 
in the commentary of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), are "intimidation 
measures intended to terrorize the population" 
155
, by discriminating against the military and 
the innocent. The use of violence for political purposes is not a new phenomenon. What is 
unusual in these new waves of violence is the danger and threat of international terrorism that 
uses planes and explosives, and is likely to gain access to weapons of mass destruction. 
In the report of the Commission for the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of 
Minorities,
156
 special rapporteur Kalliopi K. Koufa stated that terrorism violates human 
rights, threatens life, freedom, dignity of people, democratic society, social peace and public 
order. On 27 June 2001, the Commission on Human Rights prepared another report which 
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emphasized the need to distinguish between terrorism and armed conflict
157
.  In paragraphs 
129-131, the authors stated that terrorist acts are acts of violence and violations of human 
rights, humanitarian law and international conventions which tend to regulate international 
relations. Similarly, in resolution 50/186 on human rights and terrorism, the UN General 
Assembly affirmed that terrorism is a destruction and violation of human rights, fundamental 
principles of human rights, democracy and a threat to the security of States
158
. 
In situations of armed conflict, state or individual terrorist acts by armed groups constitute 
violations of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 relating to the protection of the victims of 
armed conflict, since they reflect a practice of terror directed against to the civilian 
population. A new broader concept of terrorism has been adopted by the representatives of 
certain States in matters relating to terrorism in the organs and bodies of the United Nations. 
Terrorism is connected with state resort to force. This is reflected in the official documents 
and the records of the proceedings
159
. 
 
The 1973 report of the Special Committee on International Terrorism describes this concept 
of terrorism to which several States subscribe: "Terrorism practiced on a large scale and by 
the most modern means against entire peoples for the purpose of domination or control, 
interference in their home affairs, armed attacks perpetrated on the pretext of retaliation or 
preventive action by States against the sovereignty and integrity of third States, as well as the 
infiltration of terrorist groups or agents into the territory other States "
160
. 
In recent years, the question has arisen as to whether terrorism, which is an act of violence, is 
a war or a situation of armed conflict. Former US President George W. Bush condemned the 
attacks of 11 September 2001 against the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon calling them 
"acts of war"
161
. His formulas all referred to war using a warrior vocabulary and he said: 
"International terrorists, including members of Al Qaeda, have been attacked by the United 
States armed forces
162
. Also the former Al Qaeda leader Usama Bin Ladin, for his part, used 
the very concept of "holy war" (jihad)
163
.  
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The attacks of 11 September 2001 have raised profound questions about the notion of "armed 
conflict", which is not precisely defined in conventional humanitarian law in the absence, in 
particular, of defining the threshold from which violence can be considered and described as 
an armed conflict. Some authors
164
 claim that jus in bello applies to terrorism because, on the 
one hand, terrorist acts are prohibited by international humanitarian law protecting civilians 
and, on the other hand, they provoke terror among individuals, civilians or among the civilian 
population as a whole
165
. Terrorist acts may, however, trigger an international armed conflict 
when committed by a State or its de facto agents-against another State, or a non-international 
armed conflict when committed by an organized armed group fighting against a state and its 
governmental authorities
166
. However, terrorism can not constitute an armed conflict, as it 
implies the existence of two identifiable parties to the conflict, a condition sine qua non for 
the application of the laws of war which is not the case with terrorist groups who work in 
hiding and do not carry arms openly. In both legal and political aspects, there is common 
disagreement about such a broadening of the concept of terrorism leading to the following 
questions: 
- Is the international community moving away from the classical form of war? 
- Is the terrorist group such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, ANF terrorist attacks in Arab countries and in 
Western countries, particularly in Iraq, Syrian and Europe, a war in the legal sense of the 
term? 
- Can the terrorist acts of September 11th be assimilated to acts of war when the enemy is not 
a state and does not have a regular army? 
According to Clausewitz, war is "an act of violence the object of which is to compel the 
adversary to comply with our will"
167
.  However, this notion has now become confused by 
the existing growth of international violence which, through terrorism, introduces non-state 
actors who do not use weapons and do not easily identify their identity or goals. 
Resolution 23 of 14 September 2001, of the United States Congress, authorized President 
Bush to resort to any necessary and appropriate use of force against nations, organizations or 
persons, who planned, authorized, committed or aided terrorist attacks
168
. The United Nations 
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Security Council in its resolution 1368, made it possible to combat terrorism "by all 
means".
169
 This expression implies the use of armed force within the meaning of Chapter VII 
of the Charter, without expressly stating it and without specifying when and in what legal 
context acts of terrorism turn into acts of war
170
. This chapter will analyze, on the one hand, 
the distinction between armed conflicts and acts of terrorism, and, on the other hand, the 
question of the classification of acts perpetrated by national liberation movements and their 
military actions against occupation. Also for the Arab and Islamic countries, it is indeed 
necessary to make a clear distinction between terrorism and national liberation struggles. This 
subject is also dominant for the Organization of the Islamic Conference as shown in Article 2 
of the Convention of this Organization to combat international terrorism which states: "are 
not considered as terrorist crimes cases of struggle led by the peoples including armed 
struggle, against foreign occupation, colonialism, aggression and domination, for liberation or 
self-determination in accordance with the principles of international law "
171
. 
 
3.1 The necessary distinction between Terrorism and Armed Conflict 
 
In the search for a definition of terrorism, it is vital to make the distinction between this 
phenomenon and armed conflict. In almost most of the studies made so far in the United 
Nations framework, the need for this distinction is regularly indicated. In the report of the 
Special Committee on International Terrorism, for example, it is noted that the Committee 
distinguished in its work between terrorism and armed conflict on the one hand, and terrorism 
and the right of peoples to self-determination and the right to fight against foreign 
occupation, on the other hand. In the UN General Assembly, many debates among states have 
expressed concerns about the wars of national liberation, some viewed from the perspective 
of the right to self-determination. While some States are determined not to allow the debate 
on terrorism to unduly interfere with this fundamental principle. Others have focused on what 
is increasingly referred to as "ethnic conflict" or even "nationalist / separatist conflict", 
sometimes even giving the impression that any such conflict is necessarily linked to 
terrorism
172
. 
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One of the reasons for the need to make a clear distinction between armed conflict and 
terrorism is that the law of armed conflict or jus in bello applies as soon as there is an armed 
conflict. Its rules govern military operations and weapons (Hague law) and the protection of 
victims of armed conflict (Geneva law). The first question is whether the law of armed 
conflict is a relevant body of terrorism. It is therefore necessary to know whether terrorism 
constitutes an armed conflict, especially when it comes to attacks against military objectives, 
such as the massacre of Marines in Beirut by Hezbollah on 23 October 1983
173
, the attack on 
the Dhahran US military complex in Saudi Arabia in June 1996
174
, or the attack on the 
destroyer USS Cole on October 12, 2000 in Yemen
175
. Also during an armed conflict 
combatants can use force against military targets. However, will certain terrorist attacks such 
as those mentioned above, perpetrated in the context of an armed conflict, be considered as 
acts of war? In order to answer these questions, the next sections will try to find out first 
whether the law of armed conflict can be applied to international terrorism and whether acts 
of terrorism can be qualified as acts of war. 
 
3.2 The inapplicability of jus in bello to terrorism 
 
The armed conflict is a belligerent situation that assumes the existence of two identifiable 
parts equipped with military equipment engaged in intense military operations (acts of war) 
to correspond to the customary definitions of armed conflict, which is not the case of terrorist 
groups operating in hiding and have no distinctive signs and do not openly bear arms. 
Terrorism is neither an international armed conflict nor a non-international armed conflict in 
the legal sense of these two terms. The first is an inter-state conflict, and the second is a 
conflict that has erupted in a state in the form of a civil war (between non-state entities or 
between them and the state's official army) or in the form of a national liberation war against 
an occupying foreign army.  
International Humanitarian Law relating to international armed conflicts applies, in the case 
of declared war or any other armed conflict arising between two or more of the High 
Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of the parties. Similarly, 
the same body of law applies in all cases of occupation of, all or part, the territory of a High 
Contracting Party even if such occupation does not meet any military resistance
176
.  
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In the following sections, we will specify the legal criteria for conflicts non-international 
armed forces, and we will legally distinguish non-state entities from terrorist groups. 
 
3.3 Legal criteria of Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) 
 
In the event of an armed conflict which is not of an international character and arising in the 
territory of a State, Additional Protocol II
177
 sets out criteria for qualifying a military action 
as a non-international armed conflict (i.e. " internal "or" civilian "): organized armed groups 
of the conflict exercise control over part of the territory and carry out continuous military 
operations . Using identical terms, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 
its first judgment focused on verifying the applicability of the law of internal armed 
conflict
178
, based on Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, in order to distinguish the 
internal armed conflict from troubles caused by an act of banditry. The second chamber 
emphasized two criteria: the "intensity of the conflict" and the "organization of the parties to 
the conflict"
179
. 
3.3.1. Control of territories by armed combatants 
As for the first criterion, the confrontations must be violent, and as for the second, the 
combatant parties must be organized, ranked and considered as real armies containing regular 
combatants
180
. The ICTR Trial Chamber added that these armed parties must also exercise 
control over part of the territory, with reference to the first paragraph of Article 1 of the 
Second Additional Protocol, which provides for its application to conflicts in which " (...) 
organized armed groups which, under the leadership of a responsible command, exercise 
control over a part of their territory to enable them to conduct continuous and concerted 
military operations (...) "
181
. 
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3.3.2 Intensity of the conflict 
Once the above criteria have been verified, the seriousness of the violations the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949, Article 2 of the ICTY Statute dealing with "grave breaches" 
182
. An 
internal military confrontation sometimes involves the intervention of the state armed forces, 
such as the wars of national liberation in which armed struggles against the colonial 
domination of a State or against foreign occupation are involved
183
. In the same way, the 
internal civil war is transformed into an international armed conflict as soon as there will be 
foreign interventions. In all these cases, the combatants who may participate directly in 
hostilities, according to Article 13 of the 1st and 2nd Geneva Conventions, are: members of 
the armed forces or of a party to the conflict, members of the resistance movements which 
respect certain conditions, the persons who support and follow the armed forces without 
directly belonging to it, the members of a regular force who claim authority not recognized 
by the Detaining Power, the members of the merchant marine crews, and civil aviation of the 
parties to the conflict, individuals of a population of an unoccupied territory who rise as a 
group to prevent the advance of the enemy and provided they openly stand arms
184
.  
Terrorism would not, therefore, have the characteristics of an armed conflict.  In The Hague 
and Geneva Conventions, acts of terrorism cannot be generally characterized neither as an 
international inter-state armed conflict nor as an internal armed conflict, unless they have 
been perpetrated in the name of one State against another State. During the conduct of 
hostilities, it is forbidden to attack undefended towns and villages because only military 
objectives can be attacked. According to the definition provided by Article 52 section 2 of the 
First Protocol, a property must fulfil two criteria in order to be a military objective. First, the 
object must effectively contribute to the military action of one party, and secondly, its 
destruction, capture or neutralization must provide a specific military advantage to the other 
party. Terrorist attacks are acts intended to terrorize a civilian population or people who do 
not take part in hostilities. They thus constitute a violation of the principle that the civilian 
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population must be safe from hostilities, a primary principle of the fundamental principles 
recognized by the ICJ
185
, and as the basis of modern humanitarian law by the ICTY
186
. Acts 
of terrorism can be perpetrated in peacetime as well as in time of war. In the latter situation, 
the courts verify the applicability of the law of internal armed conflict before describing 
certain terrorist acts as war crimes
187
. In order for to arrive at this analysis, it is necessary to 
clarify the difference between non-state entities and terrorist groups. 
 
3.4 The distinction between non-State entities and terrorist groups 
 
The Institute of International Law
188
, underlining the threat of the rise of many armed 
conflicts, involving non-state entities, has not expanded the concept of non-state entities to 
include terrorist groups
189
. 
3.4.1. The belligerents of non-state entities 
According to Article I of the Berlin Resolution of the Institute of International Law adopted 
on 25 August 1999, the expression of armed conflicts involving non-State entities refers to 
internal armed conflicts between the armed forces of a government and those of one or more 
non-state entities, or between several non-state entities; it also includes internal armed 
conflicts involving peacekeeping forces
190
. In such conflicts, "non-state entities" are not 
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terrorist groups but they are parties to internal armed conflicts, which oppose government 
armed forces or fight against similar entities that meet the conditions set out in common 
article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the protection of victims of armed conflict or 
article 1 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions relating to the Protection 
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II)
191
. Clandestine terrorist groups 
are excluded from this definition because they do not participate in armed conflicts as parties. 
We therefore understand that the expression is aimed primarily at quasi-state entities (or with 
a vocation to become a state or a government) which resort to a de facto participation in an 
armed conflict, and which may be insurgents belligerents recognized in as such governments 
in exile continuing struggle or national liberation movements. According to article 5 of the 
Berlin resolution, any State and any non-State belligerent party to an armed conflict are 
legally bound to , with each other and to all other members of the international community , 
respect the right of humanitarian aid in all circumstances
192
. This article highlights everything 
in particular, that no State or non-State entity can evade such obligations by denying the 
existence of an armed conflict
193
. 
3.4.2. The armed organization of the belligerents 
The concept of armed conflict is different from the other concepts such as terrorism, unrest or 
internal tensions. It is based on objective criteria relating to the intensity of the fighting and 
the degree of organization of the opposing forces and their control of part of the territory of 
the State. While the law of armed conflict is applicable, it is not applicable in the case of 
terrorist attacks or in situations of internal disturbances and tensions that cannot be governed 
by the Geneva Conventions. However, even in these cases, according to Professor Vincent 
Coussirat-Coustere, individuals remain protected by international human rights and 
fundamental human rights. Ultimately, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia held in Tadic that: the standard applied by the Appeals Chamber to the existence 
of an armed conflict for the purposes of the provisions of Article 3 It focuses on two aspects 
of a conflict: its intensity and the organization of the parties to the conflict
194
. In an internal or 
mixed armed conflict, these closely related criteria serve at a minimum only for the purpose 
of distinguishing an armed conflict from banditry, from unorganized and short-lived 
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insurrections or from terrorist activities, which are not covered by the international 
humanitarian law organization. The factors relevant to this determination are set out in the 
commentary to the Geneva Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, (Commentary, Geneva Convention I).
195
 
Clandestine terrorist groups do not resemble non-state entities that carry arms openly and 
dominate territories in state form armed forces and participate in more or less intensive 
military clashes in a non-international armed conflict. Terrorists today are suicidal, and this 
was the case on September 11, 2001. Terrorists do not always have weapons, in most cases 
they use explosives and they do not dominate the territories of a state. 
 
3.5 Terrorist acts as war crimes 
 
Terrorist acts can be qualified as war crimes which prohibited by the international 
humanitarian law
196
. Terrorist aims to terrorize the civilian population but the jus in bello 
prohibits attacks on civilians
197
 or acts of threat whose main purpose is to spread terror 
among the civilian population
198
 and acts of terrorism perpetrated against civilians who are in 
the power of the enemy
199
. Terrorist attacks can be committed by armed forces in conflict. 
They may take the form of criminal acts by a state agent or a member of a state armed 
force
200
. They may also be perpetrated by individuals on the sidelines of the conflict and be 
considered as a grave breaches in international humanitarian law
201
. 
In the following sections, this thesis will analyze the concept of "serious crimes" for crimes 
that have serious consequences for the victim in Geneva law such as acts of terrorism. Also 
this thesis will examine the criminalization of terrorism in the statutes and case law of 
international criminal jurisdictions in order to determine whether acts of terrorism can be 
characterized as war crimes. 
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3.5.1 The war crimes of terrorism against the civilian population 
Acts of terrorism constitute serious violations of the rules applicable in armed conflicts. The 
facts of these serious violations, as pointed out by Eric David, are punishable regardless of 
the international or non-international nature of the conflict in which they were committed
202
. 
This qualification is reserved for offenses that have serious consequences for the victim
203
. 
3.5.1.1 Serious violations of humanitarian law 
 
The International Law Commission has criminalized, in its Draft Code of Crimes against the 
Peace and Security of Humanity, war crimes of exceptional gravity
204
. It recalled that this 
offense is applicable in internal and international armed conflicts. . In its final report adopted 
in 1996, the ILC added war crimes to acts of terrorism
205
. 
The specific provisions for these are contained first in the Convention IV on the Protection of 
Civilians and in the two Additional Protocols in times of international and non-international 
armed conflicts then in the case law and the statutes of the international criminal tribunals. 
But before analyzing the gravity of terrorist acts and their violations of jus in bello, we need 
to shed light on the notion of serious crime
206
. 
In the case of international armed conflicts, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 provide 
special protection to certain categories of persons including: members of the armed forces 
wounded on the ground, members of the sea forces and shipwrecked wounded, prisoners of 
war, and civilians in time of war, therefore violations of these rules constitute as a war 
crimes. Articles 50, 51, 130, and 147 respectively, of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
treat certain acts as serious crimes and as war crimes when they are committed against 
civilians or property protected by the provisions of the above mentioned Conventions.
207
 
These articles prohibit terrorist acts by classifying as serious crimes attacks against civilians 
causing great bodily harm. Article 33 of the Fourth 1949 Geneva Convention on the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in time of War provides that: "no protected person may be 
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punished for an offense which he has not personally committed. Collective punishments, as 
well as any kind of intimidation or terrorism are prohibited ". The Additional Protocol to the 
Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 
I), extended the notion of grave breaches, inter alia, to a number of violations that were not 
included in the above-mentioned Conventions. The following acts are considered serious 
violations of the Protocol: "Art. 85, section 3, (a) subject the civilian population or civilians 
to attack; (b) launch an indiscriminate attack on the civilian population or civilian objects, 
with the knowledge that the attack will cause loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to 
civilian objects; e) submits a person to an attack knowing it out of action ". These two articles 
are only one form of terrorism perpetrated in the context of an international armed conflict 
and intimidation by belligerents against the civilian population. These attacks correspond to 
what could be termed "State terrorism" since they have come under the control of state 
officials and aim to terrify and terrorize civilians by violating Article 51 of Additional 
Protocol I, which provides for the following essential
208
; Section 2, neither the civilian 
population as such nor civilians shall be the object of attacks. Acts or threats of violence 
whose main purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited.  Section 
4, indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Section 5, among other things, the following types of 
attacks will be considered indiscriminate: (b) attacks that may be expected to cause incidental 
loss of life in the civilian population, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a 
combination of those losses and damages, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage expected ". The "terror" referred to in this article 
corresponds to the "terrorism" attacks that are prohibited by this text in the context of 
international armed conflicts where civilians must be protected from acts of violence
209
. 
                                                             
208
 Article 1 section 4 of this Protocol covers "armed conflicts in which peoples struggle against colonial 
domination and foreign occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of the right of peoples to self-
determination, protected in the Charter of the United Nations and in the declaration on the principles of 
international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation between States ". The ICJ, in its advisory 
opinion, on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, had taken 
into account the fact that there is still "an international armed conflict and a Israeli occupation moreover, and it 
could have recalled the Parties to the conflict, especially the Israeli army, their obligations under international 
humanitarian law with regard to the protection enjoyed by "the civilian population" "in all circumstances". ICJ, 
9 July 2004, Consequence of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Reports 2004, 
Advisory Opinion No. 131, para. 162 and 110 112. Moreover, the ICJ, as pointed out by Juan Manuel Gomex-
Robledo, "(...) has not contributed in this opinion to dispel the doubts that remain on the question of the 
definition of terrorism, which remains, unfortunately linked to that of the right of peoples to self-determination 
", and thus affirmed that the construction of the wall in the occupied territory" constitutes a serious obstacle to 
the exercise by the Palestinian people of their right to freedom of self-determination and thereby violates Israel's 
obligation to respect that right.  See Juan Manuel Gomex-Robledo, 2005, "The opinion of the ICJ on the legal 
consequences of building a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory: timid or cautious? ", RGDIP, no. 3, p. 521-
537. 
209
 Ibid. 
75 
 
This prohibition of the war crime of terrorization during the conduct of hostilities concerns 
primarily the members of the State armed forces and falls fully within the scope of article 10 
of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of the Mankind  of the 
International Law Commission
210
. According to the above mentioned there is no obstacle to 
the type of conducts in question being classified as a crime under international law. The 
question of whether one is dealing with a crime under domestic law or a crime under 
international law is important because the corresponding legal regimes are differ and the 
distinction has significant consequences as regards the application of principle no. 2, which is 
the subject of article 12 of the above draft code
211
. 
3.5.1.2. Serious consequences of acts of terrorism 
 
With regard to non-international armed conflicts, the text of common article 3 of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 also prohibits acts of terrorism without defining them. It 
focuses on "harm to life and bodily integrity, including murder in all its forms" 737 and 
requires the parties to the conflict to protect and treat those, who are not participating in 
hostilities or not in all circumstances, with humanity
212
. 
The Second Additional Protocol of 10 June 1977 on the Protection of Victims non-
international armed conflicts prohibits members of the armed forces from resorting to acts of 
violence (Article 13) whose main purpose is to spread terror among the civilian population
213
. 
Serious offenses therefore include acts of terrorism against the civilian population. This 
prohibition is clear in the text of Article 4 section 2 of the Second Protocol, which prohibits 
each of the following acts when committed against persons not taking part in hostilities: "(a) 
harm to life the physical and mental health and well-being of persons, in particular murder, as 
well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation or any form of corporal punishment; b) 
collective punishment; (c) the taking of hostages; (d) acts of terrorism; (e) attacks on the 
dignity of the person, including humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, coercion of 
prostitution and any indecent assault ". 
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We can see that Geneva's international humanitarian law does not provide a definition of 
terrorism, but it prohibits most acts that are commonly considered to be terrorist acts when 
they are committed during wartime. The two Protocols additional to the Geneva Conventions 
also proscribe acts tending to spread terror among the civilian population. Thus, acts 
committed for the purpose of terrorizing or killing the civilian population are certainly war 
crimes.  These provisions are an essential element of the rules of international humanitarian 
law governing the conduct of hostilities that is to say the manner in which military operations 
is conducted. They prohibit acts of violence which during an armed conflict do not bring 
clear military advantages. It should be noted, however, that an attack against military 
objectives even if it is in accordance with the law can spread terror among civilians. The 
above mentioned provisions prohibit attacks specifically aimed at terrorizing civilians
214
, for 
example bombing or sniping campaigns against civilians in urban areas. In the case of grave 
breaches or even war crimes, prosecutions may be brought against the perpetrators. 
3.5.2 The intentional character of war crimes of terrorism in the jurisprudence and 
statutes of International Criminal Jurisdictions 
 
With regard to the criminalization of acts of terrorism in the Statutes of the Courts the first 
important provision to be analyzed is Article 8 section 2-b of the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) which criminalized indiscriminate terrorist attacks against the civilian 
population without, however, defining them. This implication appears to be reaffirmed by the 
international jurisprudence of the ad hoc criminal tribunals. 
3.5.2.1. The criminalization of terrorism by the International Criminal Court 
 
The second paragraph of the eighth article of the Statute of the ICC prohibits: “(iv) to launch 
a deliberate attack knowing that it will incidentally cause loss of life and injury among the 
civilian population, civil damages; (v) Attacking or bombarding by whatever means, towns, 
villages, dwellings or buildings which are not defended and which are not military 
objectives; (vi) killing or wounding a combatant who has laid down his arms or has no 
further means of defence, (..)”215. Consequently “initiation a deliberate attack" was the 
subject of a comment by the ICC preparatory commission that did not require that the attack 
be followed to be deemed criminal. What matters it is the intention to specifically attack 
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civilians as such
216
. This intentional nature of the destruction of a protected object is found in 
other serious offenses covered by the ICC Statute: including attacks on civilian property, 
against property or units of humanitarian assistance, against United Nations peacekeeping 
missions, against cultural property, against property and units protected by recognized 
protective signs
217
. It should be noted that this article indirectly covers acts of terror 
committed with intent to intimidate the civilian population as well as ongoing military 
operations against the civilian population. 
3.5.2.2 The criminalization of terrorism by ad hoc criminal tribunals 
 
The jurisdiction of ad hoc tribunals is limited to the application of international law 
humanitarian. The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) does not provide for the offense of terrorism as a separate offense and only provides 
jurisdiction to try war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) expressly contemplates the jurisdiction of this 
Tribunal to try acts of terrorism. In this context, acts of terrorism are therefore acts of war 
tending to terrorize a civilian population or persons who do not participate directly in 
hostilities. These acts of terrorism thus constitute a violation of the principle that the civilian 
population must be safe from hostilities, a principle recognized as one of the fundamental 
principles of humanitarian law by the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
218
. 
 
As for the international jurisprudence of the ICTY, the two ad hoc criminal tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are aware of the war crime of terrorism but exclusively 
committed by regular combatants. The ICTY found in Tadic
219
 that its statute applied to all 
serious violations of international humanitarian law. He stated in particular that: "(...) art. 3 is 
a general clause covering all violations of humanitarian law (...) ". The ICTY, as affirmed by 
its Trial Chamber
220
, has jurisdiction to punish attacks against the civilian population that 
violate not only article 51 of the first Protocol but also article 13 of the Second Protocol and 
especially common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949. The above mentioned 
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Chamber
221
, in the judgment of 5 December 2005 clarified the constituent elements of the 
terrorist attack against civilians: "the offense of attacking civilians includes the following 
elements: offenses falling under Article 3 of the Statute and the following specific elements: 
1. Acts of violence engaged against the civilian population or civilians not directly 
participating in hostilities and resulting in death or causing serious injury to physical integrity 
or health. 
2. The perpetrator of these acts of violence has intentionally subjected them to the civilian 
population or civilian persons not directly participating in the hostilities.  
The notion of "intention" includes that of special fraud but not that of recklessness. Whoever 
attacks civilians voluntarily in complete indifference to the consequences of his actions is 
deemed to act "intentionally". In order to establish culpable intent in a terrorist attack against 
civilians, the Prosecution must prove that the person responsible knew that the attackers were 
civilians. Trial Chamber I of the ICTY characterized the crime of terrorism and the threats of 
violence and acts of terror of the civilian population as "a very serious violation of a 
fundamental rule of international humanitarian law". The main purpose of which is to 
terrorize civilians, is therefore the intentional element of the crime of terror that is 
characterized by the specific intent of the perpetrator and he is aware of the terror could 
result. "Terror" is defined by the ICTY Appeals Chamber as "extreme fear"
222
. In the Blaskic 
case, the ICTY Trial Chamber observed with regard to the material element of the offense 
that "the attack must have caused death and / or serious bodily harm to the population or civil 
property or damage to civilian objects (...) "
223
. It concluded that "in such an attack must have 
been undertaken intentionally with the knowledge that civilians or civilian objects were 
targeted without military necessity"
224
. In the Dario Kordic case, the Trial Chamber
225
 stated 
that "proscribed attacks are those which intentionally target civilians or civilian targets in the 
course of an armed conflict and that military necessity does not justify. They must have 
caused civilian casualties and / or seriously damaged their physical integrity and caused 
massive damage to civilian property. The ICTY Trial Chamber
226
 concluded that the terrorist 
offense of attacking civilians includes elements common to offenses under Article 3 of the 
Statute, as well as the following specific elements: (1) acts of violence engaged against 
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civilians
227
 not participating directly in hostilities and resulting in death or causing serious 
injury to body or health; (2) the perpetrator of these acts of violence intentionally subjected 
them to the civilian population or civilians not directly participating in the hostilities. 
 
3.6 The issue of the qualification of acts perpetrated by National Liberation 
Movements and the position of the Arab States 
 
The United Nations has been confronted for several years with the problem of the distinction 
between terrorism and national liberation struggles. This major obstacle prevents the 
international organization from developing a global and unanimous definition of terrorism, 
which is generally accepted by member States and in accordance with international law. The 
Arab States, in particular those belonging to the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the 
League of Arab States, and the African Union, defend the hypothesis that national liberation 
struggles against foreign occupation expressing the right of peoples to self-determination 
must be excluded from the general definition of terrorism in the Autonomous Convention on 
Terrorism to be prepared by the Special Committee on Terrorism. This position of the 
countries of the South is met with a refusal on the part of the Western States which reject the 
blending of the causes of terrorism and the terrorist acts that are condemned despite their 
origins or their authors. The opposition of these views has been expressed in the UN General 
Assembly since the 1970s. The UN Secretary-General's Report on "Human Rights and 
Terrorism" 
228
, together with the work of the Sixth Committee
229
 of the Legal Commission, 
reflected these different views among Member States on the issue of human rights and 
exception of the national liberation struggles of the future general definition of terrorism. 
According to the Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly the Egyptian 
Government, among other Arab governments, intended to distinguish between terrorism and 
armed struggle against colonial or other foreign domination as a legitimate right to self-
determination, while asserting that religion could not be used to justify terrorism. The Legal 
Committee of the General Assembly adopted without a vote a draft resolution on measures to 
eliminate international terrorism. Under the terms of the draft, the General Assembly decided 
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that its Special Committee on Terrorism could urgently pursue the elaboration of a 
comprehensive convention on international terrorism. It should seek to resolve the issues 
raised by the expansion of a draft international convention for the suppression of acts of 
nuclear terrorism and keep on its agenda the question of convening under the auspices of the 
United Nations a high-level conference to define a common response by the international 
community to terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. In the Sixth Committee, 
delegations explained their position on the draft resolution. The representatives of the Syrian 
Arab Republic and Lebanon argued that it was important to make a clear distinction between 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples against foreign occupation, believing that 
State terrorism and foreign occupation were more outrageous forms of terrorism. The Israeli 
delegate, however, considered that these delegations disguised constant support to certain 
terrorist groups to hide the isolation of their countries in the current unity of the international 
community to fight against terrorism. The Syrian representative, for his part, argued that the 
Palestinians' resistance is legitimate and that what must be denounced are rather the acts of 
repression committed by the Israeli forces. It thus seemed necessary to explain, at first, the 
position of the Arab states of the question of the exception of the struggle of peoples against 
occupation in the face of the Western position, which does not make such a distinction. 
Secondly, we will analyze the definitions of the national liberation movements, the right of 
self-determination, the definition of the struggle against occupation and the constitutive texts 
of the right of self-determination. We will thus be able to better understand in which 
hypotheses these texts find application, and better understand the extent of the rules of 
international law imposed on the military occupier. 
 
3.7 The position of the Arab states in the struggle of peoples for self-
determination in the face of the position of the West 
 
While the end of 2005 had been set as the deadline for the adoption of a comprehensive 
convention on terrorism, however, the debates in the Sixth Committee
230
 of the General 
Assembly in charge of its negotiation have reappeared the differences on the distinction 
between terrorism and the struggle for self-determination. Reiterating its traditional position 
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the representative of Yemen, speaking on behalf of the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference, condemned terrorism in all its forms and manifestations but he said that "the 
struggle of peoples against occupation foreign policy and for self-determination should be 
differentiated from terrorism”231. A position also supported by the representative of Cuba, for 
whom a general convention on international terrorism must make a clear distinction between 
terrorism and the legitimate struggle of peoples for independence and self-determination. On 
this point, he was joined by the representative of Egypt who considered it essential to settle 
the political discussions which are at the origin of feelings of hopelessness, such as the 
conflict over the questions of the occupation of the territories by the force and denial of the 
right to self-determination. This comprehensive approach of the Arab states raises once again 
the question of the definition of terrorism, which the international community has so far been 
unable to resolve. However, in the absence of such a broad and generally acceptable 
definition all UN counter-terrorism works risks being paralyzed and faced with the 
internationalization of terrorism, cooperation and international solidarity become crucial. 
This situation also requires a global response through concrete actions commensurate with 
the commitments made. Western states refuse to distinguish between the use of acts of 
violence by national liberation movements and terrorism. The European Council
232
 considers 
terrorism to be an ideology and a threat to public security. It adopted a framework decision 
which encourages inter alia and member States to approximate their laws and establishes 
minimum rules for terrorist offenses. After defining these terrorist offenses, this framework 
decision defined terrorist acts as "acts ... committed with the intention of threatening the 
population or seriously damaging or destroying the political, economic or social structures of 
the country including  murder, bodily injury, hostage-taking, blackmail, weapons-making, 
commission of attacks, threat to carry out the aforementioned behaviours, etc”233. These 
offenses may be committed by one or more individuals against one or more countries. It is 
noted that in this European definition there is no distinction between terrorism and the 
national liberation struggle because for the European States the terrorist acts are rather 
methods and behaviours of violence whose intention is to terrorize the civil population 
despite the causes and objectives of the attacks.  
The questions that arise here; is it necessary to distinguish between terrorism, condemnable in 
all its manifestations and in all its forms, whatever the perpetrators, of the struggle of peoples 
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against oppression and for self-determination? Is the use of violence by anti-occupation 
movements a form of terrorism? In other words, are the national liberation movement’s 
terrorist movements? Is there not a legal distinction between the two concepts in public 
international law and in international humanitarian law? In order to answer these questions, 
we will first analyze the positions of the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference and the African Union on the issue of the exception of the national liberation 
movements.  In the second step, we will analyze the Western position refusing any distinction 
between acts of violence committed for national struggle movements and acts of terrorism. 
3.7.1 The Arab distinction between terrorist acts and the struggle for national liberation 
The legal argument between Western and Arab states has not been reduced since the 1960s 
and the difficulty remains up to present.  The statements of some representatives before the 
United Nations General Assembly, including in the days following the attacks of 11 
September 2001, demonstrate the Arab states, especially the Asian and Middle Eastern states, 
distinguish between terrorism and national liberation struggle. The United States accuse some 
countries, such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Sudan and Syria to support terrorism and 
to obstruct the efforts of the United States and the international community to combat 
terrorism, as stated in the "Report on Terrorism in the World"
234
. 
The representative of Qatar at the United Nations, among other representatives of the Arab 
States, rejected these accusations at the seventh and eighth meetings of the Sixth Committee 
of the General Assembly held on 17 October 2003, and called for mobilizing international 
efforts against terrorism under the support of the United Nations. He stated that "a unified 
definition of all forms of terrorism must be developed. It must make a clear distinction 
between terrorism and resistance to foreign occupation "
235
. The Qatar representative thus 
emphasized the priority of the international community to resolve the causes of international 
terrorism, such as the Israeli occupation of the Arab territories
236
, the problems of poverty, 
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extremism and gender inequality. While Qatar stated that rejects all forms of terrorism , 
Malaysia on behalf of the member countries of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
237
, 
has also established in the United Nations General Assembly a distinction between the 
struggle of peoples against foreign occupation on the one hand, and terrorism on the other 
.Also for the representative of Iran, such a distinction is absolutely essential, he said "what 
happens in the Middle East shows that the indigenous population of Palestine struggling to 
free their territory from suppression by forces to use all means of repression at their 
elimination does not commit an act of terrorism but is fighting a liberation struggle ". This 
distinction was also defended by Syria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. According to the 
representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, "a future general convention on terrorism 
must clearly distinguish between terrorist acts and acts of national liberation". "We would give a 
blank check to countries - Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi - which, for more than two years, have 
engaged in a real state terrorism on the territory of the DRC by committing atrocities," he said and 
affirmed. This distinction was absolutely contested by the Israeli representative. This comprehensive 
approach raises once again the question of the definition of terrorism, which the international 
community has so far been unable to resolve
238
. 
3.7.1.1. The Arab position of the causes of terrorism in the face of the Israeli vision 
 
The League of Arab States rejects international terrorism, represses its dimension, its 
ramifications and encourages Arab governments to prohibit the training centres of armed 
groups on their territories and refuses to label the Palestinian national liberation movements 
as terrorists. The Israeli army, meanwhile, continues its military actions against the 
Palestinian groups, while describing as terrorism the acts committed by the latter, while 
aiming at limiting the armed attacks. Each current terrorism is presented by perpetrates as a 
resistance movement against another terrorism or against a tyranny (often they use the term 
of state terrorism). The action of a government, based on the use of force, against its national 
opponents or against the civilian population and public infrastructures, is sometimes 
considered by its rulers as a fight against terrorism. The deliberate attacks carried out by 
Israeli forces in the Gaza Strip were made in the absence of a counter-terrorist struggle 
against the Palestinian Hamas movement after taking office. They targeted infrastructure, the 
civilian population and civilian property in the Gaza Strip in ways that Amnesty International 
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characterized as violations of international humanitarian law and war crimes.
239
 For this 
reason, several authors
240
 have argued that legitimate resistance against occupation and 
illegitimate terrorist act should not be confused and that it is necessary to rely on the 
following two criteria; the legitimacy of the ends and the legitimacy of the means. In order to 
distinguish between these two phenomena, according to Passet and Liberman the legitimacy 
of ends lies in the right of the people to self-determination and their right to defend a future 
state. The legitimacy of the means can be seen in the action of a resistance against a military 
occupier and his armed forces, as pointed out by these two authors. In this respect, resistance 
to the Nazi occupation in France was considered by the Europeans as a struggle for freedom, 
but the Reich described it as terrorism. During the Cold War, the United States supported the 
resistance of fighters in Afghanistan, calling them "resistant"
241
. In recent times, the Israeli 
army declared on July 12, 2006 an offensive against Lebanon following the abduction of two 
Israeli soldiers by the Lebanese Hezbollah. While Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shimon 
Peres has stated that it is an Israeli military counterterrorism offensive, the European Union
242
 
has described Israel's military intervention as disproportionate
243
. 
The Arab States defend the right of the occupied peoples to self-determination and reject all 
forms of terrorism.
244
 On the basis of General Assembly resolution 52/113 (1997)
245
 entitled 
universal realization of the right of peoples to self-determination, for example, Lebanon in a 
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letter
246
 dated 7 June 2000 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, strongly 
condemned attempts by Israel or others to bring Palestinian refugees to its territory. Lebanon 
endorses General Assembly resolutions 194 (III) and 54/152 and insists on the right of 
Palestinians to return to their homeland and to create an independent Palestinian state.  The 
issue of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is a very sensitive issue. The Lebanese government 
refuses to grant them Lebanese nationality, while insisting on the right of return of these 
refugees to Palestine. On 10 July 2000, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya ratified General 
Assembly resolution 54/155, while also supporting the right of peoples to self-determination 
in the sense that this right is indispensable to guarantee and uphold fundamental rights.
247
 The 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya also approved the legitimate struggle of peoples for freedom and 
independence, including the use of armed struggle. The League of Arab States therefore 
supports the right of Palestinians to self-determination and the establishment of an 
independent state in Palestine. In addition, the Arab states defend the right of peoples to 
control their natural resources and to choose the system best suited to their situation
248
. 
3.7.1.2. The Arab distinction between terrorism and the struggle for national liberation 
 
During the discussions of the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Arab 
delegations emphasized their point of view by confirming the necessary distinction between 
terrorism and the struggle for the liberation of the occupied territories. For Arab 
representatives, terrorism feeds on injustice and inequality at the national and international 
levels
249
. 
Therefore, they stressed that it is important to tackle its underlying causes by fighting poverty 
and promoting development in societies where unemployed youth are easy target for terrorist 
networks
250
. The United Nations remains in the most appropriate framework to coordinate 
this collective action. That is why the United Nations adopted a Global Counter-Terrorism 
Strategy in September 2006 to promote greater mobilization of Member States to establish 
counter-terrorism legal cooperation
251
. The representative of Qatar 
252
 reaffirmed that the 
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commitment of her country to fight against terrorism and stressing that terrorism benefited 
from various funding. She hoped that the Special Committee would finalize the draft of a 
general convention and hoped a distinction would be made between the right of peoples to 
self-determination and terrorism
253
. On the international front, as a member of the Security 
Council, Qatar has unequivocally and neutrally supported all Security Council resolutions in 
this area. There should be no confusion between terrorism and belonging to a religion or 
culture
254
. The Arab countries therefore condemn all forms of attacks whatever they may be 
but they refuse to describe as terrorism the acts of national liberation movements struggling 
to establish an independent state. While reaffirming their commitment to the right of peoples 
to self-determination, the Arab countries link this right to the notions of unity and territorial 
integrity of a State. In the Arab League's "Doha Declaration"
255
, at the Arab leaders' Summit 
held in Qatar on March 30-31, 2009, member states reaffirmed their support for the 
Palestinian people's resistance to Gaza. They described the Israeli offensive as armed 
aggression and the Israeli army's acts of war crimes and violations of international law and 
humanitarian law
256
. They denounced the Israeli occupation of the Lebanese, Palestinian and 
Syrian Golan territories. But at the same time, the Arab states have rejected any form of 
terrorism, stressing the importance of resolving the causes that stimulate terrorism. This clear 
distinction between terrorism and the actions of national liberation movements is due to the 
fact that terrorists do not defend any homeland and never seek to found a state. For this 
reason, they have affirmed in several Arab summits that all measures aimed at combating 
terrorism must be applied in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and 
within a legal framework that controls the actions of States. It is in this context that the 
League of Arab States supports the efforts of the United Nations to rapidly finalize the draft 
of general convention on International Terrorism based on a clear legal definition of terrorism 
accepted by all. Yemen's representative to the Sixth Committee stressed that his country is in 
favour of promoting dialogue among civilizations, as well as establishing an international 
counter-terrorism centre in one of the Gulf countries. The definition of terrorism, he recalled, 
must establish a distinction between terrorism and the right of peoples to self-determination.  
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3.7.2 The Western refusal of any distinction between the terrorist acts of the liberation 
movements and international terrorism 
 
The European Union, for its part, stresses that "terrorism is the result of violent 
radicalisations and extremism
257
. Since the attacks in Madrid and London, it has developed a 
new long-term European strategy to combat the factors that contribute to violent 
radicalization
258
. Regarding the Middle East crises, if the European Union qualifies the 
Palestinian movement Hamas, for example, as a terrorist organization in one hand but in the 
other hand it has indirectly recognized Hamas leader in Gaza, Ismail Haniyeh, as a prime 
minister elected by the Palestinian people. Indeed, in the report of the Directorate-General for 
Humanitarian Aid of the European Union
259
, entitled humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable 
populations in the ongoing crisis in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and to Palestinian refugees 
from Lebanon. The European Commission has made it clear that it has granted humanitarian 
aid to Palestinian refugees in the Gaza Strip after the Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail 
Haniyeh's office was formed
260
 The questions here are why does the European Union refer to 
Hamas as a terrorist movement and at the same time continue to recognize its leader as a 
prime minister? Does it qualify all Hamas institutions as terrorists, or only its military organ? 
Why does the European Commission finance Palestinian institutions in Gaza if Hamas is still 
on the European list of terrorist groups? 
In the aforementioned report the European Commission noted that; following the success of 
Hamas in the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, the Israeli government has 
suspended the monthly transfer of the revenue it collects on behalf of the Palestinian 
Authority ( PA). (...) The successive closures since the beginning of 2006 have increased 
food shortages and caused prices to rise, which has a significant impact on vulnerable 
populations
261
. These European contradictions concerning the qualification of Hamas require 
an analysis of the European position of the national liberation movements and terrorist 
groups. 
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3.7.2.1. The European Union and the lists of terrorist organizations 
 
The European Union adopted a common position on 27 December 2001 concerning the 
application of specific measures to combat terrorism
262
. This position is intended to 
implement additional measures pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001). In particular, it establishes a list of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist 
acts to whom the measure of the freezing of funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources should be applied in the fight against the financing of terrorism
263
. According to 
these position persons, groups and entities involved in acts of terrorism means those who are 
proven on the basis of specific information which they have already committed, are 
attempting to commit or facilitate the preparation of acts terrorists. These are intentional acts 
that harm the life, physical integrity, property and safety of the people. The list in the annex 
to the Common Position of the European Union is composed on the basis of investigations 
carried out by the competent judicial or police authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union and may be completed and reviewed every six months
264
.  It contains the 
names of entities such as ETA (Basque Country and Freedom), IRA (Irish Republican 
Army), GRAPO (anti-fascist resistance group of October 1st), the terrorist wing of Hamas, 
and others activist revolutionary groups, as well as the names of the people in it. This list was 
completed on 17 June 2002 by Common Position 2002/462 / PESC
265
. These European lists 
of organizations were made on the basis of the European definitions of terrorist offenses set 
out in Council Framework Decision 2002/475 / JHA of 13 June 2002 on the fight against 
terrorism
266
. It applies to behaviours that can lead to terrorist acts. Article 3 of this European 
Framework Decision defines terrorist offenses as offenses "designed to seriously undermine 
or destroy the political, economic or social structures of a country by causing disruption or 
interruption of supply in water, electricity, or any other basic resource "
267
. The main purpose 
of these lists of terrorist groups is to promote a common European anti-terrorist action. 
Indeed, the international events of 11 September 2001, 11 March 2004 and the London 
attacks in 2005 have led the EU to integrate the fight against terrorism into its fields of action. 
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The EU does not distinguish between terrorist acts perpetrated by terrorist groups and acts of 
terrorism perpetrated by armed movements even if they seek to liberate occupied territories 
as long as these movements attack civilians by putting their lives, their physical integrity and 
their property in danger. For example Hamas, even though it has social activities but its 
military wing is labelled as terrorist by the EU. That is why European cooperation with the 
Palestinian Authority has excluded Hamas. Indeed, in the framework of the Action Plan for 
the Middle East Peace Process decided by the Council, a European Coordinating Office for 
Palestinian Police Assistance was established in January 2005. The office prepares and 
accompanies the Palestinian Authority in the definition of its plan of reform of the security 
services. At the same time, the EU has repeatedly denounced armed Israeli offensives in the 
Gaza Strip and in Lebanon against the civilian population. This European position on acts of 
terrorism refers to Article 54 of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, 
which states: "It is forbidden to use starvation as a method of war against civilians (...). It is 
forbidden to attack, destroy, remove or put out of use the goods indispensable for the survival 
of the civilian population”268. The implications of the above mentioned Article 54 are clear 
that the bombing of power plants in Gaza by the Israeli army, the blockade of civilian 
populations and collective punishment against them is a war crime
269
. 
 
3.8 International Law and the Right to Self-determination 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, active movements claiming the right to free self-
determination in more than sixty countries of the world as noted by Theodore Christakis
270
. 
According to this author, the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh want their attachment to 
Armenia. In Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared their independence before facing 
the Georgian tanks. In 1995, the ICJ confirmed the right of peoples to self-determination
271
. 
In the East Timor case, the Court noted that; the principle of the right of peoples to self-
determination has been recognized by the United Nations Charter and in the case-law of the 
Court. This is one of the essential principles of contemporary international law. Thus, the 
International Law Commission noted in its report on the law of treaties that the forcible 
maintenance of colonial domination constitutes an international crime. 
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3.8.1 The Right to Self-determination, an essential principle of International Law 
The United Nations in its Declaration and Program of Action of Vienna adopted on 25 June 
1993, recognized and reconfirmed the right of self-determination of peoples subject to 
colonial domination or foreign occupation. Theodore Christakis stated that "since the 
resolution of the General Assembly 2649 (XXV) of November 30, 1970, and until today, the 
UN affirms the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination
272
. Thus, Hans Kelsen
273
, 
explains that Article 1 section 2 of the Charter affirms not only the right of peoples to self-
determination but their rights to have a sovereign, independent State free from any form of 
domination, occupation or colonization
274
. 
3.8.1.1. The Right of peoples to Self-determination 
 
The practice of the United Nations has recognized in various resolutions the right of self-
determination for peoples under military occupation
275
. Resolution ES-6/2 of 14 January 
1980, resolution 35/37 of 20 November 1980, resolution 44/15 of 1 November 1989 and 
45/12 of 7 November 1990, all these UN resolutions describe as an absolute  the right of all 
peoples to decide their own form of government without interference, subversion, coercion or 
coercion from outside . Theodore Christakis concluded that “the right to self-determination of 
peoples under colonial domination or foreign occupation therefore constitutes a well-
established principle of jus gentium "
276
. Part of the doctrine has emphasized that the 
principle of self-determination also applies in cases of foreign occupation and domination
277
. 
Resolution 1514 of 14 December 1960 referred to "non-trusteeship territories", "Non-Self-
Governing Territories" and "Other Territories" which "have not yet attained 
independence"
278
. In these cases, this resolution affirms that the national liberation 
movements exercise the right to self-determination. On the contrary, it is remarkable that on 
the one hand, transnational terrorist groups do not defend any occupied territory or exercise 
any right to the independence of a state, and do not fight against colonial domination. Rather, 
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they are attacking state armies to overthrow existing governments, such as the Taliban in 
Pakistan, who have rallied to al Qaeda members after fleeing Afghanistan since the US 
offensive in 2002. In fact, in April 2009, these groups dominated several Pakistani cities and 
forcing the Pakistani army to intervene and repress them militarily during the month of May. 
On the other hand, these terrorist groups act only clandestinely to achieve political and 
financial objectives. They kill people without any distinction between civilians, including 
children, and belligerents, such as ISIS in Iraq and Syria.  
 
3.8.1.2. The Right to an independent state 
 
The General Assembly resolution 38/130 (1983) made a clear distinction between terrorism 
and national liberation movements
279
. This is by affirming that the continuing acts of 
international terrorism result in innocent human lives , reconfirming the absolute right to self-
determination of peoples subject to colonial regimes as well as to others forms of foreign 
domination . Also in defending the legitimacy of their struggle, especially the struggle of the 
national liberation movements, the UN General Assembly recommended to all member states 
to cooperate with one another in order to share information about terrorist groups and to 
suppress acts of international terrorism. The above resolution listed three different cases for 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination: (a) when a non-self-governing 
territory is subject to colonial rule; (b) when a people are subject to a racist regime; c) or 
when it is dominated by foreign occupation. Similarly, the resolution 34/145 (1979) 
280
 has 
already made this distinction between terrorist groups and national liberation movements. It 
also recalled the right to self-determination of the struggle against the occupation and foreign 
domination. And it reconfirmed their legitimate right to self-determination and independence 
and other human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
Terrorists only seek to establish a criminal mission. They carry out criminal activities by 
killings, assassinations, attacks and other threats to peace and international security. 
However, the national liberation movements, on the other hand, seek to found an independent 
state recognized by the United Nations. In 1981, the principle of self-determination was 
reaffirmed once again within the United Nations. In adopting resolution 36/109 (1981), the 
General Assembly denounced all acts of terrorism and distinguished them from the actions of 
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the national liberation movements against occupation in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter and the Convention
281
.  
The UN General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration ,the United Nations Charter, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as the United Nations Declaration and 
Program on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
282
, which reaffirmed Vienna Action of the 
fundamental significance of the right of all peoples to self-determination by virtue, of which 
they freely decide their political status and freely practise their economic, social and cultural 
development
283
. The General Assembly distinguished between national liberation movements 
and terrorist groups engaged in activities contrary to international law. In article 46 stated that 
"nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or 
individual any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act to the contrary to the 
United Nations Charter, nor to authorize or encourage any act which has the effect of 
destroying or diminishing, wholly or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of a 
sovereign and independent State "
284
. According to this resolution, even though national 
liberation movements have the right to liberate their territories from occupation and foreign 
domination, their actions must be in accordance with the UN Charters and international law. 
The occupying States must also apply the legal provisions of the right to self-determination 
and put an immediate end to their military intervention and occupation in foreign countries 
and territories and to any repression, discrimination, exploitation and ill-treatment exercised 
against the peoples concerned and to renounce, in particular, the brutal and inhuman methods 
that would be employed for these purposes
285
. 
3.8.2 The legal obligations of the occupier in international law 
The concept of military occupation requires legal clarification, especially when it results from 
an armed conflict so that the armies of one State, in a situation of war, are in the territory of 
another enemy state, for strategic reasons or others. The Hague Conventions are binding on 
the occupier of the obligations and to certain extend applied by the occupying forces. 
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3.8.2.1. Definition of the military occupation 
 
According to Odile Debbasch
286
 the notion of military occupation is in the same situation as 
many other concepts of international law. The old notion of military occupation seemed 
certainly linked to the relations of two powers in time of war. However, today the presence of 
troops abroad is no longer the mark of hostility between two or more powers. It often tries, by 
a contradictory phenomenon, to strengthen between them an alliance and a system of 
collective security. Military bases today constitute in peacetime a living example of the 
notion of military occupation. However, the latter qualification of military bases is not very 
precise because the presence of armies in an allied country results from the application of 
bilateral or multilateral treaties. Other cases of military occupation result from invasions and 
wars. Security Council resolution 1472 (2003) described, for example, the forces of the US-
British coalition as the "occupying power"
287
. This qualification was based on Article 55 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention of 11 August 1949, relating to the protection of civilians in 
time of war. Sylvain Vite stated that the occupation means "the takeover of a territory 
belonging to a neutral country
288
. The law of occupation applies in this case, even if, in 
accordance with the provisions of Article 2, paragraph 2, of the Fourth Convention, the State 
in question does not oppose any armed resistance to its adversary. Therefore, it is clear that 
the notion of "military occupation" implies the taking of control of a country by an enemy 
power during an armed conflict. 
3.8.2.2. The legal regime of the military occupation 
 
International law is binding upon the occupying forces a legal regime and obligations.
289
 
However, these are not always applied and several violations of international law were 
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committed during the occupation of Iraq
290
. Professor Jorge Cardona Llorens stated that: "the 
conflict in Iraq has neither been authorized nor legitimized by the Security Council and the 
alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction that would have justified preventive self-
defence action appears over the course of controversies and investigations as a misleading 
argument"
291
. Humanitarian law tends to limit the consequences of war. In case of 
occupation, the occupant must look after the public or private property of the occupied, as 
confirmed by Odile Debbasch, which is why an essential mission of the law of occupation is 
to put an effective limit on the power of the military authority established on invaded land
292
. 
International law then intervenes to demand the occupiers' power a series of limits. The 
Geneva Convention of 22 August 1864 gives importance to the protection of hospitals and 
ambulances. International law is binding upon the occupier to protect civilians, to preserve 
the lines of communication, cultural property, etc. Article 56 of the Hague Convention of 
1907 proclaims that: "the property of the communes, those of establishments devoted to 
worship, charity and education, to the arts and sciences, even belonging to the State, will be 
treated as private property ". The Hague Conventions also stated prohibition on looting 
(Article 47 of the Hague Regulations): "No more than the belligerent has the right to seize the 
property of the enemy soldiers, the occupier can not to confiscate that of the inhabitants of 
the invaded territory. Robert Kolb and Sylvain Vite argue that in a case of armed conflict and 
military occupation, the Hague Conventions must be applied to protect the civilian population 
and especially children. The occupying military authorities take care of the protection of the 
security of the occupied peoples and territories
293
. 
 
3.9 Conclusion  
 
International terrorism is different from anything called organized crime or national liberation 
movement. If acts of terrorism are planned, financed and perpetrated under the sponsorship of 
one State against another State, such acts may be characterized as acts of State armed 
aggression by the Security Council, which could in such cases to decide to react based on the 
Charter, including the principles of collective security, in order to protect international peace 
and security. In a state of war, terrorist offenses can be characterized as war crimes or crimes 
against humanity, as several internationalists have pointed out. In this case, the ICC may try 
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suspected terrorists. The absence of a single classification of terrorist offenses reflects the 
weakness of the international system and the flagrant legal vacuum in the international 
normative space. On the other hand, it has led to the strengthening of cooperation at both the 
international and regional levels, and has led States to develop their own national legal 
provisions and their domestic jurisdictions, which remain the only competent authorities in 
the field of terrorism. 
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Chapter Four  
The legal issues of the accurately criminalising international terrorism 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
At the time of the attacks of September 11, 2001, lawyers were unable to qualify terrorist 
offenses. This difficulty raised the question of the absence in international law of a general 
convention on terrorism, and of the absence of a general legal definition of acts of this type. 
Terrorism is a real threat to international peace and security. It is condemnable in all its 
manifestations and in all its forms. However, how can states fight against the terrorist threat 
when the latter is not qualified in international law or internal law? On the other hand, is it 
not necessary to distinguish it from the struggle of peoples against oppression and self-
determination? Should we not also differentiate between terrorism and organized crime, as 
well as "explosive" individual terrorism and state terrorism? Finally, in order to fight against 
terrorism, is it possible to consider it legally as an armed aggression and thus resort to armed 
force? Could its constitutive elements qualify it as a crime against humanity? All of these 
questions contribute to the problematic posed here. International terrorism is transnational 
violence, an organized criminal act and a dangerous use of force which threatening the lives 
of civilian populations, their property, stability and security. This type of violent force is 
denounced by the international community whether it is exercised by a clandestine extremist 
or by state or organization
294
. The use of violence by international terrorism differs from the 
conventional and armed interstate conflict where non-combatants are normally separated 
from combatants. If war had previously been interstate, terrorism, in its present form, 
resembles as, some say, war
295
. 
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4.1 The problem of the classification of terrorist offenses in international law 
 
The United Nations General Assembly in resolution 39/159 which was adopted on 17 
December 1984
296
 stated that the use of violence or the use of force by terrorists poses a 
serious threat to the independent existence of States and to the possibility of peaceful 
relations and mutual trust between them and leads to a brutal exasperation of tensions and the 
rise of the danger of war. The key questions at the moment concern the classification for acts 
of terrorism as well as the tools to combat them legally. In order to analyze the controversies 
over the question of the characterization of international terrorism, we must first of all put the 
problem of the legal characterization of this phenomenon in the context of threats to 
international security - a crime against peace, etc. To that end, we have established our 
analysis of the rules of public international law and criminal law. We will then consider the 
possible characterization of terrorism as a crime against humanity as provided for in ICTY, 
ICTR, ICC and the work of some international legal expertise, while stressing the necessary 
distinction between terrorism and organized crime in International law. The analysis of the 
legal qualification of terrorist offenses also includes work related to the Special Tribunal for 
Lebanon (STL)
297
. This special international tribunal was set up to try the perpetrators of the 
assassination in February 2005 of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri
298
. It entered into 
force on June 10, 2007, to determine the implications of those who use terror to threaten the 
Lebanese people, to intimidate those who fight for freedom and democracy, to guarantee 
indisputably the independence of Lebanon in the face of the interventions of its neighbours 
members and put an end to the activities of extremist groups linked to Hizbollah and Assad 
regime in Syria.  
The terrorist threat to international peace is the result of clandestine networks of non-state 
groups cross border. In the face of this new threat to international peace and security, the 
Security Council has adopted resolutions on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
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two issues were observed; the number of measures it can take by the Security Council of how 
can respond to the threat by using force; and the terrorist threat is then compared to a state 
resort to force
299
. Based on these two elements, the United States has turned primarily to the 
use of armed force against terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS. 
Terrorism may therefore constitute, according to the Security Council, a threat to peace but 
according to Pellet and Tzankov this is not always the case
300
. They point out that in the not-
so-distant past such acts have not always been considered to constitute threats to peace. The 
Security Council, in adopting resolution 1368 of 12 September 2001 on the basis of Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter
301
, condemned the terrorist acts it described as a threat to international 
peace and security and highlighting that those who bear the responsibility of helping, 
supporting and harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of these acts shall be 
accountable
302
. It was the first time that the Security Council adopted a Chapter VII 
resolution against a transnational group and not against a state. Moreover, the Security 
Council further connect any act of international terrorism with a threat to international peace 
and security, while in resolution 1269 (1999)
303
 it considered that certain acts of terrorism 
and not all terrorist acts could constitute such a threat. On the contrary, Professor Luigi 
Condorelli stated that terrorism very serious threat to peace and believes that this threat 
requires a collective response because no state, even the most powerful, can claim to be able 
to overcome it by only single state action
304
. Meanwhile, Josiane Tercinet adds that there is 
therefore the idea that the threat is multiform of diverse origin and difficult to determine or 
localizable and that these characteristics is born the threat to international peace
305
. 
The legal characterization of terrorism raises several questions that take into account existing 
legal concepts and gaps: 
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-What legal classification could result from the approximation of the various conceptions of 
terrorism proposed by international law and national rights? 
- Why did the International Law Commission first describe this phenomenon, in 1986, as a 
crime against humanity, especially when committed by private individuals, and then 
proposed in 1991 to make it a crime against humanity or autonomous crime while underlining 
the aggression it entails and the terror it spreads? 
- Which criterion to use that of the Security Council which qualifies terrorism as a threat to 
international peace and security or the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal that 
terrorism is a crime against peace? 
- Certainly acts of terrorism constitute threats to peace. However, what type of terrorism is 
targeted: private non-state terrorism, international terrorism, state terrorism or cross-border 
terrorism on behalf of a state? 
- Which authority could be used to sanction acts of terrorism in general? Can the global fight 
against terrorism and the suppression of terrorism at the regional and national levels succeed 
without adopting a clear single international legal authority? 
The law is constantly evolving and revealing uncertainties. In order to analyze the legal 
problems of the characterization of international terrorism in criminal law, the first part of 
this chapter will be devoted to the criminal law qualifications of the Nuremberg Military 
Tribunal and those of the United Nations. It will then analyze the legal classification of 
terrorism as a crime against humanity adopted by international jurisdictions before seeing that 
adopted in the context of the HARIRI case by the STL, the first international mixed 
jurisdiction set up to deal exclusively with crimes of terrorism . 
 
4.2 International Criminal Law in the Law of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal 
and the courts established by the United Nations: Multiple Definitions of 
Terrorism 
 
The question that arises is which classification may be best correspond in the existing body of 
law to international terrorism; is it the crime against international peace and security or armed 
aggression? It will then be necessary to question that the legal method can then be used to 
combat and repress international terrorism. The question will be raised as to the extent to 
which terrorism can be legally characterized as armed aggression, while terrorist attacks are 
perpetrated by non-state groups. Similarly, can terrorist acts in some countries threatening 
only the citizens of these countries pose a general threat to world peace and international 
security? This last qualification appeared, in fact, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 
100 
 
particular with the adoption of the resolution 731 of January 1992 in relation to the attacks of 
Lockerbie and Flight of 772
306
. On 21 January 1992, at its 3033rd meeting, the Security 
Council adopted the text of the draft resolution submitted a day earlier by the United States, 
France and the United Kingdom. Under the terms of the resolution, the Security Council 
members strongly condemning the destruction of PAN AM 103 and calling on all States to 
assist in the perpetrators of this criminal act are arrested and tried. Also deeply concerned by 
what results from investigations involving officials Libyans and which is mentioned in the 
documents of the Security Council which report requests addressed to the Libyan authorities 
by the United States of America, France and the United Kingdom related to the judicial 
proceedings concerning the attacks on the abducting of Pan American and the Air Transport 
Union, determined to eliminate international terrorism by; 
 Condemns the destruction of Pan American Flight 103 and Flight 772 of the Air 
Transport Union and the loss of hundreds of lives resulting there from; 
 Deeply deplores the fact that the Libyan Government has so far not responded 
effectively to the above requests for full co-operation in establishing responsibility for 
the above-mentioned terrorist acts against flights 103 of Pan American and 772 of 
The Air Transport Union; 
 Urges the Libyan authorities to immediately provide a full and effective response to 
these requests in order to contribute to elimination of international terrorism; 
 Requests the Secretary-General to seek the cooperation of the Government of Libya in 
providing a comprehensive and effective response to these requests; 
 Calls upon all States to encourage individually and collectively the Libyan 
Government to provide a comprehensive and effective response to these requests; 
Similarly, Alain Pellet did not refuse to describe the terrorist attacks of September 11 as 
threats to peace, as stated by resolution 1368 adopted the following day after the attack by the 
Security Council. However, he said it did not result in a state of war in the generally accepted 
sense of the word
307
.  Gerard Challiand also confirmed that terrorism is undoubtedly more of 
a threat to the security than to the peace
308
. While the international community has 
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characterized terrorism as a threat to international peace and security
309
, some jurists, such as 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin
310
, have criticized this characterisation. While him questioning the new 
forms of threat which present new challenges to the collective security system, emphasizes 
that such a qualification results from a political assessment and not from the application of 
legal criteria. According to him, the concept of a threat to international peace and security 
lacks indisputable definitions. Certain acts of terrorism may have been characterized not only 
as threats to international peace and security but as an aggression, and this is due to evolving 
interpretations of certain growing legal concepts
311
. This is gradually expanding the 
possibilities of their implementation, and therefore appears that terrorist acts can be legally 
qualified as threats to international security. This is what the ICJ says in its judgment in the 
case concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary / Slovakia) of 25 September 
1997, when it states that the treaty to be 'interpretation in the present case' is not merely fixed, 
since it contains' evolutionary provisions'
312
. 
Professor Brigitte Stern went further and describing the attacks of 11 September 2001 as 
crimes against peace and not just threats to international peace and security
313
. He stated that 
"one could think of supporting that was committing a crime against peace, since by 
recognizing the United States the right of individual or collective self-defence, the Security 
Council in resolution 1368 (2001) of 12 September 2001 implicitly admitted that acts 
committed amounting to armed aggression, the only situation which gives rise to the right of 
self-defence according to the UN Charter
314
. According to Professor Stern, a crime against 
peace exists if the acts complained of are intended to protect, prepare, unleash or continue a 
war of aggression. This internationalist based his legal qualification of international terrorism 
on the approaches adopted during the trial before the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg (IMT)
315
. This trial and the Nuremberg judgments, which followed the 
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conclusion of the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, constitute an exceptional event both 
in the history of international relations and in international law. According to Article 6 of the 
Nuremberg IMT, a crime against peace is the direction, preparation, initiation or continuation 
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of treaties, insurance or international agreements, 
or participation in a concerted plan or conspiracy to perform any of the foregoing acts "
316
. 
However, should the acts of terrorism be considered as a war of aggression or a war in 
violation of treaties, for some jurists to call them crimes against peace? Terrorist attacks 
undoubtedly violate international law, the UN Charter and international agreements, but to 
what extent could they be described as armed aggression in the legal sense of the word when 
perpetrated by illegal criminals belonging to a non-state organization, of the Al-Qaeda or 
ISIS type, not acting on behalf of a state? 
Professor Alain Pellet criticizing the speech of the former US President Georges W. Bush, 
declaring in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11 "we are at war," said that these 
attacks cannot be legally qualified as a war of aggression
317
. Pellet was in favour of the 
characterization of these attacks of threats against the peace and of crimes against humanity, 
but he contested those of war or even of aggression against legal meaning. The International 
Law Commission (ILC), established on 21 November 1947 by the United Nations General 
Assembly in resolution 174 (II)
318
, with the aim of promoting the progressive development of 
international law and its codification, did not hesitate in 1950 to consider as a crime against 
the peace and security of humanity  not only all acts of aggression but also the threat of 
aggression, terrorist activities, incitement to civil war, assistance to armed forces, measures of 
political and economic intervention, provided that those acts were committed by one State 
against another State 
319
. 
It can be seen from the comparison of Nuremberg Law and the work of the ILC, that terrorist 
attacks are not a war in the legal sense of the word, but rather are a threat and a crime against 
peace when they are directed, prepared and unleashed by one or more States against one 
another or other States
320
. This categorisation was retained by various resolutions of the 
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Security Council, notably by the two famous resolutions 1368 and 1373. It was not refused 
by the jurists who, on the contrary, affirmed that positive international law as interpreted 
State practice now views terrorism as a threat to international peace and security of a new 
type as compared to the traditional use of force between states through armed aggression, as 
prohibited by Article 2 (4) of the Charter and by customary international law
321
. 
In the following sections, we will try to know if terrorism can be qualified as an act of armed 
aggression. We will then discuss the necessary distinction between international terrorism 
and organized crime mentioned by several writers and researchers. The choice of these 
concepts is based on UN legal work, Security Council resolutions, judgments and legal 
definitions formulated by the ICJ. This will not only be a legal analysis of the multiple 
qualifications of terrorism, but also the proposals of several legal experts in the field who are 
more open to the possibility of the United Nations adopting a single legal qualification 
terrorism. 
 
4.3 Controversies over the question of the characterization of terrorism: an 
armed aggression? 
 
Prior to 2001, the Security Council neither decided nor authorized the use of armed force 
against private small groups. They could have done so had they been able to characterize a 
particular situation resulting from terrorist acts as a crime against peace. This is why, since 11 
September, we have witnessed the expansion of the concept of armed aggression and self-
defence into international law. The various terrorist acts organized and committed at the 
international level, tending to destabilize certain States even certain regions. This crime, 
moreover, is sometimes supported by States and relies on structured networks capable with 
important means and having ramifications in different states
322
. 
Terrorist acts appear, as we know, not only as a threat to peace but also as recourse to force 
and violence against innocent people, against a State either on the territory of a State, against 
its property and its civilian population; or outside its territory, against members of its 
diplomatic staff or armed forces or against ships entering its flag
323
. 
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These new threats are based on a sort of "privatization" of the use of force which is 
sometimes facilitated or encouraged by a complicit State, provided that the perpetrators of the 
attack are sent by or act on behalf of that State.  
Whether it is international terrorism in general or the attacks of 11 September 2001 in 
particular, attempts to legally qualify these acts are still controversial. The internationalist 
Yann Jurovics stressed that "because of the uncertain and variable nature of terrorism and the 
difficulties inherent in its definition, it is indeed difficult to find an existing criterion that 
could cover all acts of terrorism
324
. He also added that "the acts committed on September 
11th do not correspond exactly to the models of prosecution offered until now by 
international law"
325
. These events have been described in both Security Council Resolutions 
1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) as "a threat to international peace and security", but this 
qualification is general and does not bring anything very new for the international criminal 
repression of terrorism. The Security Council in the introduction to this resolution has described 
"any act of international terrorism as a threat to international peace and security"
326
. 
The United States counter-terrorism war was based on the main legal argument of Article 51 
of the UN Charter: "self-defence". The US regards the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 
as acts of armed aggression by irregular forces and supported by a state, Afghanistan, which 
has sheltered, tolerated or even helped without limits the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda and 
led by the Saudi Arabia citizen Usama Bin-Laden. The Security Council, in the aftermath of 
these attacks, recognized in resolution 1368 the inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with the Charter, reaffirmed a second time in another recital of its 
resolution 1373
327
. 
With regard to these events, Olivier Corten and François Dubuisson stated that this argument 
poses a problem from the outset with regard to the international law established by the United 
Nations Charter, which limits this hypothesis to the necessary and proportionate response by 
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a State to armed aggression perpetrated by another State
328
. It must then be determined to 
what extent the 9/11 attacks and other terrorist acts can be legally qualified as armed 
aggression. The latter certainly has legal aspects. However, the characterization of terrorist 
acts committed by non-state groups remains a complex qualification. 
4.3.1 Legal aspects of armed aggression in international law 
Professor Marcelo G. Kohen points out that "one of the characteristic elements of terrorism is 
the fact that it is the product of behaviour by individuals or private groups"
329
 and that 
terrorist acts are crimes perpetrated, generally, by organized non-state organizations or 
groups. For this reason, the Security Council has called on states, in several resolutions, to 
take effective measures to combat terrorism and not to support or finance, shelter or shelter 
the members of terrorist organizations
330
. Gilbert Guillaume
331
, in his course at The Hague 
Academy of International Law, said that four essential elements characterize terrorist acts:  
(a) the perpetration of certain acts of violence, (b) to spread terror among the public, (c) an 
individual or collective undertaking for the commission of such acts; (d) and the 
clandestinely or surprise element of secret terrorist actions. Terrorism is violent acts aimed at 
spreading terror to achieve political ends and violence is its material element
332
. 
The requirement of some clandestine organization or at least the preparation or planning of 
such acts is part of the intentional element. Armed aggression has, moreover, other specific 
constitutive acts, which reflect the direct or indirect involvement of one or more States. 
4.3.1.1. Constitutive acts of armed aggression 
 
The Dictionary of Public International Law defines aggression as "an armed attack by a state 
acting first against another state in violation of the rules of international law”333. The UN 
Special Committee on the Definition of Aggression has developed the following definition 
adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 December 1974
334
; 
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"Article 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by one State against the sovereignty 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other way 
incompatible with the Charter of the United Nations, as follows from this definition "
335
. 
Article 3 of the above-mentioned resolution listed the following acts as aggression: "(a) the 
invasion or attack of the territory of one State by the armed forces of another State, or any 
military occupation even temporary, resulting from such an invasion (...); (b) the 
bombardment by the armed forces of one State of the territory of another State (...); (c) the 
blockade of the ports or coasts of one State by the armed forces of another State; (d) the 
attack by the armed forces of one State against land, naval or air armed forces, or the naval 
and civil aviation of another State; (...) (e) the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed 
bands or groups, irregular forces or mercenaries engaging in acts of armed force against 
another State (...) "
336
. 
In accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter, this kind of state armed attack gives rise to 
a situation that can be defined by the Security Council as self-defence. The State victim of an 
act of armed aggression may implement Article 51 of the Charter relating to self-defence, 
according to which: "Nothing in this Charter shall affect the natural right of self-defence, 
individual or collective, where a member of the United Nations is the object of an armed 
aggression (...) "
337
. The latter is also defined by the same dictionary also as "right of armed 
reaction which individually or collectively, any State which has been the victim of an armed 
aggression”338. 
The members of the Security Council are still reluctant to allow the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) to prosecute the perpetrators of "aggression". On 13 February 2009, the Special 
Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (GTSCA), established under the Treaty 
Establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC), announced a historic breakthrough. 
After five years of deliberations, the members of the Group declared that they had finally 
reached an agreement on a draft definition of the crime of aggression. The treaty establishing 
the Court, the Rome Statute, provided that the crime would be prosecuted, but at the time of 
its elaboration, the drafters of the Statute had not been able to agree on a definition. The 
initiation of prosecution for this crime had therefore been suspended until the Statute could be 
amended to include this definition. The Assembly of States Parties was submitted the 
definition proposed by the Working Group to its Review Conference in May 2010 in 
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Kampala, Uganda. As a first step, States Parties adopted a series of amendments defining 
"aggression" and setting out how the Court could deal with it. Following the Review 
Conference, article 8 was added to the Rome Statute: "the crime of aggression" means the 
planning, preparation, launching or execution by a person effectively able to control or direct 
the political or military action of a State, an act of aggression which, by its nature, 
seriousness and extent, constitutes a clear violation of the Charter of United Nations ". They 
detailed as an "act of aggression" includes: the invasion, bombing, and blockade of ports or 
coastlines of a state by the armed forces of another state or sending by a state or in the name 
of a State of bands, groups, irregular troops or armed mercenaries. 
The second step in activating the concept of "aggression" was for this year. However, it 
seems that the permanent members of the Security Council (France, Great Britain, United 
States, China, Russia) continue to be opposed to this possibility of prosecuting the 
perpetrators of aggression. Yet, the proposal on the ICC table gives guarantees to the five 
powers. It prevents an attorney from initiating an investigation without first informing the 
Security Council, which may request a suspension for one year renewable. It also provides 
that a State may exempt its nationals from prosecution by the Court for that reason if it so 
provides in a written declaration. These guarantees did not remove the prejudices of the 
members of the Security Council. It seems that the annual meeting of the ICC member states 
will not give the go-ahead for a possible prosecution of the perpetrators of aggression. The 
fear of the great powers is to see persecuted within the ICC military interventions that they 
decided in the name of issues including humanitarian. 
The ICC, established in 1998 and established in The Hague, can try the perpetrators of 
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, but cannot prosecute the perpetrators of 
"aggression". This is due to opposition, since its inception, by the permanent members of the 
UN Security Council, who do not want to see their leaders dragged into international justice. 
Two recent examples illustrate the risk of such procedures. An Iraqi general had accused 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair for "illegal invasion of Iraq."  However, this was dismissed 
by the High Court of the United Kingdom. Also African activists filed a complaint in court 
against Nicolas Sarkozy for the 2011 intervention in Libya. 
According to these definitions, it will be observed that it is difficult to qualify legally the 
private terrorist acts perpetrated by non-State underground organizations as an act of 
aggression unless committed by State agents or by persons acting on behalf of a State. The 
act of armed aggression is generally attributed only to State agents, as stated by the 
International Law Commission, and more particularly to its principal political leaders or state 
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organizers: "These terms" leaders "or" organizers "must to be understood in a broad sense, 
that is, to designate, in addition to members of a government, persons occupying a high 
position in the military apparatus, the diplomatic corps, political parties or the business 
community "
339
. 
4.3.1.2. The direct or indirect involvement of one or more States 
 
The international legal rules may determine the involvement, direct or indirect, of a state or 
more states in an armed aggression. The jurisprudence of the ICTY may help to clarify the 
conditions under which a State should be considered according to the rules of international 
law to be involved in a terrorist act committed on the territory of a third State. The ICTY 
Appeals Chamber, in the Tadic judgment of 15 July 1999
340
, determined under what 
conditions the armed forces of a clandestine group are deemed to be acting "on behalf of" a 
third State. The Chamber ruled that "to blame a State for acts committed by military or 
paramilitary groups, it must be established that the State exercises overall control over the 
group, not only by equipping and financing it, but by also by coordinating or assisting in the 
overall planning of its military activities "
341
. 
The ICJ, in the "Case concerning border and cross-border armed actions, (Nicaragua v. 
Honduras) 
342
 had clarified that the responsibility of a third State could be engaged by an 
unlawful act committed by perpetrators who had acted in fact on behalf of that third State, 
and provided that the latter State have effective control over the armed forces responsible for 
the violation at the time the alleged violation was committed
343
. According to the highest 
international court, the effective control of the third State must be established at the moment 
of aggression, whereas the ICTY requires the third State to exercise overall control which 
does not necessarily imply effective control over each of the acts committed by the controlled 
group. Cecile Toutrnaye underlined that this jurisprudential development could lead to an 
extension of the causes of attribution of a terrorist act to a State. There is indeed a desire to 
widen the hypotheses in which the responsibility of a State can be engaged (...) "
344
. The 
intention element of an armed aggression will consist in the knowledge that the accused (the 
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armed terrorist group or the third State) of the nature of that unlawful act and their intention 
to contribute to it
345
. 
4.3.2 Armed aggression by terrorist groups: a complex qualification 
Armed aggression is, in general, a state act involving an aggressor State and an aggressed 
State. Legally, it is difficult to characterize terrorist acts as acts of armed aggression, as these 
acts are often perpetrated by clandestine non-state organizations. 
4.3.2.1. A difficult qualification 
 
Francois Bugnion
346
 distinguished between non-war terrorist act of violence and warrior act 
of violence. While the latter targets fighters and soldiers of a specific army and is subject to 
the rules gradually codified in the Geneva Conventions of 1864, 1906, 1929 and 1949, in the 
Declaration of St. Petersburg of 1868 and in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. Non-
war terrorist act of violence threatens the civilian population and non-combatants, and is not 
provoked by a state, in most cases, but by different organizations with political objectives
347
. 
Aggression, according to this author, depends on a state decision. It stated that war is an 
attribute of state sovereignty, subject to the rules of international law and the UN Charter 
which prohibits the use of force in international relations, with the exception of collective 
coercion provided for in Chapter VII and the right of individual or collective self-defence 
reserved by Article 51. War of aggression, as a war unleashed by an aggressor State against 
another aggressed State, is subject to the norms governing reciprocal of belligerents "jus in 
bello" and the norms relating to the regulation and prohibition of the use of force "jus ad 
bellum" . According to him, justice requires an absolute distinction between the aggressor and 
the victim of aggression; it is not legitimate for humanitarian law to place on the same level 
the aggressor state and the one that resists aggression since the war of aggression constitutes 
the war crime par excellence
348
. In other words, the aggressor state puts himself in the 
position of an outlaw, (and he) cannot be the holder of rights that have their source in an 
illegal act
349
. 
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The Aggressor State may be identified or designated by the Security Council. However, in 
the case of a non-state terrorist attack, the difficulties inherent in the designation of the 
aggressor cannot be ignored. With regard to resolution 3314 (XXIX) adopted on 14 
December 1974 by the UN General Assembly, Francois Bugnion points out that it is far from 
constituting a true definition; it is virtually silent on the forms of indirect aggression that 
characterize our time, such as subversion, terrorist attacks, foreign intervention in the event of 
civil war, occupation with the agreement of a dependency government, and so on. In addition, 
Resolution 3314 has taken into account an essentially subjective element, the ground for the 
use of arms, as this is inconsistent with a true definition since a definition able of having legal 
effects therefore it should be based on fact and objectives element
350
. Finally, this resolution 
does not bind the Security Council, similarly, only the Security Council can specify the 
existence of a threat to peace, a breach of the peace or an act of aggression
351
. The difficulties 
are not resolved: the decision of the Security Council could not have legal effects beyond 
those provided for in the Charter or other treaty provisions. 
4.3.2.2. New extension of international law 
 
The analysis of the content of resolution 3314 (XXIX) shows that it is only because of very 
precise conditions that a State may be held responsible for acts of aggression perpetrated by 
"irregular forces" or terrorist groups. A first hypothesis to be considered is that where a state, 
which is suspected of sending this type of force, is firstly aware of the future aggression 
action, then has itself participated in planning and the execution of this act, and finally, 
accepted or tolerated that its territory be used to commit armed actions. 
A second hypothesis is that developed by the ICJ in the judgment on "military and 
paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua", in which it states that it "does not think that 
the notion of armed aggression can cover assistance to rebels in the form of supply of 
armaments or logistical or other assistance "
352
. In another passage of this judgment, the ICJ 
refrains from equating the supply of arms by a state with armed gangs to armed aggression. It 
also states that: "If the concept of armed aggression includes the sending of armed gangs into 
the territory of another State, the supply of arms and the support given to such bands cannot 
be equated with armed aggression. Nevertheless, such activities may well constitute a breach 
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of the principle of non-use of force as well as interference in the internal affairs of a State, 
that is to say, unlawful conduct, but less serious than armed aggression 
353
. 
Olivier Corten and Francois Dubuisson supported this opinion while stressing that "the 
thousands of victims of these actions did not bring the Court to qualify the support of the 
United States other than interventions in cases under the national jurisdiction of Nicaragua or 
for some of these aspects, unlawful use of force "
354
. The Military Activities case has thus 
enabled the ICJ to determine the conditions under which armed support to irregular forces 
may be characterized as unlawful use of force or as an act of state armed aggression
355
. 
On the basis of these opinions, these two jurists did not describe the attacks of 11 September 
2001 of acts of armed aggression, as they noted that the perpetrators of these criminal acts 
were not members of the official organs of the Afghan state led by the Taliban, nor Afghans, 
but that most they had Saudi nationality. 
Nevertheless, since the events of September 11, 2001, there has been an extension of the 
definition of armed aggression. The Security Council has expanded the concept of armed 
aggression in resolution 1368 (2001), which has resulted in an expansion of international 
responsibility acts committed by terrorist organizations may be attributed to any State that 
supports, helps, shelters and houses them. Before 9/11, no United Nations body accepted the 
self-defence argument when it was used to justify a response to an alleged indirect armed 
aggression of mere support to irregular forces.  By relying of course on the gravity of terrorist 
acts, they are now assimilated to armed attacks by regular forces. This qualification, which 
does not quite correspond to terrorist acts committed by non-State terrorist organizations, 
even if they reach a very high threshold of gravity, allows the use of force against terrorism. 
This use of force can only be envisaged by Article 51 of the Charter if the Security Council 
authorizes it to fight terrorism internationally. In such a case, the Victim State may resort to 
armed force in response to a terrorist act, through the system of collective security. 
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4.4 International Terrorism and Organized Crime 
 
Over the last decade, transnational organized criminal groups have built large-scale 
international networks. They record vast profits through various illicit activities and acts of 
intimidation. According to the statement of the Tenth United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, organized criminal groups engage in the 
trafficking of human beings, especially women and children, for the purpose of slavery, 
economic and prostitution. They engage in the illicit trade in weapons and ammunition, the 
trafficking of illicit substances and nuclear material, fraud on an international scale, and 
launder huge sums of money. They bribe and buy public officials, politicians and business 
leaders
356
.  
Organized crime marks current criminal systems and is a challenge on two counts. A 
political-criminal challenge, in the sense that this phenomenon presents itself as a power 
structure that can destabilize the state, or at least compete with it. It is also a legal challenge, 
as responses in some states have developed outside the criminal legal framework. Open 
borders and technological advances, which have given new impetus to international trade and 
have also allowed criminal groups to multiply and expand their activities to all countries and 
continents for example, trafficking in weapons, drugs and nuclear materials, global scams, 
huge launderings, migrant smuggling, and so on.  
According to a United Nations General Assembly press release, the links between drug 
trafficking and transnational criminal activities, which finance international terrorism, 
dominated the Third Committee's discussions which concluded on crime prevention and 
criminal justice as well as international drug control
357
. Many delegations noted during the 
discussions that it is necessary to cut the profits from this crime in order to destabilize the 
bases of terrorist organizations. In this regard, all delegations expressed their support for the 
UN conventions, notably "the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime" of 
Palermo
358
 and Resolution 1373 (2001) of the Security Council which establishes a close link 
between transnational organized crime and international terrorism
359
. The question is 
terrorism legally a form of organized international crime? Is there not a difference in 
international law between terrorist organization and criminal organization? A legal distinction 
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between acts of international terrorism and organized crime is necessary, although the links 
between the former and the latter are considerable. 
4.4.1 The necessary distinction between organized crime and terrorism 
It is important to emphasize from the outset the link established in international context 
between terrorism and organized crime. This is the case both in the Joint Action of the 
European Union on the Criminal Organization of 1998
360
 and in the Introduction to the UN 
Convention on Transnational Organized Crime
361
 adopted in Palermo (Italy) on 8 January 
2001. In the first text, terrorism is mentioned among the forms of organized crime making it 
necessary to reinforce cooperation between member states. In the second text, the General 
Assembly noted with deep concern the growing association between organized crime and 
terrorist crimes. It considered this new convention as an effective means and the necessary 
legal framework for international cooperation in combating inter alia criminal activities such 
as money laundering, corruption, illicit trafficking, cultural heritage damage and links 
between transnational organized crime and organized crime
362
. 
From a criminological point of view, it is indeed a particular form of crime that has been 
inserted, on the one hand, into the power structures of contemporary societies, and on the 
other hand, which presents the elements of an associative crime: permanence, 
professionalism, organizational structure, etc. It is a crime heavily attached to the markets for 
arms, drugs, smuggling, and money laundering
363
. It is for this reason that we must consider 
that the problem can no longer be solved at the national level. A fight against this crime will 
only be effective after having defined and clarified legally organized international crime, and 
only after determining its constituent elements in international law. 
4.4.1.1. Organized crime: legal definitions 
 
Following the concern and the importance of the fight against organized crime, the General 
Assembly meeting on 8 January 2001 adopted the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. The provisions of which should enable member states to 
better combat organized crime. According to Article 2 (a) of the Palermo Convention, the 
term "organized criminal group” means a structured group of three or more persons who have 
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been in existence for some time and are acting in concert to commit one or more a number of 
serious offenses or offenses established in accordance with this Convention to derive, directly 
or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit "
364
. 
The first offense covered by this Convention is participation in a group organized for the 
purpose of committing serious offenses. The latter are defined in Article 2 (b), “any act 
constituting an offense punishable by deprivation of liberty, the maximum of which must not 
be less than four years”365. First, in order for the Convention to apply, a criminal group 
organized be involved in the commission of the offense. According to Article 2 (c): "the term 
'' structured group '' means a group which has not formed at random to commit an offense 
immediately and which does not necessarily have formally defined roles for its members , 
continuity in its composition or elaborate structure ".  Even though this group is not random, 
it does not have to be a large, hierarchical criminal organization. It will be constituted, in 
accordance with the legal definition, as soon as it contains at least three persons who seek to 
derive directly or indirectly a financial or material benefit. The commission of at least one of 
the serious crimes defined in Articles 2, 5, 6, 8 and 23. This includes, in particular under 
Article 6, money laundering, the acquisition, the use or transfer of property
366
 of the proceeds 
of crime and the provision of assistance, assistance or advice for their commissions, etc. 
Finally, these offenses must, according to Article 3, be of a transnational nature and this is a 
key element of the Convention. 
4.4.1.2. The constituent elements of organized crime 
 
The offense is transnational or international if it is committed in more than one state; or when 
committed in one State but an interesting part of its preparation, planning, conduct or control 
takes place in another State; or if the offense is committed in one State but involves an 
organized criminal group that engages in criminal activity in more than one State; or if it has 
effects in more than one State
367
. Thus, for the Palermo Convention to apply, three conditions 
must be cumulatively fulfilled: (a) an offense established by it, (b) the offense is 
transnational, and (c) an organized criminal group is involved. The Palermo Convention, a 
genuine legal instrument for the fight against organized crime allows States to prevent and 
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punish such crimes by adopting in accordance with Article 5 (3), the necessary legislative 
measures to ensure that domestic law can cover all serious crimes involving organized crime 
groups. 
4.4.2 The relationship between Terrorism and Organized Crime: The Complexity of 
Terrorist Financing Networks 
Terrorism is a clandestine activity that requires very significant logistical and therefore 
financial means. Traditionally, however, unlike organized crime, terrorism is not about 
money, which makes it more difficult to dismantle its funding networks. 
4.4.2.1. Financial links 
 
Article 2 (a) of the Palermo Convention distinguished between the objectives of criminal 
organizations and terrorist organizations: the former aiming to "derive directly or indirectly a 
financial or material benefit" .A terrorist group has, moreover, as an attempt to destroy the 
institutions of a state or to impose its will on a state, it is a resort to violence or the threat of 
violence in order to spread terror in civil society and to weaken the authorities in place. In 
addition, no clandestine network is specific to terrorism; and illegal activities do not 
necessarily have the purpose of financing it. 
Terrorist financing can indeed be made from fundraising or donations of money, acquired 
legally. Professor Jean-Paul Laborde pointed out that if a terrorist group uses the techniques 
of the organized criminal group and makes money and the search for huge profits its essential 
purpose, the offenses that it commits in this case fall within the scope of Convention. Thus, 
he says, "judges and prosecutors can use this convention against terrorist groups if they fund 
their activities through organized crime techniques"
368
. At the same time terrorist groups can 
become organized criminal groups when they seek resources to finance their activities 
through organized crime, corruption, money laundering, and that is why organized crime has 
close links with these networks. 
Consequently, it is necessary for the fight against terrorism to attack organized crime in all its 
forms, and especially for money laundering, by establishing forms of coordination between 
the different countries so that this fight is international. 
The adoption of international texts has the effect of pushing all states to criminalize or 
strengthen their domestic laws by extending the crimes underlying other serious crimes in 
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addition to drug trafficking
369
. Money can be used in these contexts to mount terrorist 
operations
370
. Monitoring and controlling financial flows can help break the connection 
between terrorism and its financing. 
4.4.2.2. The common money laundering networks 
 
The International Association of Penal Law has pointed out that "the sources that crime can 
launder are undoubtedly unlawful, unlike sources that support terrorism can be both illegal 
and lawful
371
. In highlighting this point, it is important to have a provision on funding 
because it is impossible to criminalize lawful funding. It is known that there are official 
sources such as national or international public support for associations in the context of legal 
funding. There is, for example, in the UK or France a flow of money coming from Saudi 
Arabia to support the mosques whose presence and takeover in the territory are increasing. It 
is for this reason that some experts
372
 argue that very technical measures must be adopted in a 
specific field of finance activity in order to curb money laundering and the financing of 
terrorism. This is a financial action by the bankers who must identify dangerous customers. 
This is a complex task, as the multiplication of financial products makes it difficult for the 
authorities in this area. Among the techniques that Ian Roberge proposes is the global or 
multi-level governance that is defined by the UN in the following ways in which individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common challenges, an ongoing process of 
conflict resolution that allows for collaboration among actors despite the existence of 
conflicting interests. This involves formal institutions and regimes that have the power to 
enforce regulations, as well as informal arrangements that are perceived as being in their own 
interests, as individuals or institutions
373
. 
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According to the economist
374
, one of the major challenges in the fight against money 
laundering exists in the difficulty of identifying the owner of financial assets, not to mention 
the problems related to tax evasion or so-called "Tax havens" where banking laws are often 
ambiguous. It is also difficult to determine common money laundering networks. But these 
difficulties did not prevent the governments to freeze, after the attacks of September 11th, the 
assets of various groups suspected of terrorism. Thus the FATF (International Financial 
Action Task Force) received the mandate to develop standards and an action plan to fight the 
financing of terrorism. 
The relationship between money laundering and the financing of terrorism on the one hand, 
and organized crime and terrorist attacks on the other hand are very complex. Money 
laundering, in legal terms, is the conversion or transfer of capital or other property for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising their illicit origin or assisting anyone who is involved in 
the realization of the offense from which these assets and assets originate to escape the legal 
consequences of its actions and that organized crime, according to the Palermo Convention, 
seeks to derive directly or indirectly a financial or other advantage material. Terrorism 
remains an act intended to kill or seriously injure a civilian or any other person who does not 
contributed directly in hostilities in a situation of armed conflict where by its nature or 
context such act is intended to threaten a population or to force a government or an 
international organization to perform or refrain from performing any act
375
. 
 
4.5 The qualifications of international courts 
 
Several contemporary scholar and criminalists experts 
376
 describe terrorist acts as crimes 
against humanity. They assert that this concept as well as its qualification appeared for the 
first time in the Allied Agreement of August 8, 1945
377
. Article 6 (c) of the Statute of the 
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, which gave the first definition of crimes against humanity 
and described as “murder, extermination, and all other inhumane acts committed against all 
civilian populations before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious 
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grounds when such acts or persecution whether or not they constituted a violation of the 
domestic law of the country in which they were perpetrated "
378
. 
The concept of crime against humanity appeared again when the General Assembly of the 
United Nations adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
adopted in 1948. Crimes against humanity are related to international regulations and are 
characterized by serious violations of the rules formulated in international conventions. These 
acts are of a serious nature, as the Judgment of 14 January 2000 of the Second Trial Chamber 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia emphasizes
379
. 
The question that now needs to be addressed is whether certain acts of terrorism can be 
described as crimes against humanity, and if they are therefore within the jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court. On the other hand, we will analyze the qualification of the 
assassination of the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri (February 2005), elaborated 
by the Security Council and the Lebanese government, in the Statute of the Special Tribunal 
for Lebanon (STL) in May 2007. 
 
4.6 Qualifications of the Military Criminal Court of Nuremberg and other 
International Criminal Tribunal 
 
According to the statute of the Nuremberg Military Criminal Court, the general elements 
The crimes against humanity are the same as those for ordinary crimes; the actus reus and the 
mens rea. According to its sixth article
380
, a crime against humanity is a crime that violates 
international conventions and laws and is at the same time condemned by all States. Indeed, 
all states have progressively integrated crimes against humanity into their domestic law, and 
all international criminal tribunals have also recognized it as an independent crime
381
. 
The actus reus element is characterized by the contempt of the civilian population by their 
freedom and their bodily integrity through serious, systematic and organized attacks against 
people and property. The mens rea (intentional) element of these crimes, which can be 
committed against civilian populations depend on, as confirmed by Nasser ZAKAR
382
, the 
execution of a state plan or a policy of the organization. It is in fact the motive that is 
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different in common law crimes and crimes against humanity
383
. It states that it is 
inconceivable that the agent of the crime against humanity does not have the will to hurt and 
the conscience of the unlawful character of the crimes which it advocates, provokes or 
executes. Thus, the perpetrator of such a crime must be aware of the existence of an attack 
against a civilian population and be aware that its act falls within the scope of the latter even 
if it is not informed all the details. To this end, Nasser Zakar emphasized that "movable 
intent" is one of its constituent elements that determines the definition and conditions the 
repression of the crime against humanity. The question is to what extent terrorist acts can be 
characterized as crimes against humanity. To answer this question, we first need to determine 
the legal aspects of the crime against humanity and then analyze the possible characterization 
of terrorist attacks as crimes against humanity. 
 
4.7 The legal aspects of the attack constituting crime against humanity in 
international law 
 
Article 6 (C) of the Statute of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal requires that 
Victims of crimes against humanity are civilian populations attacked before or during armed 
conflict, and have been persecuted for political, racial or religious reasons. These elements 
have been taken up by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, which 
has adopted its own definition of crimes against humanity. According to article 5 of its 
Statute: “The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has the power to try 
persons presumed responsible for the following crimes when they have been committed 
during an armed conflict of an international or internal character and directed against any 
civilian population: murder, extermination, enslavement, expulsion, imprisonment, torture, 
rape, persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds (...) "
384
. 
According to this definition, there is a link between crime against humanity and armed 
conflict. However, the Tadic judgment of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY of 2 October 
1995 provided some legal clarification regarding the existence of an armed conflict, so that 
such crimes can be committed outside of hostilities against civilian populations. This will be 
discussing in the following sections
385
. 
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4.7.1. The exclusion of the condition of armed conflict 
After reviewing the principle of the requirement of an armed conflict, the ICTY Appeals 
Chamber in Tadic decided that it was not essential that a link be established between the 
concept of crimes against humanity and armed conflict
386
. This jurisprudential interpretation 
may open the possibility of repression of crimes against humanity not only by the ICTY but 
also by the ICC. It is no longer legally necessary for crimes against humanity to be 
committed on the geographical scope of armed conflict
387
. They may be committed outside 
the geographical and temporal framework of the armed conflict, as for example in the 
territory of the Parties to the conflict. It remains essential, according to the preceding 
definitions that they should be directed against a civilian population, whether in peacetime or 
in time of war. The Appeals Chamber concluded that customary international law no longer 
requires a link between crimes against humanity and armed conflict
388
. 
4.7.2. Systematic attack against the civilian population 
The ICTY held in Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic
389
 of 12 February 1999 that to be directed 
against a civilian population, a crime against humanity must fulfil three criteria;  
First, these criminal acts must have as their object a civilian population specifically identified 
as a group by the perpetrators of those acts; Secondly, these criminal acts must be part of a 
certain organization and have a systematic character; finally, their commission must be of a 
certain size and seriousness. 
It must be stated that, on the one hand, all of these criteria do not specify what specific 
character this group must present and that, on the other hand, the concept of crime against 
humanity initially defined by the Nuremberg Tribunal has evolved through the jurisprudence 
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of the International Criminal Tribunal. Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, charged with prosecuting persons responsible for acts of genocide and 
other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of 
Rwanda or by Rwandan citizens in the territory of Rwanda States between 1 January and 31 
December 1994, stipulates that crimes against humanity must be committed as part of a 
widespread and systematic attack directed against any civilian population because of its 
national affiliation political, ethnic, racial or religious. Unlike the statute of the ICTY, the 
ICTR Statute does not require in the definition of the actus rea of crime against humanity the 
existence of what is called a "policy of ideological hegemony", provided for by the Statute of 
the Tribunal Nuremberg, nor the condition of an "armed conflict" provided for by the Statute 
of the ICTY. 
The Statute of the ICTR only requires that acts be committed as part of an attack directed 
against a civilian population and this attack tends to terrorize the civilian population. The 
Kunarac judgment defines the attack as a course of action involving the commission of acts 
of violence that can vary greatly in nature and gravity while producing enormous terror
390
.  
As the terrorist attacks were characterized, on the one hand, by the use of violence, terror and 
organized crime by groups or movements of state or non-state against the civilian population 
for political purposes and on the other hand, through the intentional use of explosives and 
other deadly devices in a public place, causing the death of innocent civilians or serious 
bodily harm
391
. Some scholars and internationalists such as President Gilbert Guillaume have 
argued in this regard that large-scale terrorist attacks against civilian populations could be 
regarded as crimes against humanity
392
. 
 
4.8 Serious terrorist attacks classified as crimes against humanity 
 
For Marie Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, the general 
categorisation that best fits the acts of 9/11 is that of crimes against humanity
393
. However, 
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this classification has been criticized by some internationalist specialists. In the following 
section these arguments will be further explained
394
. 
4.8.1. Legal aspects of this classification 
Professor Brigitte Stern
395
 supported the characterization of terrorist attacks as crimes against 
humanity. She stressed that "the three elements of the ICTY's Nikolic judgment, which is 
considered as stating current customary international law in this area, are indeed present: they 
must be particularly serious acts directed against a civilian population, and committed in a 
systematic or generalized manner. These elements are in fact included in Article 7 of the 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, which refers to a whole series of inhumane acts 
committed in the context of a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population 
and in knowledge of this attack
396
. The President Gilbert Guillaume, meanwhile, clarified that 
even if the crime of terrorism does not come as such within the jurisdiction of the ICC, this 
would not prevent this Court from knowing acts of terrorism that would be qualified under its 
Statute, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and certain war crimes. However, how 
can terrorism be characterized as a crime against humanity, when it could not be constituted 
as an independent crime? The Rome Convention covers certain war crimes and not terrorism, 
distinguishing between offenses committed in cases of international armed conflict and those 
identified during armed conflicts that do not represent such a character. To the extent that acts 
of terrorism fall within these characterisations, the International Criminal Court would be 
competent to know and punish them. In this regard, President Guillaume stated that: "In this 
perspective, the judge has a prominent role to play whether it is the national judge or the 
international judge, in the service of the common good; it must contribute to the fight against 
terrorism. It must also ensure that this struggle is conducted in accordance with the law and 
civil peace and peace between nations are indivisible from justice”397. 
4.8.2. The constituent elements of this qualification 
Herve Ascensio rejected the hypothesis that one or more attacks constitute a widespread or 
systematic attack on a civilian population. According to his point of view; “the terrorist act is 
characterized above all by its singularity from which it draws the essential its symbolic 
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strength without the singular character of the event. The terrorist act will no longer appear as 
a challenge from the oppressed to the powerful; it will no longer be an asymmetrical violence 
but a conflict between powers
398”. However, the question is not terrorism a systematic violent 
attack on innocent civilians? Is it not the terrorist offense a widespread attack that threatens 
international security and the stability of international relations? 
The terrorist acts covered are generally aimed at civilians who do not participate directly in 
hostilities. They constitute a violation of the principle that the civilian population must be 
spared from hostilities, a principle recognized as one of the fundamental principles of 
humanitarian law. Terror has also been taken into account in criminalizing crimes against 
humanity.  In the Krstic case in particular, the terror imposed on the civilian population made 
it possible to establish the forced nature of the transfer of this people out of Srebrenica
399
. As 
the terrorist attacks are based on the systematic use of violence that generalizes a situation of 
insecurity, and as they are characterized by what constitutes essentially the actus rea covered 
by the definition of crimes against humanity provided for in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court. A crime committed in the context of a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, they may be characterized as crimes against 
humanity and therefore they fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC as claimed by several 
internationalists and criminalists
400
. 
However, William A. Schabas and Clementine Oliver claim that the mere fact that terrorist 
acts constitute widespread or systematic attacks, of which the victims are civilians, is not 
sufficient to qualify them as crimes against humanity
401
. They point out that the concept of 
crimes against humanity necessarily involved, and until recently, some form of state 
intervention. However, it can be considered that this condition was changed as early as 1997, 
when the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
argued that crimes against humanity require a policy of a government, organization or of a 
group rather than the closer involvement of a state policy
402
. More recently, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has asserted that 
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the existence of a state plan or policy is not necessary to qualify an act as a crime against 
humanity
403
. 
Regarding the notion of "generalised attack", it was defined by Article 7 (2) of the Rome 
Statute as “the conduct which consists in the multiple knowledge of acts referred to in 
paragraph 1, and against any civilian population in pursuance or in the pursuit of the policy 
of a state or organization for the purpose of such an attack”404. This definition can cover the 
terrorist attacks, because it must be understood not only the geographical field but especially 
the number of deaths and this criterion is inspired by the practice of the ad hoc tribunals in 
the Tadic case. It was stated that: "crimes against humanity may be committed on behalf of 
entities exercising de facto control over a particular territory but without the international 
recognition or official legal status of a de jure State, or by a group or a terrorist 
organization
405”. 
In the Erdemovic case, the ICTY had already stated that the person prosecuted must have 
participated in "a widespread and systematic attack against a relatively large group
406
. The 
adjective "systematic" would imply the implementation of a methodical, thoughtful, 
orchestrated and organized plan. In the Kayishema case
407
, the ICTR had already clarified the 
meaning to be given to the adjectives characterizing the attack, it declared that a "generalised 
attack is characterized by the fact that it is directed against a plurality of victims. A 
systematic attack, an attack perpetrated under a preconceived policy or plan. In the Vukovar 
Hospital case, the ICTY stated that "to the extent that it is related to the widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population, a single act could fulfil the conditions of a 
crime against humanity”408. 
A single act can therefore also be characterized as a crime against humanity, even if it does 
not present the characteristics of generality and systematic but only the other characteristics 
of the crime (intentionality, discriminatory character). In spite of the few criticisms made, 
article 7 of the ICC constitutes in its complete content an important step in the definition of 
the crime against humanity, as Nasser Zakar pointed out, which gives the following 
definition: "is a crime against humanity, any breach of international law committed against a 
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group of persons in a systematic and generalized manner with the motive of attacking the 
human person in execution of a policy that transcends the rules of international law "
409
. 
Crimes against humanity appear to be able to cover the terrorist attacks, because according to 
the ICTY: "crimes against humanity cover serious acts of violence that harm the human being 
or reach him in what is most essential to him: his life, freedom, integrity, health and his 
dignity. They are inhumane acts which in their magnitude or seriousness exceed the limits 
tolerable by the international community which must enforce the sanction "
410
. 
The crime against humanity no longer appears to be linked to the existence of an armed 
conflict, which brings it closer to organized terrorist criminal acts that can be perpetrated in 
peacetime as well as in war against civilians and endanger their lives, their property and their 
freedoms
411
.  
 
4.9 The characterization of terrorism and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) 
 
At present, the Hariri Case constitutes a working pathway for the Security Council which 
may allow for the legal qualification of a terrorist attack perpetrated in Lebanon on 14 
February 2005. This is evidenced by the work of the International Commission of Inquiry 
(ICI) on the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others, as 
well as the trial of the next International Criminal Court which should evoke the concept of 
terrorism. This is the first time that an international commission of inquiry has been set up to 
investigate a terrorist attack perpetrated in Lebanon in order to prosecute the perpetrators and 
help the Lebanese authorities to investigate all aspects of this terrorist act, including the 
identification of perpetrators, sponsors, organizers and accomplices 
412
. 
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4.9.1 The characterization of the attacks in the STL Statute 
On 30 May 2007, the Security Council adopted resolution 1757 (2007), which entered into 
force on 10 June of the same year, on the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL) to try perpetrators of attacks in Lebanon since 2005  including the killers of former 
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri assassinated on February 14, 2005. This resolution 
reflects the agreement between the Lebanese government and the United Nations. The 
legally-binding text provides that the tribunal "will start operating at a date to be determined 
by the UN General Secretary in consultation with the Government of Lebanon, and taking 
into account the progress of the international investigation commission's work. An agreement 
for establishing it was signed in 2006
413
 between the UN and the Lebanese government, but 
its ratification by the Parliament of Beirut, required by the Lebanese Constitution, could not 
take place because of the political crisis in Lebanon
414
. The resolution also provides for the 
case where an agreement between the UN, Lebanon and a host country on the seat of the 
tribunal would be impossible. In this case, the Council decides that the seat of the tribunal 
will be the subject of an agreement between the UN and the host country, in consultation with 
the Government of Lebanon. The tribunal would be composed of three judges, one Lebanese 
and two foreigners. The prosecutor would also be a foreigner, but assisted by a Lebanese 
deputy. A court of appeal should be founded and composed of two Lebanese judges and three 
foreigners. Non-Lebanese magistrates would be appointed by the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations. The court for reasons of security and serenity should sit outside Lebanon. 
4.9.1.1. The description of the attacks committed in Lebanon 
 
With regard to international anti-terrorist law, the adoption of the STL on the basis of 
Chapter VII by the Security Council confirms the UN's characterization of terrorism as a real 
threat to international peace and security
415
. According to the definition often quoted by Jean 
Combacau: "[a] threat to peace within the meaning of Article 39 is a situation which the 
body competent to launch a sanctions action declares that it actually threatens peace"
416
. The 
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Security Council is the competent organ of the World Organization declared in resolutions 
1368 and 1373 that terrorist acts constitute a threat to international peace and security. 
The status of the STL, which came into effect on June 10, 2007, aims to establish the 
responsibilities of those who used terror as an instrument of intimidation of the Lebanese 
people and destabilization of their government. The very special jurisdiction of this 
internationalized national court
417
 calls for a preliminary remark. According to article 1 of the 
draft statute, it deals mainly with the crime of 14 February 2005, which is described as 
"terrorist" in the preamble and also on other crimes committed between 1 October 2004 and 
31 December 2007. It could even relate to crimes committed later if there was a consensus on 
them between the Lebanese government and the Security Council.  
The STL is therefore competent to try terrorist crimes perpetrated only in Lebanon. He could 
prosecute state agents from neighbouring countries if they were involved in the attacks in 
Lebanon since the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. However, on the 
contrary, he could not judge terrorist crimes perpetrated outside Lebanese territory, for 
example in Iraq. The legal advance of the STL treaty resides first and foremost in the fact of 
bilaterality, that is to say that this International Criminal Tribunal entered into force on June 
10, 2007, while its text (very binding based on the foundation of the Chapter VII of the 
Charter) does not oblige Lebanon to ratify it and is not open to adoption by other states, 
particularly Lebanon's neighbouring states some of whose nationals may be involved in the 
assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. In general, ratification will take place in 
accordance with the law of treaties if it is provided for in the treaty. In this case, ratification is 
an indispensable condition for the entry into force of the treaty. It is therefore not a mere 
formality but an act of essential importance.
418
 This provision offers the Lebanese parties a 
new opportunity to reach an agreement by following the ordinary Lebanese procedures for 
ratifying the international treaty represented by the agreement between Lebanon and the UN.  
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4.9.1.2. The Agreement between Lebanon and the United Nations 
 
The second legal exclusivity is the development of a treaty annexed to a resolution adopted 
by the Security Council. The Resolution 1757 (2007) includes in its annex the Statute 
establishing the STL. The question that arises here is whether this treaty is legally valid in 
international law. There is no rule of international law prohibiting a text annexed to a 
resolution or a joint statement from constituting international agreements intended to submit a 
dispute to arbitration or judicial settlement
419
. Unlike the ad hoc international criminal 
tribunals (ICC), which have been established through unilateral acts of mandatory scope and 
by decisions of the Security Council pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations Charters 
420
 of the so-called "hybrid" or "mixed" STL needed Lebanon's agreement to enter into force. 
That is to say, this bilateral agreement requires the consent and ratification of Lebanon. 
However, the Statute of the STL has not been ratified by the Lebanese Parliament because of 
the political conflict between the pro-Syrian Lebanese opposition and the parliamentary 
majority. This question focuses on the nature of the STL. 
We recognize that the ratification of treaties is governed by domestic law. The Lebanese 
internationalist Aida Azar noted: "It is difficult to see how one could ask a State to which the 
Tribunal has been compelled to participate in its composition and to join the trial”421. As the 
status of the STL was blocked by the opposition and President Lahoud, the Security Council 
following the request of the Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Seniora and the deputies of the 
parliamentary majority to overcome this block adopted the status of the STL under Chapter 
VII of the Charter by Resolution 1757 of 30 May 2007. This UN desire reflects not only the 
internationalization of the United Nations global counter-terrorism strategy, but its resolve to 
end violence and terrorist attacks in Lebanon. Aida Azar stated that “by the resolution 1757, 
the Security Council substitutes an international procedure for an internal procedure; more 
exactly, it replaces a law of ratification by a resolution of the political organ of the United 
Nations"
422
. In this framework of application and to strengthen regional criminal law 
cooperation, the STL statute provides that supplementary agreements may be concluded. 
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4.9.2 The framework of the STL as an international anti-terrorist court with a mixed 
jurisdiction 
 
The Security Council has described the systematic attacks committed in Lebanon as acts of 
international terrorism. The assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was also 
the subject of this qualification elaborated in the Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon 
(STL)
423
. These acts of terrorism threaten the stability of Lebanese society, the security of the 
Lebanese Republic, and the lives of citizens. Such acts present a degree of seriousness, 
violence and terror. The UN wanted to put an end to this worrying situation in Lebanon by 
the internationalisation of the STL and its composition. 
The internationalization of the STL is not only reflected in the composition of Chambers and 
the participation of foreign judges. This internationalized cooperation is in addition to the 
cooperation already specified by the statute of the STL, with all the organs of the Special 
Court at all stages of the proceedings. It also facilitates the access of the Prosecutor and the 
Defence Counsel to the places, persons and documents they need for the purposes of 
investigations
424
. This judicial cooperation goes hand in hand with international financial 
cooperation aimed at financing the STL, since fifty-one per cent of the Tribunal's expenses 
are financed by voluntary contributions from States
425
. 
The status of the STL provides for a majority of international judges to which the Trial and 
Appeal Chambers will consist of more than fourteen independent judges. The Trial Chamber 
will consist of a Lebanese judge and two international judges. If the STL is led to have a 
second Trial Chamber, it will be composed of the same way
426
. Regarding the Appeals 
Chamber, it will be composed of five judges: two Lebanese and three international. 
International judges shall be selected by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from 
among judges who have exercised their functions independently and do not accept or seek 
instructions from any government or any other source. Their term of office is three years 
renewable after consultation with the Government of Lebanon
427
. Also the Prosecutor will be 
appointed by the Secretary-General and a Lebanese Deputy Prosecutor to assist the 
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Prosecutor in the conduct of investigations and prosecutions. It must be noted that the STL is 
an internationalized mixed jurisdiction and applying the Lebanese criminal code
428
. 
 
4.9.3 The definition of terrorism as an international crime by the STL 
As previously discussed in chapter two, it is difficult and complicated to draw a general 
definition of terrorism in international law
429
. However, on 16 February 2011, the STL 
Appeals Chamber issued, at the request of the Pre-Trial Judge, a preliminary ruling on the 
applicable law in which it affirmed the existence of a customary international definition of 
terrorism
430
. To be able to rely on case law supporting its view of the definition of terrorism, 
it remained to justify its inclusion in the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the STL. Article 
2 of the Statute clearly states that the law applicable to the Tribunal is limited to the Lebanese 
Criminal Code and its national definition of terrorism. How then to take into account a 
definition of customary international law?  
This issue had been raised by the Pre-Trial Judge in his order for preliminary rulings. Noting 
the tension between national law and international law that runs through the STL's Statute, 
the STL wonders whether "the Tribunal must also take into account relevant international 
law"
431
.This tension would be apparent in view of the international character of the Tribunal, 
who’s Statute contains aspects of international criminal law.  Noting that its mission is to 
apply the Lebanese Criminal Code as the Lebanese courts the Chamber begins by setting out 
the principles of interpretation relating to Lebanese law. To interpret the provisions of the 
Lebanese Criminal Code as the Lebanese courts would is to take into account the 
international law that is binding on Lebanon". Although Lebanese law does not mention the 
application of customary international law, the Chamber considers that the latter "must 
necessarily play a role within the Lebanese legal system"
432
.  Relying on some Lebanese 
decisions referring to customary international law, the Chamber concludes that; where it is 
directly applicable, custom may implicitly modify Lebanese law
433
. At this stage, therefore, it 
can be concluded that international law cannot be directly applied by the STL, but can 
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nonetheless be used as an interpretative aid insofar as it is part of the context of Lebanese 
law. 
Effectively, interpreting Lebanese law under customary international law broadens Lebanon's 
definition of terrorism. Article 314 of the Penal Code may, indeed, appear rather restrictive in 
so far as it enumerates the means likely to be used for an act to be considered as terrorist: 
Are included in the term acts of terrorism any facts whose purpose is to create a state of 
alarm, which will have been committed by means likely to produce a common danger, such 
as explosive devices, flammable materials, toxic or corrosive products infectious or microbial 
agents
434
. 
The Lebanese courts have traditionally apprehended this enumeration in a restrictive manner. 
As a result, an act committed with a firearm could not be considered a terrorist act. Not 
containing such restrictions, the international definition makes it possible to overcome this 
limitation. Indeed, the literal reading of Article 314 of the Lebanese Penal Code does not 
confirm the restrictive approach. According to the Chamber, emphasis should be placed on 
the words "means likely to create a common danger" which are central to the establishment 
of the "tools" likely to be used to commit a terrorist act
435
.The use of a firearm in the street is 
just as likely to put others at risk as the explosive is. It can also be added that the word 
"such", which precedes the enumeration, tends to demonstrate its illustrative and non-limiting 
nature. 
The Chamber takes the extensive interpretation a step further by linking the purpose of the 
act - "creating a state of alarm" - with the result of the means used - creating "a common 
danger". It argues, therefore, that attacking a person of a single size at home is also likely to 
create a common danger because of the violent reactions that this act could cause in the 
population
436
. The problem is, however, that in this approach it is the act and no longer the 
means as such that is likely to create a common danger. However, considering the structure 
of the sentence, "likely to create a common danger" is the description of "average"; it 
characterizes the nature of the object or the use that is made of it. 
The extent to which this definition addresses the issues that hinder the establishment of a 
single definition of terrorism, namely: the issue of freedom fighters, wartime terrorism and 
terrorism, needs to be examined. With the exception of this last point, the preliminary ruling 
addresses all of them directly, but quickly dismisses the controversies they contain. With 
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regard to freedom fighters, the great difficulty is the willingness of some states to include a 
reference to the legitimate struggle of peoples for independence and freedom and in this way 
distinguish terrorism from other forms of political violence
437
. In this regard, the Chamber 
considers that a sufficiently generalized agreement has emerged since even the States that 
hold this distinction have ratified texts - in particular the Convention on the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism
438
 which do not mention the legitimate struggle of certain 
peoples
439
. "States that still insist that an exception be made to" freedom fighters "and that 
therefore object to the international definition of terrorism may at best be considered as 
persistent objectors
440
 . 
After all, it is accepted that "the interests of the international community tend to prevail over 
those of individual sovereign states
441
. Another obstacle to the adoption of the General 
Convention on Terrorism concerns the extension of its scope, including acts perpetrated 
during wartime
442. The STL considers, on this point, that "a customary rule, which also 
covers terrorism in times of armed conflict, is in the making", the definition it has 
emerged applying only in times of peace. We can see that the Chamber is indeed seeking 
to resolve certain controversies and to highlight the elements on which the positions of 
the States are ultimately not so far apart. 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
The terrorist offense remains at present an unspecific crime under international law despite 
the existence of several global conventions on counter-terrorism. Terrorism is a serious crime 
and it is exercised by transnational anti-state groups that often target civilian populations and 
government institutions. The definition of armed aggression refers to acts of terrorism acting 
on behalf of an aggressor State under its control against the territory, property, civilian 
population or members of the diplomatic staff of another State. 
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Terrorist armed aggression therefore depends on a state decision. Judges of the ICJ concluded 
in the judgment of 27 June 1986 that the provision of material, financial and logistical 
support to groups engaged in acts of terrorism abroad, without the Aggressor State having 
direct control over such acts remains an unlawful act and not an armed attack. However, after 
11 September 2001, any aid, funding, and support to terrorist groups would be qualified as 
terrorist offenses under international law, European provisions and national criminal law. 
Different offenses of organized crime, serious terrorist acts, systematic and organized, 
directed against the civilian population and committed by a state or an organization, could be 
qualified as crimes against humanity
443
.  International terrorism is different from anything 
called organized crime. If acts of terrorism are planned, financed and perpetrated under the 
sponsorship of one State against another State, such acts may be characterized as acts of State 
armed aggression by the Security Council, which could in such cases to decide to react based 
on the Charter, including the principles of collective security, in order to protect international 
peace and security. In a state of war, terrorist offenses can be characterized as war crimes or 
crimes against humanity, as several internationalists have pointed out. In this case, the ICC 
may try suspected terrorists. 
From what has just been presented, Antonio Cassese's customary definition of terrorism, both 
doctrinally and judicially, pursues the same aim: to fill the gaps in the law and thus to better 
apprehend the phenomenon of international terrorism. The whole of scholars and experts 
thoughts on the subject is, in fact, guided by the will to fight against impunity, which 
ultimately required a unique definition of the concept. This definition was later incorporated 
into the preliminary ruling by the Appeals Chamber of the STL, the only international court 
competent to deal with acts of terrorism. This transposition, which allows widening the 
means likely to be used for an act to be qualified as terrorist in Lebanon, is of limited 
practical interest in the Tribunal's jurisdiction. On the other hand, confirmed in jurisprudence, 
the customary definition of terrorism acquires a greater persuasive force likely to lead to an 
evolution of international law. Its ability to do so, however, remains uncertain if one 
considers the reception that the decision received. Nevertheless, the decision constituted a 
deliberate attempt of judicial law-making
444
, in continuation of what Antonio Cassese 
conceives as the role of the specialist of international law. 
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In conclusion, the absence of a single classification of terrorist offenses reflects the weakness 
of the international system and the obvious legal gap in the international law. On the other 
hand, it has led to the strengthening of cooperation at both the international and regional 
levels, and has led States to develop their own national legal provisions and their domestic 
jurisdictions, which remain the only competent authorities in the field. 
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Chapter Five 
The Concept of Foreign Terrorist Fighters at the 
Framework of International Law 
5.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter is about the foreign terrorist fighter issue concerning how the law seems to be 
changing in this field , what the implications might be for humanitarian action and then to 
highlight some of the recent developments in this field. Also give a bit of a context for the 
relationship between counterterrorism laws broadly, so this is where will be discussing in 
foreign terrorist fighters, and humanitarian action. 
In the field of global counterterrorism, certainly we see in the wake of the September 11th 
2001 attacks is a tremendous global effort to expand counterterrorism law. We also see the 
Security Council taking a leading role in requiring under Chapter 7 authority that every state 
implement laws and enforcement approaches that would ensure that global terrorists or 
transnational terrorists were not able to take advantage of loopholes in various territories to 
develop wealth, arms, and personnel.  We also see a real move in the field of 
counterterrorism regulations to focus in not just on terrorist attacks themselves or bombs and 
military training themselves but also on the idea of support for terrorism. 
After Security Council resolution 1373 which lays out many of the arenas in which the 
council is demanding that states implement criminal laws. The security council also moves 
into a much more robust approach to designating particular individuals and armed groups as 
terrorists, and thereby requiring that all states implement asset freezes and travel bans on 
those individuals and groups .So what we see is an effort to restrict and regulate support and 
that it falls to states to determine what does support for terrorism mean. Some states develop 
criminal laws that are exceptionally broad in their understanding of support and others tailor 
it very narrowly towards things that we might have traditionally seen as being support for 
terrorism. So our concern and where we came at this research is what happens when these 
two worlds meet when these two efforts at global lawmaking regulation and policy collide in 
areas where listed or designated terrorist actors controlled territory or access to a population 
in a situation that is an armed conflict where the civilian population and the wounded and 
sick require humanitarian assistance. 
It should be noted that the Council decision further qualifies foreign fighters as 'terrorists', 
characterization is not without problematic consequences, especially with regard to the 
coordination of the measures contained therein with the rules of international humanitarian 
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law. It is necessary in this regard to discuss that the Res. 2178 must be inserted in the context 
outlined in particular by the Res. 2170 (2014) and 2199 (2015), which contain a series of 
measures aimed primarily at freezing up the funding sources of the Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant (ISIL), which took control of large territories in Syria and Iraq
445
. 
 
5.1 Security Council Resolution 2178  
 
On September 24, 2014, the United Nations Security Council, in a meeting chaired by US 
President Obama, approved the resolution 2178, by imposing on States the adoption of 
measures against foreign terrorist fighters. A series of legislation has recently been passed to 
give States the power to prevent what is called terrorism related travel. However, the 
definitions are vague and the rules are prone to being interpreted in a variety of ways. The 
constant reinvention of definitions means that we could be talking about the same piece of 
international law but at the national level there's more than one way of interpreting it. 
Therefore, many of international law scholar, academic and experts are involved in analyzing 
and understanding any new resolution that the UN Security Council passes like resolution 
2178
446
. The resolution stated that all countries should make it a serious criminal offense for 
their citizens to travel abroad to fight with terrorist organizations or to recruit and fund others 
to do so
447
.  At a meeting chaired by the US President Barack Obama, the 15-member council 
unanimously adopts 2178 drafted by the US and compelling countries to prevent and 
suppress the recruitment and travel of fighters to foreign conflicts
448
. The US President 
Barack Obama stated that “the historic resolution that we just adopted, enshrines our 
commitment to meet this challenge. It is legally binding; it establishes new obligations the 
nations must meet. Specifically nations are required to prevent and suppress the recruiting 
organizing transporting or equipping of foreign terrorist fighters as well as the financing of 
their travel or activities”449.  
During the UN Security Council meeting , the US president Barack Obama was also stated 
that “In the nearly 70 years, the United Nations there's only the sixth time that the Security 
Council is met at a level like this. We convene such sessions to address the most urgent 
threats to peace and security. What brings us together today, what is new is the 
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unprecedented flow of Fighters in recent years to and from conflict zones including 
Afghanistan, in the Horn of Africa, Yemen Libya and most recently Syria and Iraq. Our 
intelligence agencies estimate that more than 15,000 foreign fighters for more than 80 
nations have travelled to Syria in recent years. Many have joined terrorist organizations such 
as al Qaeda's affiliate the Al- Nusrah Front and ISIL which now threatens people across 
Syria and Iraq. These terrorists exacerbate conflicts; they pose an immediate threat to people 
in these regions. And as we've already seen in several cases they may try to return to their 
home countries to carry out deadly attacks”450. 
The resolution 2178 is a classic suppression resolution, so the drafters would probably argue 
that it doesn't create any sort of criminal legislation within the member states that it's aimed 
at. But it is just simply requires those member states or all member states , to suppress in their 
own legal systems their domestic legal systems some sort of legislative framework that would 
prevent fighters from joining up with the Islamic state
451
. The Security Council resolution is 
under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter which means it's legally binding on member states and the 
Security Council has the authority to enforce Res. 2178 with economic sanctions or force. 
The resolution 2178 is directly addresses individuals as opposed to organizations or groups. 
So whereas before you might have prosecuted someone for being a member of Al-Qaeda for 
example, you can now arrest and jail them for travelling in order to become a member. In 
effect, Res. 2178 require member states to ensure that legal systems can prosecute as a 
serious criminal offense the travel for terrorism that includes helping someone else to travel 
or financing such activities.  
It also compels member states to prevent suspects from entering or using their territories for 
transit for any terrorist related intentions and for this the states can ask Airlines to provide 
passenger lists. The UN resolution 2178 generally targets fighters travelling to conflicts 
anywhere in the world but it doesn't mandate military force to tackle the foreign fighter issue; 
what states can do is convict individuals or groups that are proved to be helping people 
joining the fight overseas. This is the sort of classic problem that happens with UN Security 
Council Resolutions or any other resolution in international law. For example, with the 
European Convention on Human Rights, so they allow for generally what's called a margin of 
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appreciation, meaning it's a fancy way of saying that each member state has some discretion 
as to how to apply a piece of international law
452
. 
The other issue is the Security Council is made up of only 15 of the 193 countries represented 
at the UN, essentially which means the vast majority of nations have to adapt to regulations 
they haven't had a say in and while Security Council member states are setting the rules on 
things like human rights and civil liberties is anyone watching the remaining 178 member 
states to ensure they're not abusing that authority they're given under the excuse of preventing 
terrorism. 
Through resolution 2178 the Security Council condemns violent extremism and the 
perpetration planning or participation of terrorism but it's failed to define what that means.  
It's not only lacking in clear definition but internationally it has no definition and pretty 
vague, it is a way of ideologically slandering someone whose views you disagree with and so 
it simply acts as a means of stigmatization.  
To give an example Richard Baxter, who was a US military specialist at delegate to a number 
of conventions on international law said on terrorism; the term is imprecise, it is ambiguous 
and above all it serves no operative legal purpose
453
. Also Rosalyn Higgins who has a judge 
on the International Court of Justice from the UK said “terrorism is a term without any legal 
significance; it is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities whether of states or of 
individuals widely disproved of in which either the methods used are unlawful or the targets 
protected or both”454. So what we are seeing is that from the legal side of things that people 
who are professionals and experts in this area indecisive at the very idea of having some sort 
of legal significance attached to terrorism. The big problem in the UK and other countries are 
terrorism law, which is that terrorism can apply to practically anything, it is extremely broad 
and general and vague. You also find with a lot of UN documents particularly Security 
Council documents they don't necessarily give definitions to those terms and it is 
problematic, as for example , to what a foreign fighter is and what is an illegitimate armed 
force. For instance, if you take genocide there is a legal definition of genocide in the 
Genocide Convention
455
 and that's what you find in the statute of the International Criminal 
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Court and as a legal definition of torture in the UN Convention against Torture
456
, however, 
so far there’s no generally accepted definition of terrorism. In the past, there are cases where 
states have defined terrorism based on who their enemies are, also tells us that those 
definitions are prone to change depending on what the government defines as the national 
interest. While thousands travelling to fight alongside ISIS but there are a few who have gone 
to fight on the other side by joining for example YPG
457
 or the Kurdish people's protection 
units. Some fighters changed their mind after growing suspicious of the group's ties to the 
Kurdish Workers Party
458
 ( PKK) which has been designated a terrorist organization by USA 
and Europe. This is because they are worried that they would never be allowed to return to 
their countries if they were seen to be associating with the PKK.   
PKK is still on the terrorist list even there's a big campaign to have it taken off the terrorist 
list but it's still there at the present moment. So associating with the PKK in any way 
whatsoever is dangerous any case. For example, Macer Gifford is a former public school boy 
who proudly poses with weapons on his face book page as he fights against ISIS
459
.  Macer is 
fighting with the Kurdish people's protection units in Iraq and Syria. In this case Macer 
possibly being in breach of resolution 2178. In this regards the Home Office spokesman 
commented that “the UK has consistently advised against all travel to Syria and parts of 
Iraq
460
, anyone who travels to these areas is putting themselves in considerable danger.  It's 
added the following guidance anyone who engages in fighting abroad could potentially be 
prosecuted under the UK's criminal or terrorism laws. Whether an individual is arrested or 
prosecuted will always depend on the facts and circumstances of the case, and is an 
operational decision for the police and the Crown Prosecution Service”461.  
This is depending on the ideological circumstances and depending on who is the group or 
party. So as mentioned in this case, it's the PKK which despite the fact that it's a prescribed 
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terrorist organization, it's a situation of the enemy of my enemy is my friend, and so 
everybody to a certain extent suspends the application of the law where it's politically 
expedient. And of course the PKK isn't the only circumstance. There is a notable 
circumstance where this happens too when a fighter is joining up with the Israeli Defence 
Forces. There is legislation particularly United Kingdom that prohibits individuals from 
joining a foreign fighting force in any event whether it's a designated group or not
462
. 
For example you can't go and join a foreign nation and join their army and start fighting in 
conflict there's. There’s an old piece of legislation from the 1800s that still prescribes that and 
that's one of the issues that was raised in UK Parliament solely by George Galloway in 
relation to the Israel-Palestinian conflict in that British citizens are joining the IDF and could 
in effect face prosecution when they return to UK irrespective of whether there is a 
determination on the status of the IDF, Israel as a legal category, it doesn't matter that it's a 
legitimate armed force because it's still fighting for a foreign country
463
. 
The phenomenon of joining conflicts abroad isn't new, some countries recruit foreigners to 
their armed forces. For example Bangladesh and Pakistan recruit Palestinians who come to 
train in their military academies, non Israeli Jews are allowed to join the Israeli army through 
a series of programs and any citizen of a European Union country is eligible to join the 
Belgian Armed Forces and of course troops from all over the world take part in military 
operations as part of the UN peacekeeping force.   
The French Foreign Legion was set up in 1831 as a military service wing of the French army. 
Although it was exclusively created for foreign nationals who wanted to join the French army 
nearly a quarter of its recruits are French citizens
464
. The Spanish government also set up the 
International Brigade during the 1930s Civil War. Foreign fighters joined the units mainly 
through communist parties around the world travelling to Spain had to be done using 
clandestine routes much like the way fighters arrived in Syria today. Although governments 
including the British and French didn't recognize the right to join the brigades, there were no 
convictions if any of them returned to those countries
465
.  
More recently the mountainous terrains of northern Afghanistan saw soldiers who arrived in 
the thousands to fight against Soviet forces. Some trained and equipped by Western nations, 
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the foreign fighters came from all over the world and included men who would go on to 
become some of the main players in other conflicts like Osama bin Laden.  Bin Laden is 
credited with financing and directing a contingent of all Arab fighters with the assistance and 
support of the Saudi and Pakistani government's. Their efforts contributed to the 1989 
withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. While some of Afghanistan's Mujahedeen
466
 
returned home, many went on to fight on the side of the Bosnian during the 1990s Bosnian 
war.  They joined a number of other foreign fighters who had started off as humanitarian 
workers. The Bosnian Mujahedeen’s primary aim was to fight for Islam and many of them 
are still considered heroes in their respective home muslin communities. 
A decade later the same territories of Afghanistan were to become a source of foreign 
fighting activity but this time not with the same approval from the fighters’ home countries. 
The UK army officers conducting the USA led war against the Taliban complained of a 
surreal mini British civil war with a growing number of home-grown fighters. 
At the time MI5 estimated that up to 4,000 British citizens had travelled to Pakistan and 
Afghanistan for military training. The parameters have shifted, the idea of foreign fighters 
once considered heroes both at home and by their host countries has become problematic 
even for the states that used to approve them. While we still have the French Foreign Legion 
and UN peacekeepers, the face of a foreign soldier these days is masked in black and 
associated more with beheadings and burning prisoners alive than with the selfless support 
and struggle of a Mujahedeen fighter, and while the International Law seeks to universalize 
what is and isn't allowed nation states are nowhere closer to agreeing on definitions.  
However, it has given countries the International approval they need to pass laws under the 
banner of anti-terrorism so that for the first time in its history France seized the passports of 
six of its citizens who it claimed were planning to travel to fight in Syria. The government 
estimates that about fourteen hundred French citizens have links to recruitment cells for Syria 
and Iraq of which 400 are believed to already be fighting there. The ability to seize passports 
and identity cards of anyone suspected of travelling to fight is one of the key measures of the 
French anti-terrorism bill that was passed by Parliament two months after resolution 2178. 
The consequence of that UN Security Council meeting raises questions about a measure 
perhaps too extreme and this resolution 2178 can be abused. This has been the case with 
previous UN Security Council resolutions targeting specifically terrorism. For example, 
probably the best document in a tested example was in relation to UN Security Council 
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resolution 1267 that created what's called a blacklisting regime. By virtue of resolution 1267 
there was a Security Council committee convened and they would place individuals and 
organizations on a blacklist. The problem was in many well documented instances 
individuals were caught on a blacklist because they had an identical name to someone who 
was suspected of terrorism or there was a mere suspicion that they were up to something.  
These individuals had no means of getting off the blacklist even in circumstances where the 
judiciary or the courts of member states agreed and said their names didn't belong on the list. 
The problem is the Security Council is not a judicial body so you do not have for example 
any means of redress if there's an error and you have no way of appealing decisions. In fact 
from the time that UN Security Council resolution 1267 was implemented until today, there 
were a hundred cases of what could be call abuse or miss application and 1267 therefore 
relies on members of the Security Council of reviewing these cases. Because there's a veto 
power on the Security Council, it subjects to a certain type of politicization where the review 
process can be vetoed so it's effectively hijacked by for example China or Russia owning two 
political considerations not legal considerations. If we look at any resolution it is not without 
its problems, however, this resolution is probably a lot clearer than many resolutions that 
come out the Security Council. It will take time the situation with Islamic State which is 
certainly developing every day and expanding throughout the region and it's becoming a 
bigger problem this will suggest further resolutions come out of the Security Council. 
International Law was never going to be easy to master the reality when dealing with global 
organizations that seek to establish parameters for legislation that's at a national level. This 
means without proper clarification and without set definition of terms like terrorism, member 
states can continues using and even misusing resolution 2178 in ways it may be so 
complicated to explain
467
.  
 
5.2 The Definition of Foreign Terrorist Fighters  
 
The case of foreign terrorist fighters is a very important development related to radicalization 
leading to violence. These concerns are reflected, in particular, in the actions that try to 
prevent these individuals from going to fight abroad and through the management of the 
return of these combatants. This raises the question of what exactly is a foreign fighter.  
Foreign fighter is a relatively new concept and you don't find it in the academic literature 
before the early 2000s. There is still some conceptual work to be done in this field but work 
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by Thomas Heggehammer
468
 and a scholar David Malet
469
, has tried to narrow down a 
definition of foreign fighters. The first thing about foreign fighters is to as an intermediary 
category between two types that are very familiar from the international relations literature; 
we have insurgents on the one hand and international terrorists on the other hand. Insurgents 
in a nutshell operate locally and they use guerrilla tactics.  International terrorists on the other 
hand, operate transnationally and use terrorist tactics.  Foreign fighters take one element of 
each, so they operate transnationally but they use primarily guerrilla tactics. They move like 
international terrorists but they fight like insurgents. However, this can be narrow it down 
further with four key criteria;
470
  
First, foreign fighters are typically private actors and that sets them apart from deployed 
soldiers. Second, they are also typically unpaid or receive a very low pay which sets them 
apart from mercenaries who go out and fight for money. Third, they are not from the conflict 
area that they are fighting in and it sets them apart from traditional insurgents who typically 
have sort of born and rose in the place they fight. Fourth, they fight like insurgents, they 
typically engage primarily in guerrilla type activity and in that respect they differ from 
international terrorists. 
Despite these concerning prospects and the fact that foreign fighters are increasingly the 
subject of public and security service concern, few studies go beyond individual case studies 
and utilize the possibilities of comparative historical approach.  One significant exception is 
David Malet’s comparative study of foreign fighters’ transnational identity in civil conflict, 
Malet defines foreign fighters as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during 
civil conflict, and furthermore as individuals who are not driven by promise of material 
reward, but by ideological- religious motivations and the perception of transnational threat 
against their own community”471. 
Yet another possibility is Moore and Tumelty definition of foreign fighters as “non-
indigenous, non-territorialised combatants who motivated by religion, kinship, and/ or 
ideology rather than pecuniary reward, entre a conflict to participate in hostilities”472.  It can 
nevertheless be argued that these definitions are too narrow, and that a more diverse approach 
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is needed. One such multi-pronged definition would be to divide foreign fighters into four 
different categories, which Maja Touzari Greenwood has attempted;
473
 
 Local foreign fighters, who engage in regionally limited conflicts, such as the civil 
wars in Libya and Syria. 
 Terrorist fighters, who fight as part of global terrorist networks such as Al-qaeda and 
the ISIS. 
 Migrant fighters, who migrate to the areas where they fight. 
 Diaspora fighters, who have ethnic or family/clan attachments to the area where they 
fight (such as al-Shabaab or the Kurdish insurgents in Northern Iraq, Iran, Syria or 
Turkey). 
As many concepts in social science, the concept of Foreign Fighters are not always crystal 
clear. There are some borderline phenomena that can be difficult to classify as foreign fighter 
or not.  For instance, first we have the case of Diaspora volunteers for example Somali British 
who going and fight in Somalia. They may be raised in the United Kingdom but they have a 
family connection to the conflict that is joining. So the one criterion about not being from the 
conflict area is blurred
474
. Another borderline phenomenon is Ideological Volunteers to 
Foreign Militaries, for example every year many non-Jewish Europeans traveled to Israel to 
serve in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) usually for ideological reasons. Now this is also 
borderline case because the IDF is not an insurgent organization but at the same time there is 
ideology motivating the volunteers. A third borderline phenomenon is Terrorist trainees, for 
example European Islamists who travel to Pakistan to train with Al-Qaeda central and some 
of them may leave with the intention to fight in Afghanistan as insurgents but they end up 
basically training for international terrorism. This poses a definitional question should we see 
them as foreign fighters or as international terrorists. The fourth borderline phenomenon 
Volunteers in non-combat roles, in many foreign fighter destinations you see if foreign 
volunteers arriving and doing things other than fighting. They may serve as aid workers or 
help with logistics and so on, that poses a question whether we should count them as foreign 
fighters or not.  
In this context, the Security Council resolution 2178 (2014) defined the phenomenon of 
foreign terrorist fighters as “an individual’s who travel to a State other than their State of 
residence or nationality for the purpose of committing, organizing or preparing acts of 
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terrorism, or for participating in or giving or receiving training in terrorism, particularly in the 
context of an armed conflict "
475
. 
According to the above definition, three conditions are required to be met in order to be label 
an individual as foreign terrorist fighters. The person must travel to a country other than that 
of his nationality or residence; the person have the intention of participating by any means 
whatsoever in terrorist acts or; to receive / provide training in terrorism. This definition 
creates a complexity by referring to the question of the country of residence. According to the 
above definition, for the person to be considered a foreign terrorist fighter, the state to which 
he or she surrenders must not be his country of nationality or country of residence. But if his 
country of residence turns out to be the country where the conflict is taking place, the person 
can participate without meeting the definition of foreign terrorist fighter. In other words, to 
justify one's residence in the country of the conflict is enough to avoid being classified as a 
foreign terrorist fighter. This residence has no time limit or period. Thus a person, who 
travels to a country on a regular basis, asks for a residence permit and gets it; may participate 
in terrorist acts or receive / provide training in terrorism without being counted among 
foreign terrorist fighters. 
This opens the way for several foreign terrorist fighters to escape their status by the fact that, 
in the case of both current and future conflicts, some of them can claim the status of resident 
that their purpose, even before obtaining the resident's card, was terrorist action. However, 
there is the question of people who have been in the country for long periods before the 
conflict and whose first reason for settling in this country was other than terrorist. This 
category can logically be assimilated to nationals and escape the status of foreign terrorist 
fighter. The question of the State of residence must be accompanied by conditions concerning 
the period of stay and the period of stay as well as details of the relationship between the 
beginning of the stay and the date of the outbreak of the conflict. 
Thomas Hegghammer , the Norwegian expert, provides a more elaborate in his study on the 
Rise of Foreign Fighters, compiled by the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs 
of Harvard University
476
; he identifies four criteria for distinguishing a foreign fighter. "The 
foreign terrorist fighter is for him an individual: 
• who joined an insurrection and operates within it; 
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• who does not have citizenship or kinship with the conflicting parties; 
• who is not affiliated with an official military organization and; 
• who is not paid. 
The notion of "foreign terrorist fighter" is therefore two-headed: 
• A "foreign fighter" is someone who has left their country of origin and has joined a non-
state armed group in an armed conflict abroad by ideology, belief or affinity. 
• He/she is a terrorist; this attribute refers to two explanations: 
 either a person who joins countries on whose territories terrorist organizations are 
established and have training camps where he can receive training that will allow him 
to carry out attacks upon his return to his country of origin . 
 either it is a fighter who commits terrorist acts on the territory where the armed 
conflict is taking place, knowing that this territory is not that of his country of origin. 
Thomas Hegghammer does not even bother about the resident's question; he evokes a 
question of kinship with the conflicting parties, opening another question: what is kinship 
with a territory? Is it a relationship with a citizen of that territory or an administrative 
relationship with the territory itself? The complexity of the concept does not allow dealing in 
this chapter. It would be sufficient to say that the question of the common definition affects 
cooperation between States. We cannot fight a phenomenon together if we do not apprehend 
it in the same way. Terrorism is a cross-border phenomenon with its motivations and 
implications. The globalization of radical Islamic organizations, the broadening of their 
sources of funding, and the exploitation of social networks to promote their Salafi jihadist 
ideology and attract foreign terrorist fighters make the standards defined by Heghammer 
insufficient to define a foreign terrorist fighter. 
The National Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague
477
 counts on the lack of a common 
definition among the challenges encountered even in the country census of these foreign 
fighters; “each country introduces those which it judges, from its own point of view to be part 
of this category. Several challenges were encountered during the collection period, especially 
with regards to the number of FTF. First, lacking a common and agreed definition of FTF ...” 
This is how the report of the above-mentioned centre makes a special recommendation for the 
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question of definition. “One common definition of FTF is necessary to ensure coherence in 
policies, accuracy in data collection and greater validity when it comes to data analysis”478. 
Although there is no generally agreed definition of what could consider a terrorist, we can 
only resort to legal analysis to determine from an international treaty or some Security 
Council resolutions or domestic laws what exactly mean when we say a terrorist or a foreign 
terrorist fighter.  When we look at the definition from Res. 2178 of what a foreign terrorist 
fighter is, and the Security Council promulgated the following “it’s a national who travels or 
attempts to travel to a state other than their state of residence or nationality and other 
individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories other than their states of 
residence or nationality”479. There are no clear answers to these questions and different 
commentators, analysts and scholars will classify individual groups of activists differently 
depending on how the stance they take on these borderline cases. 
5.3 The need to improve counter-terrorism measures 
 
On September 24, 2014, the United Nations Security Council in a meeting chaired by US 
President Obama approved the resolution 2178 by imposing on States the adoption of 
measures against foreign terrorist fighters. The global approach of the decision adopted on 
the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which is based on three pillars: the fight against 
radicalization and violent extremism through initiatives that involve the civil society of the 
member states; prevention measures in the strict sense especially with regard to controls on 
the movement of suspected terrorists; the judicial response in the sense of the advance of the 
criminal protection raise crimes of acts which precede the commission of a terrorist act. 
Because of the categorization of terrorism as a threat to peace and the general nature of the 
obligations envisaged, the Res. 2178 (2014) was immediately combined with the previous 
resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1540 (2004). These decisions are highly criticized by the 
doctrine because with them the Security Council would have acted ultra vires exercising 
legislative powers not provided for by the UN Charter
480
. First of all, it was claimed that 
situations such as international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
                                                             
478
 Ibid. 
479
 United Nations Security Council Rresolution 2178 (2014). 
480
 R. Cadin, 2008. The assumptions of the action of the Security Council in art. 39 of the United Nations 
Charter, Milan, pp. 305-312; Also P. Gargiulo, 2009. Non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
fight against terrorism, The crisis of disarmament in international law, on the fourth centenary of the death of 
Alberico Gentili, XIII Convention SIDI, Naples ,p. 235  
148 
 
as such could not be traced back to the notion of threat to peace on the basis of art. 39 of the 
UN Charter
481
, and therefore constitute the assumption of the action based on Chapter VII.  
However, they considered that this determination remained in reality within the margin of 
discretion assigned by the Charter to the Security Council and that the art. 41 of the UN 
Charter could indeed constitute an adequate legal basis
482
. While noted the formation of a 
consensus around the fact that the Council itself could issue urgent measures of a binding 
nature and general character in order to counter the serious threat to peace and to the security 
represented by the terrorist activities of non-state actors on a global scale
483
. But this 
assumption was based on the fact that res.1373 and res. 1540 essentially reproduced 
obligations previously entered into multilateral treaties which States were invited to ratify 
such as the Convention against the financing of terrorism. More problematic is the 
application of this argumentative pattern to res. 2178, since at the time of its adoption there 
was no contractual text concerning foreign fighters.  
The Security Council in adopting the res. 2178 has in fact acted as a material body of the 
international community, thus exercising new powers not provided for by the Statute in order 
to provide an additional level of legitimacy or implementation to measures that the States had 
already decided to manage general interests. This approach is based on the fact that the fight 
against terrorism is now a general interest of the international community and on the thesis, 
shared by us, of the existence in general international law of rules on the prevention and 
repression of terrorist activities, especially productive norms of obligations ergo omens
484
. 
Moreover, the draft resolution had received support from more than one country which had 
therefore expressed the urgent need to contrast according to a global approach the 
complexities and transformations underway in Islamist extremism. Although there is an 
explicit reference to the need to implement the measures contained therein with respect to the 
                                                             
481
 Chapter VII — Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, 
Article -39 “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, 
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance 
with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” 
482
  Chapter VII — Action with respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression, 
Article -41 “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be 
employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such 
measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
483
 M. Sossai, 2012. The prevention of terrorism in international law, Turin, pp. 49-53. 
484
 J. Proulx, 2012.Transnational Terrorism and State Accountability: A New Theory of Prevention, Oxford – 
Portland. For a discussion of the issue of legitimacy according to the different approach of transnational law, see 
also C. Murphy, 2015.Transnational Counter-Terrorism Law: Law, Power and Legitimacy in the 'Wars on 
Terror', King's College London Law School Research Paper No. 2015-14. 
149 
 
foreign fighters operating in support of ISIL and the Al-Nusrah Front, the res. 2178 lacks a 
definition of terrorism. This could have referred to paragraph 3 of the res. 1566 (2004)
485
 
which contains one on which a broad consensus was reached among the States
486
. Also 
expressed in the framework of negotiations towards a global convention and which had also 
been recalled by international jurisprudence
487
. There are three cumulative conditions on the 
definition is based on: (1) it must be acts carried out with the intent to cause the death of a 
person or to cause serious injuries or the capture of hostages; (2) in order to provoke a state of 
terror and intimidate the population or force a government or international organization to 
perform or refrain from doing any act; (3) which constitute offenses according to 
international treaties on terrorism. Previously in the days of approval of the res. 2178, an 
authoritative voice had highlighted in the absence of a definition of terrorism the risk of 
possible abuses deriving from the indeterminacy of the criminal offenses envisaged by the 
resolution to the point of believing that "Res. 2178 (2014) eliminate the gradually progress 
made over many years in introducing protections of human rights and the rule of law into the 
highly problematic manner in which the Security Council exercises its supranational 
powers"
488
. 
5.4 The legal status of foreign fighters in International Humanitarian Law 
 
The resolution 2178 introduces the notion of 'foreign terrorist fighter', defining it as follows: 
"individuals who travel to a state other than of residence or nationality for the purpose of the 
perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the provision 
of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflict "
489
. The three essential 
elements of the definition are the 'foreign' character of the combatants; their qualification as 
terrorists; their participation in an armed conflict. As for the first character, the notion would 
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seem at first glance to exclude the situation in which an individual leaves his country of 
residence to return to his country of origin: for example, the case of a Syrian resident in a 
European state headed for Syria. However, in light of the aim and purpose of the resolution 
the correct interpretation of the conjunction or between residence and nationality seems to be 
the most extensive to understand even the situations just outlined
490
. 
The reference to the terrorist character of foreign fighters associated with their participation 
in an armed conflict is more problematic. To understand the possible problematic outcomes 
of such a definition of a foreign terrorist fighter, it is necessary to start from the issue of the 
possible existence of an armed conflict and the question of the legal qualification of the 
presence of foreign fighters according to international humanitarian law. 
First of all, although the view sustained by the United States continues to be that of the 
continuing existence of an armed conflict of a non-international character with Al-Qaida
491
, 
has been stressed by several parties that the ‘War on terror' must in fact distinguish itself 
according to its components. It will have to be verified that the identified threshold has been 
exceeded for international armed conflicts by the common article 2 of Geneva Conventions in 
the existence of a conflict between states, and for internal conflicts, in the existence of 
clashes of a certain intensity between the armed forces of a state and the insurgents or 
between groups organized within a State
492
. 
As a preliminary point, it should be noted that foreign fighters do not fall into the category of 
mercenaries under the law of international armed conflicts. This is because they do not fulfil 
the condition of being motivated by profit-making purposes
493
. In this context the issue of 
possible connections between Al-Qaeda and ISIL there is no doubt about the characterization 
of violent scenarios in Syria and Iraq as armed conflicts of a non-international nature. Rather, 
the Syrian case highlights the existence of a complex situation in which it is not always easy 
                                                             
490
 Ibid. 
491
 H. Koh, 2010.The Obama Administration and International Law, speech at the annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law.  
492
 The art. 3 does not contain a definition of non-international armed conflict: in the Tadic case, it was 
established that there is an armed conflict when armed violence takes place between government authorities and 
organized armed groups or between armed groups organized within the state. ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko 
Tadic, IT-94-1-T, sentence of May 7, 1997, par. 561-568; The Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, IT-03-66-T, sentence 
of 30 November 2005, par. 94-170. It should be noted that the II Additional Protocol provides for a more 
restrictive definition of non-international armed conflict: first of all, it introduces the condition of control of the 
armed group on part of the territory; secondly, it excludes from its application the armed conflicts between non-
state armed groups. See also ICRC, 2008. How is the Term "Armed Conflict" Defined in International 
Humanitarian Law ?, Opinion Paper. 
493
 S. Percy, 2007.  Mercenaries: The History of a Norm in International Relations, Oxford. 
151 
 
to identify the different parts of the conflict. Also because of the difficulty in verifying if the 
different rebel factions satisfy the conditions for their qualification as an organized armed 
group. Since 2013, the Syrian armed forces have been involved in a non-international armed 
conflict against, at least, the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Al-Nusrah Front and, starting from 
April of that year the ISIL. Contributing to the fragmentation of the scenario would be added 
conflicts that see opposites of different armed groups. The Kurdish People's Protection Units 
(YPG) that oppose ISIS also constitute an armed group
494
. 
As for the status of foreign fighters in Syria
495
, they become part of the organized ISIL group, 
which constitutes a non-state party to the non-international armed conflict subject to the 
common article 3 of Geneva Conventions and to the customary international law on the 
subject
496
. However, the identification of members of the armed group is significant from the 
point of view of the protection of the civilian population that cannot be attacked while it 
represents a point firm the principle that insurgents are not legitimate fighters and can be 
punished including foreign fighters for the mere fact of taking part in the conflict
497
. It 
remains that the legal characterisation internally or internationally, or politics of a group 
armed as a terrorist is irrelevant to the existence of an armed conflict governed by 
international humanitarian law
498
. 
It must be underlined in any case that international humanitarian law expressly prohibits acts 
of terror. As for the regulation of non-international armed conflicts, the common article 3 of 
Geneva Conventions already contains an implicit ban on carrying out terrorist attacks. With 
regard to people who do not take an active part in the conflict, the provision prohibits in any 
situation violence against life and the person and the taking of hostages elements that 
characterize most acts of terrorism. In addition, article. 4 (2) (d) of the II Additional Protocol 
prohibits acts of terrorism against all persons who do not participate directly in hostilities or 
do not participate in them anymore. Also the subsequent art. 13 (2) of the II specific protocol 
that violent acts carried out with the primary purpose of spreading terror among the civilian 
population are prohibited
499
. Finally, according to the principle of distinction, humanitarian 
law prohibits a series of other acts which if carried out outside of an armed conflict, would be 
                                                             
494
 S. Casey-Maslen, 2014. The War Report: Armed Conflict in 2013, Oxford, p. 207.  
495
 S. Kraehenmann,2014.Foreign Fighters under International Law, Academy briefing No. 7. p18. 
496
  UN Doc. A / HRC / 27 / CRP.3, Report of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the 
Syrian Arab Republic. Rule of Terror: Living under ISIS in Syria, 19 November 2014, par. 76. 
497
 N. Ronzitti, 2014. International Law of Armed Conflicts, 4th ed, Turin, p. 363. 
498
 S. Kraehenmann,2014. Foreign Fighters under International Law, cit., P. 23. 
499
 Ibid. 
152 
 
commonly classified as being of a terrorist nature
500
. For example refers to indiscriminate or 
disproportionate attacks or attacks on certain categories of goods such as monuments or 
places of worship or objects indispensable to the civilian population, or installations 
containing dangerous forces. Alternatively, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) expressed concern over the overlapping and possible combination between 
international humanitarian law and the international legal framework on terrorism especially 
with regard to the qualification as a terrorist acts that are lawful or otherwise not prohibited 
by the law of armed conflicts, such as attacks on personnel and military installations
501
. 
It should be noted that the International Independent Commission of Inquiry on Syria found 
that as of April 2013, ISIL, as an armed group part of the conflict violated its obligations to 
civilians and hors de combat (people outside the fight) serious violations that constitute war 
crimes. The Commission has concluded that “attacks on the civilian population have come to 
light through the coordinated campaign of spreading terror among the civilian population. 
The terror inflicted on the civilian population is clearly evidenced by witness and victim 
accounts”502. The report then specified that “such terror was inflicted through a systematic 
imposition of restrictions on fundamental rights and freedoms and through the large-scale 
commission of violations of humanitarian law and war crimes including sentencing and 
executions without trials, killing, and mutilation, rape, sexual violence, forced pregnancy, 
torture, cruel treatment, the use and recruitment of children, and outrages upon personal 
dignity”503. 
5.5 The concept of Foreign Terrorist Fighters and International Law 
 
It will be appropriate here to discuss from a legal point of view and international law in 
particular, the concept of FTF in order to clarify this relatively new concept. 
The motivations of the foreign fighter are not so much financial and material, but rather 
ideological and religious. In other words, a foreign fighter is an individual who leaves his 
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country of origin or residence to join a non-state armed group in a third country in conflict 
whose main motivation is ideological rather than material
504
. 
As a result of the significant phenomenon of FTF joining ISIS in Syria and Iraq and therefore 
potential returns to countries of origin or residence, the UN Security Council adopted two 
resolutions in 2014 (2170 and 2178 ) for states to take action against foreign terrorist fighters. 
These resolutions explicitly refer to the term Foreign Terrorist Fighters associating the 
activities of the foreign combatant in an armed conflict with activities related to terrorist 
networks. However, according to Kraehenmann
505
 such an association is problematic and 
reductive from the point of view of international law
506
 since different branches of the latter 
regulate the question of armed conflicts (International Humanitarian Law-IHL) or the law of 
armed and the issue of the prevention and suppression of terrorism (a legal framework 
developed within the United Nations, such as Security Council resolutions or regional legal 
corpus on counter-terrorism, following the example of the Council's decisions of the 
European Union or Council of Europe Conventions). For example, resolution 2178, which 
will be discussed further below, blurs the boundaries between the notion of terrorism and 
armed conflict by creating legal consequences for FTFs intending to travel to a conflict 
zone
507
. 
In International Humanitarian Law, its protection for people affected by armed conflict and 
the legal consequences of acts of individuals in armed conflict are closely related to the status 
of the person. Thus, the question of the status of foreign combatants in armed conflict is 
legally important in determining the role and responsibility of a FTF. IHL distinguishes 
between International Armed Conflicts (IAC) and Non-International Armed Conflicts 
(NIAC) 
508
 and codifies two distinct legal regimes respectively. According to Kraehenmann, 
most foreign fighters are engaged in Non-International Armed Conflicts which is civil wars. 
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Indeed, almost all current conflicts result in civil wars, however, with international 
components like the forces of international coalitions involved in an internal conflict. 
Regarding the status of Foreign Fighters during a Non-International Armed Conflicts
509
, IHL 
does not refer to the status of combatant or prisoner of war and does not clearly define the 
conditions of detention during a war. During a NIAC, IHL applies to anyone involved in an 
armed conflict regardless of the foreign fighter's nationality. And the absence of a combatant 
status means that any individual including the foreign fighter can be sued by his or her 
country of origin or residence for taking up arms during a NIAC, regardless of whether such 
acts have been conducted in violation of IHL or not. This implies that fighters of an armed 
opposition during a NIAC would tend not necessarily to observe the IHL since; in any case, 
they can be prosecuted and punished according to the domestic legislations. 
These clarifications are important from a legal point of view, since currently foreign fighters 
join for the most part groups described by the United Nations as terrorists in the context of a 
non-international armed conflict following the example of the civil war in Syria. Thus, the 
foregoing makes it possible to situate, from a point of view of international humanitarian law 
who are the foreign terrorist fighters to be analyzed in this chapter. 
Also with regard to the involvement of foreign fighters in an armed conflict, questions of 
international law relating in particular to the duty of prevention of the States of residence or 
origin of the FTF, obligations regarding the arrest of FTF or conditions relating to criminal 
prosecution of an individual who has committed crimes abroad are dealt with in detail in 
Kraehenmann's study, "Foreign Fighters under International Law", of the Academy of 
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights in Geneva
510
. This study also analyzes 
the problematic of the measures implemented in the fight against terrorism and their 
consequences vice versa of the notion of rule of law. Indeed, a number of studies on this 
subject analyze the human rights implications of the application of measures against FTF, 
such as the deprivation of nationality, the confiscation of identity and any other measures 
aimed at restricting individual liberties (prohibition of entry or exit from a territory, 
interception of communications, etc.). 
In order to adapt the distinction made by Kraehenmann, it is still necessary to approach the 
concept of FTFs from two angles, namely the perspective of UN international law and the 
regional (European) international law. With regard to the United Nations body of law, 
Security Council resolutions 2170 and 2178 adopted in August and September 2014 
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respectively address threats to international peace and security resulting from acts of 
terrorism. These resolutions deal, in particular, with the concept of FTF and the threat that 
they may pose. It is worth recalling what has just been developed above that while these 
resolutions provide definitional elements that help to understand the concept of FTF in terms 
of the concerns of the UN Security Council, it is necessary to distinguish from a point of view 
of international law the notion of foreign combatant and the notion of the fight against 
terrorism. Indeed, the resolutions that will be mentioned below explicitly using the term 
foreign terrorist fighter do not draw the distinction between international humanitarian law 
(which deals with the notion of foreign combatant in the context of an armed conflict) and 
UN and regional international law (referring to United Nations resolutions and conventions or 
to Council of Europe conventions in the field of the prevention and suppression of terrorism).  
For example, resolution 2170 condemns ISIS, Al-Nusra Front and all other organizations 
affiliated with al-Qaeda for their terrorist activities in Syria in particular. This resolution calls 
on member states to fight terrorism in a comprehensive manner and reminds that the 
measures taken as a result must respect the international humanitarian law, the protection of 
human rights and the refugee law. After the attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States, Western states have apprehended terrorism as an international phenomenon and not 
only national. Thus, the answers to this phenomenon have become international.
511
 With this 
resolution, the Security Council expresses itself with particular concern at the influx of 
foreign terrorist fighters joining the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) 
and the Al-Nusra Front (ANF) and all other individuals, groups, companies and entities 
associated with al-Qaida and the extent of this phenomenon. The Security Council condemns 
all recruitment activities as well as the financing or facilitation of the travel of foreign 
terrorist fighters. The Security Council therefore calls on all member states to take national 
measures to stop the flow of foreign terrorist fighters to join a terrorist organization and to 
deter individuals from joining such an organization abroad. In this context, for example, the 
Swiss Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in September 2015, the aim of which is 
precisely to prevent any export of terrorism and any support for terrorism from its territory. 
The UN Security Council reiterates its concern about FTF in the resolution 2258 (2015), 
which it defines "expressing serious concern
512
 by the terrible and growing threat posed by 
foreign terrorist fighters, ie individuals who travel to a State other than their State of 
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residence or nationality, with the intent to commit, organize or prepare acts of terrorism, or to 
participate in or to provide or receive training in terrorism, particularly in the context of an 
armed conflict [..]". In order to cope with this problematic, the Security Council reminds that 
all the causes of the phenomenon must be tackled, which implies detecting and preventing the 
processes of radicalization, recruitment and the fight against violent extremism result in 
terrorist activities. According to this resolution, it is also a question of promoting political and 
religious tolerance as well as economic development and social cohesion, also stopping and 
resolving armed conflicts and facilitating reintegration. It should be noted here that this 
resolution mentions the "Hague-Marrakech" Memorandum of the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum (GCTF
 
) which addresses a series of good practices around four main themes, in order 
to ensure an effective response to the phenomenon of FTF, which are radicalization and 
violent extremism, recruitment and facilitation, travel and combat, and return and 
reintegration. Thus, apart from binding international law, it is also contributes to the 
definition of the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters and the design of the responses to 
be provided. It will therefore be interesting to address these very general concepts with the 
presence of the analysis of foreign terrorist fighters from Switzerland as an example and to 
the possible extent to deconstruct these notions. With regard to the perspective of regional 
international law, the decisions of the Council of the European Union and the following 
Council of Europe Conventions also provide insight into the concept of FTF and complement 
the international legal framework originating from UN. 
Thus, firstly at the level of the European Union, the Framework Decision of the Council 
(European Union) of 13 June 2002 on the fight against terrorism defines among other things 
what a terrorist group and condemns the participation in such a group (Article 2). This 
Framework Decision is the basis of the European Union's counter-terrorism policy and 
defines terrorist offenses in a harmonized manner
513
. The 2008 Framework Decision
514
 
underlines the international dimension of the terrorist networks and the global response to 
them and encourages repeated attempts to combat recruitment and training for terrorist 
activities. Ultimately, the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European 
arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States facilitates judicial 
cooperation within the European Union, in particular with regard to the prosecution of the 
FTF. 
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Secondly, at the level of the Council of Europe, the 1977 Council of Europe Convention for 
the Suppression of Terrorism facilitates extradition and therefore the prosecution of foreign 
terrorist fighters. And it is the 2005 Council of Europe Convention for the Prevention of 
Terrorism that is most relevant to the FTF phenomenon. Article 6, for example, condemns 
recruitment for terrorism, which is, "soliciting another person to commit or participate in the 
commission of a terrorist offense or to join an association or organization group to contribute 
to the commission of one or more terrorist offenses by the association or group ". Also article 
7 condemns training for terrorism. It should be noted that this text also promotes international 
cooperation in criminal matters between States Parties (Article 17). In the end, the Additional 
Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism adopted in 
Brussels in 2015 makes explicit mention of travel for the purposes of terrorism. Thus, article 
4 condemns the fact of travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism, namely "the fact of 
travelling to a State, which is not that of the traveller’s nationality or residence, in order to 
commit or to contribute or to participate in a terrorist offense or to provide or receive training 
for terrorism "
515
. This definition is clearly similar to the one that Security Council resolution 
2178 referred to above and establishes regarding foreign terrorist fighters. Ultimately, Article 
5 condemns the financing of foreign travel for the purpose of terrorism and article 6 
condemns the organization or facilitation of such trips. For example, internationally 
Switzerland has ratified and implemented a number of additional counter terrorism 
conventions and protocols signed under the auspices of the UN
516
. However, the Swiss penal 
system does not have a definition of terrorism and this result in many difficulties as regards 
the convictions and the sentences to be formulated against the defendants accused of the 
commission of terrorist activities. Also regarding the notion of FTF and travel for the purpose 
of terrorism, the Swiss legal system is even more incomplete and limited. On 22 October 
2015 Switzerland signed in Riga the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe the 
Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism, the Convention that Switzerland also signed in 
2012, but not yet ratified. However, this protocol must still be ratified by Switzerland so that 
it can create a standard condemning travel for terrorism as well as the financing, organization 
and facilitation of such travel but also recruitment and training of terrorists
517
. Legal gaps are 
therefore still observable at this level and the processes of ratification and implementation of 
these texts at the domestic level will require a few more years of work. 
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The question of the different forms and options that criminal prosecution can take against 
foreign fighters who have joined an armed insurrection abroad is still worthy of mention here. 
One option is to prosecute the returnee suspected of committing or having been involved in 
the commission of war crimes or other international crimes during an armed conflict. These 
include the execution of civilians, the taking of hostages, acts of torture, sexual violence or 
the recruitment of child soldiers. For example, an FTF that has joined the ranks of ISIS is 
likely to have perpetrated such crimes in the Syrian conflict. As such, all countries that have 
ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and transposed it into their 
national laws have the competence to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, or 
crimes against humanity. Another option is to prosecute the foreign fighter by making it 
illegal to undertake a trip (see resolution 2178) to participate in an armed conflict abroad. 
Kraehenmann concludes his study "Foreign Fighters under International Law" on the finding 
that violations of international humanitarian law cover all forms of terrorist acts in a situation 
of armed conflict. These violations are prosecuted as war crimes. But according to the author, 
prosecuting these same acts under national anti-terrorism laws does not adequately address 
violations of international humanitarian law
518
. She takes the example of the Islamic State 
and its fighters responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law in Syria 
and Iraq. However, much of the domestic criminal prosecution of FTFs focuses on terrorist 
offenses and participation in a terrorist organization. She believes that it is easier to do this 
rather than find the evidence which is extremely difficult to collect, that war crimes were 
potentially committed, but notes that it is problematic to address the issue foreign terrorist 
fighters solely in terms of the terrorist threat to countries of origin or residence. It is 
sometimes a question of repressing war crimes, sometimes of ensuring national security by 
fighting against terrorism. 
This chapter thus demonstrating that the notion of foreign combatant is a source of stakes and 
debates on the level of international law and that it covering a relatively broad field. In 
addition, this section focused on the notion of foreign terrorist fighter adding a qualifier and 
therefore a specific dimension to the phenomenon of foreign fighters. It is this qualification 
that illustrates a shift between the notion of foreign fighters and that of terrorist fighters. 
Indeed, it is the current terrorist threat that is perceived as a priority and which causes 
considerable difficulties and challenges to prosecution authorities as well as judges in proving 
support or participation in a terrorist organization and to qualify a company as such. 
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5.6 The new criminal figures foreseen in the Res. 2178 (2014) 
 
It has been discussed of the qualification as terrorists of the foreign fighters according to the 
Res. 2178 (2014). In fact, in its paragraph 6 the decision requires States to criminalize the 
transfer to a country other than that of residence in order to commit, plan, prepare or 
participate in terrorist acts or for the purpose of providing or receiving terrorist training; the 
financing of these transfers; ultimately, the recruitment of subjects destined to move to other 
countries to commit acts of terrorism. It is therefore crucial, in relation to the above, to 
establish what interpretation should be given to the expression of acts of terrorism in the 
context of an armed conflict such as the Syrian example
519
. It should be borne in mind that 
the most recent conventions on terrorism contain exception clauses which restrict their scope 
by excluding the activities of the armed forces during an armed conflict, as governed by 
international humanitarian law. One of the main reasons for not approving a global 
convention on terrorism is precisely the inclusion and content of a clause of this kind, 
essentially in relation to the question of whether and to what extent the simple participation in 
hostilities and acts of armed groups that are lawful under humanitarian law may fall within 
the scope of the global convention and therefore qualify as terrorists
520
. In fact, the most 
recent exception clause included in the Nuclear Terrorism Convention
521
 is to be interpreted 
as meaning that the activities of the armed forces of a party only when governed by the law of 
armed conflicts, as a lex specialis, are not the subject of the convention. 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) highlighted that criminalization as a 
terrorist offense (and not as a crime as such) of simple participation in an armed conflict with 
a certain organized group would end up weakening the fundamental principle of equality of 
the belligerents, namely the equality of rights and obligations of the parties to an armed 
conflict, even of a non-international nature
522
. In this sense, a possible reading of the outcome 
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of res. 2178 which correspond the obligations contained therein with the right of armed 
conflicts without resorting to the application of art. 103 of the United Nations Charter
523
, 
could be that of interpreting the expression 'terrorist acts', when carried out in the course of a 
conflict as violations of international humanitarian law. On the other hand, it is clear that the 
purpose of the measures introduced by the Security Council is that on the one hand to prevent 
and on the other to constrict trips to foreign territory to take part in armed groups considered 
as terrorists. In this sense, it was then observed that the resolution could be understood as 
solely applicable to the terrorist groups mentioned in paragraph 10, namely ISIL and Al-
Nusrah Front; nevertheless, it cannot be said that the objective of this decision remains that of 
its general application
524
. 
As noted, the res. 2178 was criticized the lack of a definition of terrorism, and for the risks of 
abuse that could derive regards the respect of the principle of legality and more generally of 
human rights despite the continuous reference to them in different passages of the decision. 
As for its implementation at the national level, the major doubts concerned both the 
indeterminacy of the case and the increasingly marked anticipation of criminal protection to 
preparatory acts ever more remote compared to future acts with terrorist purposes. In this 
sense, it has been stressed that, since this is a specific case of double malice, they are 
characterized by accentuated subjectivism, with the consequent difficulties of proof of 
malice
525
. 
5.7 The concept of prevention 
 
As for the preventive implements, the res. 2178 reaffirms the obligation to prevent terrorists 
and groups movements through border controls and the issuing of passports, as well as 
through measures to prevent counterfeiting, falsification and fraudulent use of the same
526
. It 
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should be recalled that the due carefulness obligations
527
 take all practicable measures to 
prevent international terrorism. This is already contained in instruments of a contractual 
nature and then reaffirmed by the Security Council starting from the res. 1373 (2001), 
constitute the further specification of the principle of general international law, to protect 
state sovereignty
528
. Which is obliges the State to not knowingly allow its territory to be used 
for acts contrary to the rights of the other States according to the authoritative definition of 
the International Court of Justice in the affair of the Strait of Corfu
529
. The well-known 
Declaration of the General Assembly on friendly relations and cooperation between states of 
1970, which preserved based on the principles of non-intervention in internal affairs and 
prohibition of the use of force in international relations, the obligation not to tolerate on its 
territory organized activities directed to the commission of acts of terrorism in another 
State
530
. Control of the terrorist movement must therefore be included in the scope of 
prevention measures
531
. The Res. 2178 would seem to pursue a dual objective: not only to 
prevent the transfer of foreign fighters to destinations in which to carry out terrorist activities, 
but also to protect the countries of origin of nationality or residence, in particular with respect 
to the threats represented from recruitment activities
532
. 
A fundamental instrument of prevention is the detection of the movements of suspected 
terrorists and the sharing of information between states. In addition to the controversial issue 
of the acquisition of passenger data when booking travel
533
, is a fundamental element of the 
res. 2178 concerns the acquisition and transfer of information on a bilateral and multilateral 
basis in order to monitor and prevent transfers. In this context, the Security Council 
encourages Interpol to make a contribution to strengthening cooperation between States
534
. In 
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this regard, it should be noted that there are different measures that the European legislator 
has provided for the protection and activities of intelligence agencies, including the 
possibility for information and security services to conduct investigative interviews with 
detainees in order to prevent acts with terrorist purposes. It also responds to the need for 
nationwide coordination of investigations into criminal proceedings and terrorism prevention 
procedures. 
In the European context, several States have introduced measures relating to the withdrawal 
of residence permits and travel documents
535
. A major concern is the initiatives undertaken 
by various countries not only to temporarily exclude their citizens from the territory
536
 but 
above all to regulate the circumstances in which revocation of citizenship is possible as an 
instrument to prevent the return of foreign fighters in their territory. The issue was debated in 
relation to the broad powers that the British government exercised in depriving terrorists of 
suspected citizenship, even if there was a risk of statelessness
537
. 
5.8 Further actions & new resolution by the UN Security Council 
 
The question is what should be done to deal with the threats posed by the return of foreign 
terrorist fighters, are the necessary measures issued by international bodies, such as Security 
Council resolution 2178, sufficient or should specific measures be put in place to address the 
returns of foreign fighters? 
The biggest issues that the countries where these fighters will return is the danger of not 
detecting them at the entrance. If they manage to join the countries anonymously, they will 
then have the necessary time to build the networks of a secret life (false papers, hideouts, 
networks of supply) and then become more and more out of reach of the security services
538
. 
Therefore, great attention is required at the level of border posts, particularly with regard to 
the use of false or forges documents as requested by the UN Security Council
539
. The 
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methods and techniques used by foreign terrorist fighters make the job of frontline officers 
very difficult, especially at borders points requiring particular and very advanced training
540
. 
Such measures, however, face obstacles due in large part to the financial resources that these 
measures required. Every country has neither had the same means nor the same capacity to 
install at their borders devices which capable of detecting forgery and counterfeiting 
documents. Since the threat is worldwide, the chain of international security is disrupted as 
soon as one of its links fails. According to the report of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of 
the United Nations Security Council only 51 countries, or about a quarter of all UN members, 
have a prior information program on travellers, this means have advance system for the 
security of borders and airspace, and to detect the arrival or departure of potential foreign 
terrorist fighters. The report adds that only half of these 51 states use these systems in 
practice
541
. 
Development aid in the context of human security will have to consider this aspect into 
account in order to offer part of the aid to secure borders and implementing advanced checks. 
Donors must also ensure that a part of their loans and donations are devoted to measures in 
order to prevent and limit the free movement of terrorists including foreign terrorist fighter. 
One of the difficulties facing the government policy makers is how to deal with the issue of 
returning foreign fighters whether to choose between suppression, reintegration, or a 
combination of both approaches. In fact, this group of people can be labelled together under a 
single criterion as representing a group of people that travelled outside of a country 
institutional framework to take part in acts of non-legitimate fighting in a third country. 
However, it would be neither reasonable nor fair to deal with them in one standard way that 
would apply to the whole despite the differences that shows their levels of involvement. 
Upon the return of the FTF, they can be classified at least by three categories according to 
their involvements
542
: 
• The first group of FTF returnees will be classed as an extension and the remaining of the 
armed division of terrorist groups; 
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• The second group FTF returnees will be classed as the followers and supporter of the group 
to continue extending the jihadist ideology and; 
• The third group FTF returnees will be classed as vulnerable and being victims as a result 
they have suffered by the terrorist groups.  
Not only should the reactions of governments have to be adapted into appropriate policies to 
reduce risks, but also consider public opinions and accepted expressions too. The 
governments should also differentiate between the levels of involvement of theses returning 
fighters and avoid taken any inappropriate measures. States sometimes find it difficult to 
decide between the lawfully correct and the popular preferences dictated by the subjective 
and the emotional.  
In Tunisia, on Thursday, December 28, 2016, while President Beji Caid Essebsi was 
discussing with his head of government plans put in place by the government to deal with the 
issue of Tunisians returning from hotbeds of tension, "political parties have put in place guard 
against any secret or announced agreement which favours their return. These parties recalled 
that these Tunisians constituted "a real danger to national and regional security". Some 
protesters went so far as to demand the revocation of the nationality of these fighters to 
prevent them from returning to Tunisia. The Tunisian government is therefore faced with the 
dilemma of dealing in a legal framework with nationals who have broken the law and 
committed crimes or respond to popular subjectivities that dictate extreme and quasi-illegal 
measures. However, the UK have found a middle approach
543
: The British law allows in 
some cases for the judges to cancel the passports of the British nationals gone to fight abroad 
and to insert them in the lists of the persons prohibited to borrow the flights to the United 
Kingdom. The person concerned must then return home to seek the authorization of the UK 
authorities. This allows these authorities to study the case, such as to issue a visa and assess 
the case before the person enters the territory of the Kingdom
544
. These people are not, as the 
Tunisian demonstrators demand, deprived of their nationalities; but only obliged to go 
through a return authorization. Opting for routine and extreme suppression cannot, from the 
point of view of some experts, describe the appropriate explanation
545
. Constrictive and 
oppressive policies discourage fighters who they know of their mistakes and have rebelled 
against the barbaric acts of ISIS and ANF and chosen regret and return to their country of 
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origin. Such policies also minimise the involvement of their families to encourage the 
terrorist members to return who have committed to terrorist organizations because for fear 
that they will be punished to heavy sentences without appropriate study of their cases and 
without differentiating between those as classified above. Any misrepresentation or extreme 
and cruel treatment can only generate injustices that can in turn be reasons of radicalization 
and future violence. On the other hand, also there should be no automatic amnesty policies on 
simple regretful statements by the fighters who want to return. As this could allow terrorists 
using the Taqqia
546
 technique to conceal their intention and get away the required controls. 
The answer to the above issue can therefore be the combination of both approaches 
repression and rehabilitation. Also the report entitled "returning foreign fighters: 
criminalization or reintegration
547
; explains the dilemma facing Europeans in dealing with the 
foreign terrorist combatants in these terms, and concludes that it is necessary to combine both 
above approaches. Generally, western states have adopted approaches to deal with FTFs that 
are mainly "hard" or "liberal." While both hard (criminalization) and liberal (rehabilitation 
and reintegration) policies have their advantages and disadvantages, but by combining both 
approaches then we would be in a better position to achieve a very good understanding and 
outcomes for this issue. The government’s bodies and the community should work together 
and closely to create places and opportunity to those foreign terrorist fighter and their 
families whom wants to return to their country of origin. The foreign terrorist fighter who 
makes the promise to return to his country or is interrupted at the border will have to be taken 
to particular campus where his regime is not that of a prisoner, but of a person whose status is 
to be verified
548
. In this case, the returning candidate will be checked by a number of experts 
(judges, psychologists, sociologists, intelligence specialists, etc) who will be decide whether 
the person concerned should be assigned to civil or governmental organizations that must 
help him to overcome the suffering of the living conditions in which he has evolved during 
his stay for example in Syria or Iraq and therefore assist his reintegration; or should be 
assigned to the intelligence services for debriefing and possible participation and ask the 
judicial services for instruction in appearance before the courts. In addition, the families, 
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friends and relative of foreign terrorist fighters, can also play an important role in the dealing 
of these people when they return to their countries of origin. This is including encourage and 
convince them to returns while many of these fighters, remained in contact with their families 
after their departure. The families and relatives can also play an important role in 
reintegrating those foreign terrorist fighters and involving them again into society
549
. 
Finally, many provisions of Security Council Resolution 2178 on foreign terrorist fighters 
can be applied by States to encourage new methods for the return of this category of 
individuals. Certain procedure such as those taken at borders to avoid the exit of fighters to 
Syria and Iraq can also help in identify returns. However, the issue of returns would require 
the new and improved Security Council resolution
550
. This is due to the fact that the new 
resolution would help and encourage states to consider the threat more seriously and detain 
those dangers fighters who they were involved in fighting. On the other hand, the new 
resolution would provide as guidance and encourage universal foundation for making 
national and regional measures.  However, it would be appropriate for a potential resolution 
to be made to set stronger emphasis to international cooperation, especially to help those 
countries that cannot carry out certain methods in order to meet the concerns of the 
community on the problem
551
. 
 
5.9 Conclusion  
 
The adoption of the resolution 2178 by the Security Council with the challenges posed by its 
implementation in the national legal systems 
552
 summarises many of the themes of the 
difficult collective response to international terrorism
553
. An assessment of the UN 
contribution in countering terrorism highlights and shadows as if almost every result achieved 
is almost mirroring a failure. Firstly, in the face of the unanimous agreement around the 
condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations to its classification as a threat to 
peace and international security, the question of definition still remains unsolved. Secondly, 
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while recognizing the decisive role of the Security Council and to a lesser extent, the General 
Assembly, in designing construction of measures to combat terrorism, the legislative power 
of the Council continues to be problematic on various levels. Thirdly, even in the presence of 
a complex series of international obligations to combat terrorism, also confirmed by broad 
adherence to the anti-terrorist conventions, there is in fact no adequate control over their 
implementation by the States aimed at ensuring their effectiveness and exclude abuse. 
Fourthly, although after September 11, 2001 the United Nations made a positive contribution 
to the emergence of the concept of the prevention of terrorism in order to deprive terrorists of 
access to resources, means and places to carry out their activities, it emerged dramatically the 
issue of legal coordination between the measures envisaged and other rules of international 
law starting with humanitarian law up to those protecting human rights, where the argument 
of the binding nature of Security Council decisions has often been used to justify the sacrifice 
of rights guarantees fundamentally
554
. In the background, there is the theme of the fight 
against radicalism and extremism
555
, also present in the Res. 2178 on which States and 
international organizations are certainly called to greater effort. 
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Chapter Six 
Summary & Conclusion 
6.0 Introduction 
 
On the beginning of the 21st century, the phenomenon related to terrorism has showed unique 
characteristics along with defining trends.  The importance of any study concerning the 
determination, accuracy and definition of a term with a legal dimension, in this case "the 
terrorist act", is measured in its ability to include the concept and the perspectives it 
represents in the whole and taking into consideration all the elements liable to spread out into 
the perception and understanding. This thesis is not claiming to be so exhaustive but allowed 
to perceive the terrorist act from a different angle and in a new perception. A study does not 
always consist of finding solutions, but also asking new questions or updating existing 
means. While the purpose of any study is obviously to find answers first, however, the 
national and international solutions adopted so far for the problems inherent in the notion of 
terrorism and terrorist acts have not provided any clear legal framework for phenomenon and 
not answered the permanent examinations in the subject.  
This thesis, chapter one and two, has already examined the conceptual and legal difficulty 
involve in the search for the generally accepted definition of the term of terrorism. The 
objective of terrorism and guerrilla warfare may well be the same; but they are distinguished 
from each other by the targets of their operations
556
. A legitimate cause does not act 
legitimate the means and methods utilized; therefore, the third chapter examined peoples 
actively pursue their right to self- determination, and the relationship between the struggle for 
self determination, liberation movements and terrorism. 
The fourth chapter of this thesis turned to the legal issues of the accurately criminalising 
international terrorism. The terrorist offense remains at present an unspecific crime under 
international law despite the existence of several global conventions on counter-terrorism. 
Terrorism is a serious crime and it is exercised by transnational anti-state groups that often 
target civilian populations and government institutions. The definition of armed aggression 
refers to acts of terrorism acting on behalf of an aggressor State under its control against the 
territory, property, civilian population or members of the diplomatic staff of another State. 
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Terrorist armed aggression therefore depends on a state decision. Judges of the ICJ concluded 
in the judgment of 27 June 1986 that the provision of material, financial and logistical 
support to groups engaged in acts of terrorism abroad, without the Aggressor State having 
direct control over such acts remains an unlawful act and not an armed attack. However, after 
11 September 2001, any aid, funding, and support to terrorist groups would be qualified as 
terrorist offenses under international law, European provisions and national criminal law. 
Different offenses of organized crime, serious terrorist acts, systematic and organized, 
directed against the civilian population and committed by a state or an organization, could be 
qualified as crimes against humanity
557
. On the way to include terrorist organizations now 
that the group of criminals was prolonged the attacks on September 11 could be ideally 
viewed as a crime against humankind. According to some researchers, terrorism crime is the 
crime that is against humanity is the most appropriate in order to tackle terrorist crimes along 
with the international fundamental crimes. The main requirement against humanity is 
eventually that the unlawful act should be dedicated as a part of an extensive or methodical 
attack focused against a civilian people. The entire state, or in this situation the non-state 
actors, should not essentially accept a policy or strategy as the official policy. The word 
terrorism is not a new occurrence; by organizations as well as individuals trying to achieve 
political goals and objectives it has long been a process of violent action. 
However, international terrorism is different from anything called organized crime. If acts of 
terrorism are planned, financed and perpetrated under the sponsorship of one State against 
another State, such acts may be characterized as acts of State armed aggression by the 
Security Council, which could in such cases to decide to react based on the Charter, including 
the principles of collective security, in order to protect international peace and security. In a 
state of war, terrorist offenses can be characterized as war crimes or crimes against humanity, 
as several internationalists have pointed out. In this case, the ICC may try suspected 
terrorists. The absence of a single classification of terrorist offenses reflects the weakness of 
the international system and the obvious legal gap in the international law. On the other hand, 
it has led to the strengthening of cooperation at both the international and regional levels, and 
has led States to develop their own national legal provisions and their domestic jurisdictions, 
which remain the only competent authorities in the field of terrorism.  
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In this modern era there is a rise in terrorist organizations and groups, different in their 
political goals and objectives along with geographic roots. One unifying variable will be 
faced by all these organizations their deep confidence on the usage of violence against 
civilians population in order to accomplish their goals and objectives. So as to distinguish 
between actions those are authorized by a government (and thus "lawful") in addition to those 
of other actors, together with individuals and minor groups. For instance, bombing with 
missiles with an enemy country, which is well-designed in order to affect civilian provision 
for a cause, so would not be considered as terrorism when it is allowed by government. This 
standard is fundamentally difficult and is not completely accepted since the existence of state 
terrorism is denied by this; the very same act might or might not be categorized as terrorism 
liable on whether its support is outlined towards a "legitimate" government; "legitimacy" as 
well as "lawfulness" are particular, completely depending on the viewpoint of one single 
government or another government; along with it deviates as of the historically 
acknowledged meaning and source of the term. 
The fifth chapter of this thesis analysed the concept of foreign terrorist fighters at the 
framework of International Law. The adoption of the resolution 2178 by the Security Council 
with the challenges posed by its implementation in the national legal systems
558
  summarises 
many of the themes of the difficult collective response to international terrorism
559
. An 
assessment of the UN contribution in countering terrorism highlights and shadows as if 
almost every result achieved is almost mirroring a failure. Firstly, in the face of the 
unanimous agreement around the condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations to its classification as a threat to peace and international security, the question 
of definition still remains unsolved. Secondly, while recognizing the decisive role of the 
Security Council and to a lesser extent, the General Assembly, in designing construction of 
measures to combat terrorism, the legislative power of the Council continues to be 
problematic on various levels. Thirdly, even in the presence of a complex series of 
international obligations to combat terrorism, also confirmed by broad adherence to the anti-
terrorist conventions, there is in fact no adequate control over their implementation by the 
States aimed at ensuring their effectiveness and exclude abuse. Fourthly, although after 
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September 11, 2001 the United Nations made a positive contribution to the emergence of the 
concept of the prevention of terrorism in order to deprive terrorists of access to resources, 
means and places to carry out their activities, it emerged dramatically the issue of legal 
coordination between the measures envisaged and other rules of international law starting 
with humanitarian law up to those protecting human rights, where the argument of the 
binding nature of Security Council decisions has often been used to justify the sacrifice of 
rights guarantees fundamentally
560
. In the background, there is the theme of the fight against 
radicalism and extremism
561
, also present in the Res. 2178 on which States and international 
organizations are certainly called to greater effort. 
Furthermore, the United Nations Security Council in response to the terrorist phenomenon 
considered that all forms and manifestations of terrorist act constitute one of the most serious 
threats against international peace and security.  However, this formula does not attribute any 
effective legal framework to the terrorist act. For this reason, it seems unlikely that an 
effective legal definition of the terrorist act will emerge promptly in international criminal 
law. This is due to the following reasons detailed in this thesis: 
International politicians are turning a blind eye in separating political ideology from terrorist 
action for technical, practical and political reasons. This complicates any attempt to give an 
effective legal consideration to the terrorist act and leads the international community to enter 
into violence against each other. The equation is, however, obvious a terrorist act that does 
not carry a political aims is a criminal act subject to common law even if the means used and 
the procedure adopted are the same for both acts. Moreover, a terrorist act cannot be qualified 
as such if it does not carry a terrorist intent. The specific terrorist intent of the terrorist act 
presupposes that the perpetrator is not only aware that terror could result from his actions, but 
it is also specifically the consequence that he expects
562
. The effectiveness of terrorist attack 
is not enough; terror must be the main purpose and intention of the terrorist. The terrorist act 
is indeed the combination of a political aims and the terrorist means used. Their gravity is 
such that the perpetrators of these acts cannot enjoy the favours’ or privileges sometimes 
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enjoyed by political crimes that can be partially amnestied. The combination of the political 
purpose and the objective of terrorizing the population seem sensible insofar as both are 
necessary to identify the terrorist act. One cannot imagine a terrorist act without the objective 
of terrorizing the population. Moreover, the political nature of the violence or the act 
committed reveals a desire to obtain radical, political or ideological results, thus excluding 
from the category of "the terrorist act" any offense committed for a purely profitable purpose 
that it falls under common law. 
The continue confusion between terrorist offense, political offense and common law offense 
leads to the impossibility of interpreting the legal nature of the terrorist act. The political 
offense, because of its general nature, can take the form of a terrorist offense if one relies on 
the means used and the procedure adopted. Thus, the absence in the national and international 
criminal systems of a body of law of the political offense leads to multiple points of 
difference to an almost impossibility of agreement between States and highlights the 
difficulty encountered in international law to understand the notion of terrorism and to 
develop a legal and effective definition of the terrorist act. 
The combination to introduce the notion of terrorist act and some legitimate legal concepts 
such as the right of peoples to self-determination and self-defence reduces the border between 
the legitimate and the illegitimate and leads to the difficulties of classifying the act terrorist 
among criminal offenses. The existence of the notion right of peoples to self-determination in 
the form of exclusion clause in regional anti-terrorist conventions and in the form of 
safeguard clause in sectoral international anti-terrorist conventions, as it is governed by 
international humanitarian law is applicable to international armed conflicts.  Members of 
national liberation movements enjoy the status of combatant; there is no legal interest to put 
an end to the conceptual agreement between the concept of terrorist act and the right of 
peoples to self-determination.  Similarly, self-defence like the notion of the terrorist act has 
being ambiguous, vague and ill-defined. In the field of anti-terrorist action, self-defences 
raises a number of issues. The first relates to the problem of the classification of aggression in 
relation to these acts. The second concerns the difficulty of identifying the actus rea elements 
that constitute a terrorist action before it reaches its objective. The third relates to the problem 
of the durability of the current tendency to broaden the notion of self-defence in the field in 
order to neutralize the act of aggression and repression on the territory of a third State. The 
fourth part deals with the problems of self-qualification, the extensive interpretation of the 
concept of self-defence, its extension into legitimate self-defence and its use in the face of 
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armed aggression by non-State groups. This calls into question the adaptation of the concept 
of self-defence to new international and irregular conflicts and highlights the cooperation 
between self-defence and state terrorist acts. 
The criminal responsibility of States and their leaders for terrorism is not precisely 
established in clear and concise texts. This is the difficulty in establishing an effective legal 
regime for the terrorist act and in establishing the responsibility of the perpetrators since 
individual terrorist acts are often sponsored, financed or supported by individuals and States. 
In this context it is of interest to the international community is the evolution of international 
law and respect for the right to self-determination of peoples. Thus it is necessary to define 
the principle of compulsory jurisdiction for all differences, both political and legal, and to 
give international bodies the means to ensure its obligatory execution. The interdependence 
of States in all fields, especially political, legal and economic, is an essential factor that 
favors the creation of a compulsory international jurisdiction. 
The terrorist phenomenon, since its emerge, has a heavy emotional and political burden. In 
this sense, the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism confirms that "the term terrorism has a 
very high emotional and political burden. In general, this term implies a negative judgment 
and is used selectively"
563
. The term systematically has a pejorative connotation and is thus 
used for political purposes. Moreover, the subjectivity of the very notion of "terrorism" 
increases the difficulty of apprehending it objectively and academically. The definition of 
"terrorist act" is inherently controversial. It is all the more complex because it seems almost 
impossible to formulate it without resorting to value judgments. The emotional field of the 
expression "terrorist act" is so broad whether at the level of its own definition (terror, 
intimidation ...), at the level of the feelings it leaves on its direct or indirect victims, or at the 
level of its impact and the message that the terrorist seeks to transmit in society, that it does 
not find an effective definition in criminal law.  
The problem posed by the definition of the terrorist act being more political than legal, in the 
face of crime with identity and political consequences, there will be always multiple points of 
variances in its perception and its comprehension. This subjective understanding has lead to 
the multiplication of definition that is subject to political interests and an ideological 
perception. Only legal and moral requirements and their stability will succeed in putting an 
                                                             
563
 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Terrorism and human rights Final 
report of the Special Rapporteur, Kalliopi K. Koufa, 25 June 2004, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/40. 
174 
 
end to the anarchy that prevails in the definition and description of terrorist acts. Despite the 
differences in positions on these vital issues, the international community must demonstrate 
its willingness to continue its efforts to achieve a political climate and international relations 
for peoples' peace and security. 
The approach adopted in this study explaining the semantic development of the notion of 
terrorism and the doctrinal beginning of the notion of the terrorist act  until its national and 
international legal re-establishment while recalling its origins and the complexity that 
accompany it. In the face of terrorism, it is impractical to use categorisation and to confront 
them in the name of "the fight of the good against evil ". These processes have demonstrated, 
moreover, their inefficiency at the legal, political and military levels and if we condemn 
terrorism, we need to condemn all terrorism. 
Finally, while it might be suggested that it is irrelevant to find a universal and effective legal 
definition of the terrorist act, but punishment remains the only way to deal with this 
phenomenon. In this respect, international law is the sole guarantor and it is up to the 
international community to adapt, update and modernize it in the face of new perception of 
terrorism. 
6.1 Key Findings of the Research 
 
 There is no specific, unique and internationally agreed definition of the concept of 
terrorism. 
 The political factors have an important and effective result on the expansion of 
terrorist operations. The political difference and the domination of a state over another 
state or group in another category, whether political or religious, plays an important 
role in the terrorist operations as well as the multiplicity of religions parties and 
differences in the ruling regimes . 
 The economic factors have also contributed greatly to the exacerbation of the 
phenomenon of terrorism and the spread of geographical area that extends this 
phenomenon. 
 Social factors are no less than the previous in terms of importance, social injustice and 
family disintegration and every person working in the absence of a scrutinize are all 
factors are a key factors in the spread of terrorism and wide and reflect the role 
negatively on the country and this in turn due to the lack of employment, equal 
opportunities and the existence of terrorist groups for disintegration Family. 
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 Inadequate contribution of the media in conveying the true picture of this 
phenomenon. 
 The association of terrorism with other illegal acts and activities that assist in its 
growth, including organized crime, human trafficking, money laundering and illicit 
trafficking in arms and explosives, must be eliminated or at least reduced in order to 
combat terrorism. 
 
6.2 Recommendations 
 
Based on the above summary and findings, this thesis proposes a number of 
recommendations and measures aimed at improving the international legal framework for 
combating terrorism. These recommendations are outline below; 
1- The necessity of criminalizing and prosecuting these terrorist acts because of the grave 
consequences for international and internal societies by criminalizing the preparatory acts of 
these crimes and initiating them as a complete crime. 
2. The need to develop a comprehensive definition of terrorism since the absence of a unique 
definition of terrorism hold back international efforts to combat it on the one hand, and raises 
the confusion between terrorism and other phenomena that may be legitimate in themselves, 
such as self-defence and legitimate resistance to occupation and the right of peoples to self-
determination. 
3 - The necessity to reduce ignorance and unemployment if it cannot eliminate it completely. 
There is no doubt that ignorance and unemployment constitute the appropriate ground for the 
growth of the phenomenon of terrorism and propagation, as well as religious awareness of 
individuals intellectually and religiously. 
4. The need for effective  measures to be taken by the cohesion of individuals and the security 
services to combat and report terrorist crimes, the perpetrators of the crimes and the guidance 
of their places of gathering and the storage of their weapons. 
5. The need to activate measures to prevent terrorists from possessing weapons of mass 
destruction and possessing means of transport should be activated and States should tighten 
controls on land and sea borders to avoid the infiltration of weapons or suspected persons. 
6 - The need to focus on the procedures to eliminate terrorist organizations and prevent 
production and proliferation by eliminating the factors that constitute productive ground for 
the growth and prosperity of terrorist cells. 
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7 - The need to control the persons suspected of coming from abroad through aircraft and 
ships can be drawn from their passports and consulates must be warned after the prevention 
of entry visa to the country for suspects and must control foreign citizens coming from a 
country hosting terrorism and exports to other countries. 
8- The necessity of activating the policy of criminalization of the subsequent preventive by 
combating the establishment of terrorist organizations and preventing the provision of aid and 
assistance to them and the confiscation and resolution of their funds. 
9. The necessity of activating the role of the visual and invisible media in dealing with the 
claims of terrorists of the legitimacy of their misdeeds to establish guidelines for press and 
media reports in this regard, the peoples of the dangers of terrorism. 
10. The necessity of activating the role of the visual and invisible media in dealing with the 
allegations of terrorists of the legitimacy of their wrongful acts of establishing guidelines for 
media and press reports in this regard, thus increasing communication with the media in order 
to improve people's awareness of the dangers of terrorism. 
11. Establishment of an international system of compensation for victims of terrorist crimes. 
12. The establishment of civil liability for terrorist crimes and the obligation of the State 
involved in the repair of the damage caused by this crime. 
13. The need for States to strengthen the punishment for the preparation and initiation of 
terrorist crimes and to adopt restriction penalties for execution. 
14. The need of all members at the United Nations and in particular  Muslim and Arab 
countries to enact a law to deal with terrorism issues in a manner that protects the safety of all 
citizens and international countries, in particular preserves their security and protects the 
personal freedoms of individuals. 
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6.3 Mapping of Contribution  
 
Original contribution to knowledge in the field 
Chapter of 
Contribution 
Theoretical framework approach, this is in order to understand the 
complications involved in the meaning formation of the notion of 
terrorism. Since this understanding is an initial step towards overcoming 
the confusion that overcomes at the international scene vice versa acts of 
violence that some countries view as “terrorism” while others do not. This 
thesis progress the discussion a step further then was the case in previous 
literatures on the subject.  
 
 
 
Chapter 1 & 2 
Examined peoples actively practise their right to self- determination and 
the linkage between Terrorism, the right to self-determination and 
Liberation Movements (a linkage not full exploded in previous literature).   
 
Chapter 3 
Exploration the legal issues of the accurately labelling and criminalising 
international terrorism. Also comparing International Terrorism with other 
crimes such as armed aggression and organised crimes. 
 
Chapter 4 
Discussion of the use of the concept of Foreign Terrorist Fighters at the 
framework of International Law. The adoption of the resolution 2178 by 
the Security Council with the challenges posed by its implementation in 
the national legal systems summarises many of the themes of the difficult 
collective response to international terrorism. An assessment of the UN 
contribution in countering terrorism highlighted.  Recommendation for 
greater clarity regarding the concept of foreign terrorist fighters as well as 
sufficient procedural safeguards for assessing the selection and labelling 
of  whom is the foreign terrorist fighter.    
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 
Recommendations based on research findings. Chapter 6 
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6.4. Conclusion 
 
In view of the current situation taking place throughout the world, in particular the Middle 
East with regard to the Palestine problem and Kurdish issue for independence, it is highly 
relevant to revisit the concept of self-determination, liberation movements and Terrorism. At 
the end, this thesis are able to carry out some final considerations on the comprehensive 
phenomenon of international terrorism, which today more than ever attracts the attention of 
the entire international community. In the light of the most recent terrorist events claimed by 
the jihadist terrorism of the Islamic State, the States have once again been faced with their 
weaknesses and the inability to effectively counter the terrorist threat. Governments have 
taken note of the limitations and gaps in international law and their internal legislation and 
are working more than ever to resolve issues left unresolved to date. 
At the centre of the problem there is a need for a universally agreed definition of terrorism 
that definitively resolves the debates on the subject in order to standardize international 
cooperation in the fight against terrorism. In fact, this thesis have tried to illustrate how 
conventional law offers a very inconsistent legal framework due to limited and sectorial 
counter-terrorism tools that are not able to respond to the many situations of violence that can 
be hypothesized and which exclude terrorism hypotheses from their field during armed 
conflicts. 
Although a customary norm has emerged that has highlighted some essential elements of the 
crime of international terrorism, at least in times of peace, it does not seem sufficient to cover 
the multiple forms in which terrorism can manifest itself. In this context, the meeting and 
dialogue between States is desirable to complete the draft of a Global Convention on 
International Terrorism, which has been the subject of debate and internal issue at the United 
Nations, which has managed to regulate those gray areas that have remained uncertain for 
many years. Since brings the theme of terrorism back to the scope of the law by delimiting 
the boundaries with respect to conduct deemed legitimate by other sources of criminal, 
military or humanitarian law. 
Although the threat of today's terrorism can certainly not be defeated only through legal 
instruments and legal definitions, the reference to international humanitarian law in the Draft 
of a Global Convention could resolve the question of the relationship between the IHL and 
the international counter-terrorism instruments that have generated uncertainties on the 
classification of acts of terrorism in the hypotheses examined. 
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In fact, after September 11th and the beginning of the so-called "global war on terror", the 
international community also questioned the effectiveness of the UN to face the new 
challenges of terrorism. With this paper we have tried to analyze the aspects related to 
terrorist violence in the course of armed conflicts, which can be implemented by non-state 
groups and even regular armed forces. In the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) there is a 
general ban on carrying out terrorist acts against the civilian population with the aim of 
terrorizing or bending Governments towards a certain political line. In this context, the 
prohibitions are aimed at both civilians and combatants of the state or non-state armed forces, 
whether they are legitimate or illegitimate. Unlike the anti-terrorism Conventions, the IHL 
does not prohibit attacks on enemy combatants or military and government property, and 
indeed there is a real right of legitimate fighters to participate directly in hostilities, without 
prejudice to the prohibition of committing betrayal. 
Numerous problems revolve around the application of the IHL to the violence involving 
terrorist groups in the context of a conflict. States often resort to extensive application 
practices and interpretations of articles 2 and 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 
to frame transnational situations legally in order to extend humanitarian protection. The need 
for the existing categories of conflicts to be adapted through a different interpretation of 
armed conflict or to negotiate a new regime of norms that guarantees greater protection is felt 
by many parties, including the International Red Cross Committee. If these problems of 
classification are added then the fact that states not to bind themselves to the obligations 
imposed by the IHL tend not to recognize the existence of a conflict within them and to 
classify as mere tensions internal hostilities becomes even more complicated framework of 
the repression of terrorism. Indeed, the solution of the issues is left to the understanding of 
the individual States that privilege the national sources and the international anti-terrorist 
treaties of which they belong, which are an alternative regime to that of international 
humanitarian law, rather than cooperating and making effective the instruments of 
international humanitarian law. States could not simply declare that a situation represents an 
armed conflict based on political preferences, but in practice it is what happens. For the time 
being, we can conclude that, despite the uncertainties and unlike international anti-terrorism 
treaties, the IHL is the result of a long and gradual consensus path that offers an adequate 
framework to the contemporary armed conflicts examined, so any attempt by States to 
weaken its brought to avoid the obligations it provides, it seems contradictory and 
meaningless. A clear definition is needed to determine the situations of "terrorism" and to 
clearly distinguish the terrorist from the terrorist is not to be able to determine the application 
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of the relevant regulations. International humanitarian law protects all persons involved in 
armed conflict, including suspected terrorists and those accused or convicted of acts of 
terrorism. 
In the current fight against terrorism, while on the one hand the United States claims to 
employ the IHL of international conflicts, on the other hand they do not feel bound to respect 
many of the obligations prescribed by it and, above all, do not recognize any right to their 
enemies considered terrorists. It would therefore be necessary for states to endeavour to 
respect and implement the existing rules and to ensure that all parties to the conflict, 
including terrorists, respect them, granting them certain rights. The great political, juridical 
and moral challenge consists in finding the way to manage the new forms of violence while 
preserving the already established protection rules to avoid gaps and gaps in protection. 
Finally, the adaptation of international law to new generations of international conflicts and 
changes in international politics is the keystone of the fight against terrorism. A reflection on 
the paramount importance of law and the need to complement national and international laws 
and jurisdictions is a second step in the process of adaptation to arrive at a new international 
order that puts all States on the same equality balance in terms of responsibility, decision-
making power and international commitments. In the unprecedented development of 
international conflicts, it is therefore necessary to adopt a treatment and a policy adapted to 
our time. To update the law, the international community must first take into account the 
specificity of each state, then study and try to solve the underlying causes of international 
crime. However, the task seems difficult when you consider the number of countries 
concerned and their diversity of the representation of States within the UN especially when it 
comes to their decision-making power. Whether, terrorism in a national affair or an 
international affair for the peace of whole humanity it should be tackled in way that would be 
the best for whole humanity. Terrorism should be tackled in such a way that peace and 
prosperity will be seen by the whole world and that peace will also be enjoyed by coming 
generations.  
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